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Benchmark Level (benchmark + level)
Selected AbstractsDefinitions of antiretroviral treatment failure for measuring quality outcomesHIV MEDICINE, Issue 7 2010A Samaranayake Objectives Our aim was to compare three different definitions of treatment failure and discuss their use as quality outcome measures for a clinical service. Methods Data for treatment-naïve patients who attended the Melbourne Sexual Health Centre (MSHC) between 1 January 2000 and 31 December 2008 were analysed. Definition 1 was the strict Food and Drug Administration (FDA) definition of treatment failure as determined using the time to loss of virological response (TLOVR) algorithm. Definition 2 defined treatment failure as occurring in those whose viral load never fell to <400 HIV-1 RNA copies/mL or who developed two consecutive viral loads ,400 copies/mL on any treatment (switching or stopping treatment with a viral load <400 copies/mL was permitted). Definition 3 was the same as definition 2 except that individuals were also deemed to have failed if they stopped treatment for 6 months or longer. Results There were 310 antiretroviral-naïve patients who started treatment in the study period. Of these, 156 [50.3%; 95% confidence interval (CI) 42.1,53.3%] experienced treatment failure under definition 1, 10 (3.2%; 95% CI 1.5,5.8%) experienced treatment failure under definition 2, and 16 (4.5%; 95% CI 2.5,7.4%) experienced treatment failure under definition 3 over the 108 months of follow-up. The probability of failing definition 1 was statistically different from the probability of failing definition 2 or 3 (P=0.01). Conclusion There were significant differences in treatment failure for the three definitions. If definition 1 were used, the outcomes would be sufficiently common to enable clinics to be compared but would be less meaningful. If definition 2 or 3 were used, the events would be too rare to enable clinics to be compared, but it would be possible to set a benchmark level of success that clinics could aim to reach. [source] GROWTH AND MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTY IN AN UNREGULATED FISHERYNATURAL RESOURCE MODELING, Issue 3 2009ANNE B. JOHANNESEN Abstract Complete information is usually assumed in harvesting models of marine and terrestrial resources. In reality, however, complete information never exists. Fish and wildlife populations often fluctuate unpredictably in numbers, and measurement problems are frequent. In this paper, we analyze a time-discrete fishery model that distinguishes between uncertain natural growth and measurement error and in which exploitation takes place in an unregulated manner. Depending on the parameterization of the model and at which point of time uncertainty is resolved, it is shown that expected harvest under ecological uncertainty may be below or above that of the benchmark model with no uncertainty. On the other hand, when stock measurement is uncertain, expected harvest never exceeds the benchmark level. We also demonstrate that the harvesting profit, or rent, under uncertainty may be above that of the benchmark situation of complete information. In other words, less information may be beneficial for the fishermen. [source] Multiplicity-Adjusted Inferences in Risk Assessment: Benchmark Analysis with Quantal Response DataBIOMETRICS, Issue 1 2005Daniela K. Nitcheva Summary A primary objective in quantitative risk or safety assessment is characterization of the severity and likelihood of an adverse effect caused by a chemical toxin or pharmaceutical agent. In many cases data are not available at low doses or low exposures to the agent, and inferences at those doses must be based on the high-dose data. A modern method for making low-dose inferences is known as benchmark analysis, where attention centers on the dose at which a fixed benchmark level of risk is achieved. Both upper confidence limits on the risk and lower confidence limits on the "benchmark dose" are of interest. In practice, a number of possible benchmark risks may be under study; if so, corrections must be applied to adjust the limits for multiplicity. In this short note, we discuss approaches for doing so with quantal response data. [source] The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and Market LiquidityFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 3 2008Pankaj K. Jain G14; M41 Abstract Investors rely heavily on the trustworthiness and accuracy of corporate information to provide liquidity to the capital markets. We find that the rash of financial scandals caused a severe deterioration in market liquidity in the form of wider spreads, lower depths, and a higher adverse selection component of spreads vis-à-vis their benchmark levels. Regulatory responses including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) had inconsequential short-term liquidity effects but highly significant and positive long-term liquidity effects. These liquidity improvements are positively associated with the improved quality of financial reports, several firm-specific variables (e.g., size), and market factors (e.g., price, volatility, volume). [source] The Regulation of Public Company Auditing: Evidence from the Transition to AS5JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2010RAJIB DOOGAR ABSTRACT The replacement of Auditing Standard No. 2 (AS2) by Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) creates a natural experiment that sheds light on (1) potential inefficiencies caused by regulatory responses to a political crisis and (2) audit efficiency and effectiveness improvements resulting from the risk-based approach embodied in AS5. We study these effects by examining the impact of AS5 on audit fees. We find that AS5 audit fees are aligned with auditee fraud risk, but not AS2 audit fees. Second, relative to AS2 benchmark levels, AS5 audit fees are, on average, lower for all auditees. Third, relative to AS2 benchmarks, AS5 fees are lower for lower-fraud-risk auditees but greater for higher-fraud-risk auditees. Overall, the evidence is consistent with (1) initial overregulation (via AS2) followed by reform (via AS5) and (2) auditors deploying a risk-based audit approach to obtain both efficiency and potential effectiveness gains in audit production. [source] |