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York Stock Exchange (york + stock_exchange)
Kinds of York Stock Exchange Selected AbstractsCorporate Boards and Company Performance: review of research in light of recent reformsCORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 5 2007David Finegold Recent US corporate governance reforms introduced extensive regulations and guidelines for public corporations, particularly corporate boards. This article evaluates the extent to which empirical research on corporate boards and firm performance supports these reforms. Building on the meta-analysis conducted by Zahra and Pearce (1989), we review 105 studies published between 1989 and 2005. We find most of the practices mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and the regulations issued by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ, had not been subject to prior study. Where board characteristics have been studied, we find limited guidance for policymakers on identifying governance practices that result in more effective firm performance. In an effort to increase the relevance of future research on boards and firm performance, we provide a framework on corporate boards. [source] Underpricing of Foreign and Domestic IPOs in the U.S. Market: Empirical EvidenceFINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, Issue 1 2001Bill Francis Although the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) has been well documented, the underpricing of foreign IPOs have received relatively little attention. In a comparative analysis of foreign and domestic IPOs in the U.S. market for the 1990-1993 period, we find that for a matched sample, foreign IPOs are significantly more underpriced. Our results are consistent with the models developed by Rock (1986), Beatty and Ritter (1986), and Carter and Manaster (1990). Examination of the characteristics of foreign IPOs reveals that they are more likely to be larger in size, employ more prestigious underwriters and are much more likely to list on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). [source] The tick/volatility ratio as a determinant of the compass rose: empirical evidence from decimalisation on the NYSEACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 3 2003Michael D. McKenzie Abstract Recent research suggests that volatility has an important role to play in the appearance of the compass rose pattern. The introduction of decimal prices on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) provides an ideal opportunity to test this hypothesis using actual market data. The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that the 85 per cent reduction in the tick/volatility ratio resulting from the decimalisation of prices was not sufficient to eliminate the compass rose pattern. [source] Changes in Korean Corporate Governance: A Response to CrisisJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2008E. Han Kim In the last months of 1997, the value of the Korean currency lost over half its value against the dollar, and the ruling party was swept from power in presidential elections. One of the fundamental causes of this national economic crisis was the widespread failure of Korean companies to earn their cost of capital, which contributed to massive shareholder losses and calls for corporate governance reform. Among the worst performers, and hence the main targets of governance reform, were family-controlled Korean business groups known as chaebol. Besides pursuing growth and size at the expense of value, such groups were notorious for expropriating minority shareholders through "tunneling" activities and other means. The reform measures introduced by the new administration were a mix of market-based solutions and government intervention. The government-engineered, large-scale swaps of business units among the largest chaebol,the so-called "big deals" that were designed to force each of the groups to identify and specialize in a core business,turned out to be failures, with serious unwanted side effects. At the same time, however, new laws and regulations designed to increase corporate transparency, oversight, and accountability have had clearly positive effects on Korean governance. Thanks to reductions in barriers to foreign ownership of Korean companies, such ownership had risen to about 37% at the end of 2006, up from just 13% ten years earlier. And in addition to the growing pressure for better governance from foreign investors, several newly formed Korean NGOs have pushed for increased transparency and accountability, particularly among the largest chaebol. The best governance practices in Korea today can be seen mainly in three kinds of corporations: (1) newly privatized companies; (2) large corporations run by professional management; and (3) banks with substantial equity ownership in the hands of foreign investors. The improvements in governance achieved by such companies,notably, fuller disclosure, better alignment of managerial incentives with shareholder value, and more effective oversight by boards,have enabled many of them to meet the global standard. And the governance policies and procedures of POSCO, the first Korean company to list on the New York Stock Exchange,as well as the recent recipient of a large equity investment by Warren Buffett,are held up as a model of best practice. At the other end of the Korean governance spectrum, however, there continue to be many large chaebol-affiliated or family-run companies that have resisted such reforms. And aided by the popular resistance to globalization, the lobbying efforts of such firms have succeeded not only in reducing the momentum of the Korean governance reform movement, but in reversing some of the previous gains. Most disturbing is the current push to allow American style anti-takeover devices, which, if successful, would weaken the disciplinary effect of the market for corporate control. [source] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMAN CAPITAL MARKETS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCEJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2001Eric Nowak Financial economists continue to point to Germany as a relatively successful model of a "bank-centered," as opposed to a market-based, economy. But few seem to recognize that, in the years leading up to World War I, German equity capital markets were among the most highly developed in the world. Although there are now only about 750 companies listed on German stock exchanges, in 1914 there were almost 1,200 (as compared to only about 600 stocks then listed on the New York Stock Exchange). Since German reunification in 1990, there have been signs of a possible restoration of the country's equity markets to something like their former prominence. The last 10 years have seen important legal and institutional developments that can be seen as preparing the way for larger and more active German equity markets, together with a more "shareholder-friendly" corporate governance system. In particular, the 1994 Securities Act, the Corporation Control and Transparency Act passed in 1998, and the just released Takeover Act and Fourth Financial Market Promotion Act all contain legal reforms that are essential conditions for well functioning equity markets. Such legal and regulatory changes have helped lay the groundwork for more visible and dramatic milestones, such as the Deutsche Telekom IPO in 1996, the opening of the Neuer Market in 1997, and, perhaps most important, the acquisition in 2000 of Mannesmann by Vodafone, the first successful hostile takeover of a German company. [source] Volatility, Market Structure, and the Bid-Ask Spread,ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Issue 1 2009Kee H. Chung Abstract We test the conjecture that the specialist system on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) provides better liquidity services than the NASDAQ dealer market in times of high return volatility when adverse selection and inventory risks are high. We motivate our conjecture from the observation that there is a designated specialist for each stock on the NYSE who is directly responsible for maintaining a reasonable level of liquidity (i.e., the bid-ask spread) as the ,liquidity provider of last resort' whereas there is no such designated dealer on NASDAQ. Empirical evidence is consistent with our conjecture. In a similar vein, we show that the specialist system provides better liquidity than the dealer market in thin markets. [source] | ||||||||||