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Wage Negotiations (wage + negotiation)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

R&D INVESTMENTS AND SEQUENTIAL WAGE NEGOTIATIONS,

AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 3 2009
JUAN CARLOS BÁRCENA-RUIZ
This paper analyses how the structure of wage bargaining affects R&D investment by firms that increases the productivity of labour in a Cournot duopoly. We find that total expenditure on R&D is greater when wages are set simultaneously than when they are set sequentially. Thus sequential wage negotiations reduce the incentive for firms to innovate and affect the productivity of labour. When wage negotiations are sequential the productivity of labour is greater (lower) in the follower (leader) firm than when negotiations are simultaneous. We also obtain that for same parameter values it is possible for the firm with the lower productivity to end up paying a higher wage than the firm with the higher level of labour productivity. [source]

Fixing minimum wage levels in developing countries: Common failures and remedies

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR REVIEW, Issue 1 2008
Catherine SAGET
Abstract. Some developing countries have set their minimum wages too high or too low to constitute a meaningful constraint on employers. The article compares minimum wages worldwide, proposes several ways of measuring them in developing countries and discusses whether they are effective thresholds in those countries. The second part of the article considers the institutional factors leading countries to set minimum wages at extreme levels. The author concludes that the minimum wage is used as a policy instrument to several ends , wage negotiation, deflation and social dialogue , which results in the absence of a wage floor, weak collective bargaining, or non-compliance. [source]

RAISING WAGES TO DETER ENTRY INTO UNIONIZED MARKETS,

THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2009
SHINGO ISHIGURO
This paper investigates entry under a unionized oligopoly when entry and wage negotiations are sequential. We find the incumbent has incentives to raise the wage, which strengthens the bargaining position of the union relative to the entrant at subsequent negotiations and thus discourages entry. We show that entry is more likely to be deterred (accommodated) if the union is wage (employment) oriented and that raising unemployment compensation during recession not only reduces the burden of the unemployed but also induces new entry, creating more employment opportunities. However, during a business boom, reducing unemployment compensation is a better policy. [source]

R&D INVESTMENTS AND SEQUENTIAL WAGE NEGOTIATIONS,

AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 3 2009
JUAN CARLOS BÁRCENA-RUIZ
This paper analyses how the structure of wage bargaining affects R&D investment by firms that increases the productivity of labour in a Cournot duopoly. We find that total expenditure on R&D is greater when wages are set simultaneously than when they are set sequentially. Thus sequential wage negotiations reduce the incentive for firms to innovate and affect the productivity of labour. When wage negotiations are sequential the productivity of labour is greater (lower) in the follower (leader) firm than when negotiations are simultaneous. We also obtain that for same parameter values it is possible for the firm with the lower productivity to end up paying a higher wage than the firm with the higher level of labour productivity. [source]