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Belief Task (belief + task)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Psychology75%

Kinds of Belief Task

  • false belief task
    		•

    Selected Abstracts

    Coherence as an Explanation for Theory of Mind Task Failure in Autism

    MIND & LANGUAGE, Issue 3 2002
    Deepthi Kamawar
    O'Loughlin and Thagard (2000) present a specific computational implementation of the idea that the problems encountered by a child with autism in classic False Belief tasks derive from a failure to maintain coherence among multiple propositions. They argue that this failure can be explained as a structural feature of a connectionist network attempting to maintain coherence. The current paper criticizes this implementation because it falsely predicts that the same children will have a parallel problem with the False Photographs task. The fact that the content of representations makes a difference while the structure remains constant casts doubt upon their claim. [source]

    The link between infant attention to goal-directed action and later theory of mind abilities

    DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE, Issue 6 2008
    Gisa Aschersleben
    Various studies have shown that infants in their first year of life are able to interpret human actions as goal-directed. It is argued that this understanding is a precondition for understanding intentional actions and attributing mental states. Moreover, some authors claim that this early action understanding is a precursor of later Theory of Mind (ToM) development. To test this, we related 6-month-olds' performance in an action interpretation task to their performance in ToM tasks at the age of 4 years. Action understanding was assessed using a modified version of the Woodward-paradigm (Woodward, 1999). At the age of 4 years, the same children were tested with the German version of the ToM scale developed by Wellman and Liu (2004). Results revealed a correlation between infants' decrement of attention to goal-directed action and their ability to solve a false belief task at the age of 4 years with no modulation by language abilities. Our results indicate a link between infant attention to goal-directed action and later theory of mind abilities. [source]

    Young children have difficulty ascribing true beliefs

    DEVELOPMENTAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2005
    Kevin J. Riggs
    Using the format of a false belief task (Wimmer & Perner, 1983), we investigated the ability of 88 3- and 4-year-olds to ascribe a previously held true belief to a story protagonist. In an unexpected transfer task, children found true belief ascription as difficult as false belief ascription even though they could answer memory questions about story details. Results are discussed in relation to theoretical accounts of theory of mind development that stress the importance of understanding the falsity of belief, and those accounts that stress the importance of information or executive processes. [source]

    How specific is the relation between executive function and theory of mind?

    INFANT AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT, Issue 2 2002
    Contributions of inhibitory control, working memory
    Abstract The relation between executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM) may involve specific processes of inhibition and/or working memory capacity contributing to ToM, or it might be a reflection of general intellectual ability. To differentiate these alternatives, we administered task batteries measuring inhibitory control (IC), working memory, and ToM, as well as measures of verbal and performance intelligence, to 47 typically developing preschool children. Inhibitory control tasks in which a dominant response needed to be suppressed while a subdominant response was activated (Conflict IC) significantly predicted performance on false belief tasks over and above working memory, the intelligence measures, a simple delay task (Delay IC), and age. In contrast, working memory, Delay IC, and intelligence were not significant in this analysis. Conflict IC, but not Delay IC, was related to working memory. Together, these findings suggest that the combination of inhibition and working memory (as reflected in Conflict IC tasks) may be central to the relation between EF and false belief understanding. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]