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Wage Determination (wage + determination)
Selected AbstractsCommodity Taxes, Wage Determination, and ProfitsJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 2 2001Sophia Delipalla We examine the effects of two different types of commodity taxation, specific and ad valorem, on wages and profits. We analyze two models of wage determination, one with efficiency wage setting and one with union-firm bargaining. In the former, a (locally) revenue-neutral shift from specific to ad valorem taxation leads to an increase in both employment and wages and a reduction in profitability. In the latter, the effect on wages and profits may be reversed: predominantly ad valorem taxation raises employment but lowers wages, and under certain circumstances, the net effect is an increase in profits. [source] Delegation and Wage Determination in Trade UnionsLABOUR, Issue 3 2000Laszlo Goerke Delegation of wage determination is modelled as the transferral of decision-making rights to better-informed agents. The rank and file of trade unions has less information and can, therefore, benefit from delegation. However, delegation might be disadvantageous for union members, since delegates pursue their own objectives. Also, delegates might incur a utility reduction, since becoming a delegate implies forfeiting a better-paid outside option. We investigate under what conditions delegation of wage bargaining power is beneficial for union members and their potential leaders. The wage and employment effects of delegation are derived. [source] The Industrial Tribunals and Wage Determination in the Australian Iron and Steel Industry, 1921,38AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC HISTORY REVIEW, Issue 3 2000Malcolm Abbott It is believed in some quarters that the system of federal and state industrial tribunals in Australia has exercised a considerable impact on the determination of wages in Australia, making the average level of nominal wages more inflexible and wage differentials more equal in the interwar period. The purpose of this paper is to identify, through cross-country comparisons, the impact that the industrial tribunals had on the iron and steel industry labour market, an industry that played a crucial role in Australia's industrial development during the 1920s and 1930s. [source] An Equilibrium Theory of Learning, Search, and WagesECONOMETRICA, Issue 2 2010Francisco M. Gonzalez We examine the labor market effects of incomplete information about the workers' own job-finding process. Search outcomes convey valuable information, and learning from search generates endogenous heterogeneity in workers' beliefs about their job-finding probability. We characterize this process and analyze its interactions with job creation and wage determination. Our theory sheds new light on how unemployment can affect workers' labor market outcomes and wage determination, providing a rational explanation for discouragement as the consequence of negative search outcomes. In particular, longer unemployment durations are likely to be followed by lower reemployment wages because a worker's beliefs about his job-finding process deteriorate with unemployment duration. Moreover, our analysis provides a set of useful results on dynamic programming with optimal learning. [source] Commodity Taxes, Wage Determination, and ProfitsJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 2 2001Sophia Delipalla We examine the effects of two different types of commodity taxation, specific and ad valorem, on wages and profits. We analyze two models of wage determination, one with efficiency wage setting and one with union-firm bargaining. In the former, a (locally) revenue-neutral shift from specific to ad valorem taxation leads to an increase in both employment and wages and a reduction in profitability. In the latter, the effect on wages and profits may be reversed: predominantly ad valorem taxation raises employment but lowers wages, and under certain circumstances, the net effect is an increase in profits. [source] Delegation and Wage Determination in Trade UnionsLABOUR, Issue 3 2000Laszlo Goerke Delegation of wage determination is modelled as the transferral of decision-making rights to better-informed agents. The rank and file of trade unions has less information and can, therefore, benefit from delegation. However, delegation might be disadvantageous for union members, since delegates pursue their own objectives. Also, delegates might incur a utility reduction, since becoming a delegate implies forfeiting a better-paid outside option. We investigate under what conditions delegation of wage bargaining power is beneficial for union members and their potential leaders. The wage and employment effects of delegation are derived. [source] Inter-industry Wage Differences and Individual Heterogeneity,OXFORD BULLETIN OF ECONOMICS & STATISTICS, Issue 5 2004Alan Carruth Abstract Two well-established findings are apparent in the analyses of individual wage determination: cross-section wage equations can account for less than half of the variance in earnings and there are large and persistent inter-industry wage differentials. We explore these two empirical regularities using longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). We show that around 90% of the variation in earnings can be explained by observed and unobserved individual characteristics. However, small , but statistically significant , industry wage premia do remain, and there is also a role for a rich set of job and workplace controls. [source] One Hundred Years of British Minimum Wage LegislationBRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 2 2009Simon Deakin The Trade Boards Act 1909 was a landmark in the development of minimum wage regulation in Britain and around the world. Although their powers were limited, the trade boards had immediate and tangible effects in terms of raising living standards, and over time they became a core part of the system of state support for collective wage determination. While influential overseas, the wages councils (as the trade boards became after 1945) were eventually seen as providing only a partial solution to the problem of low pay. In the 1980s, their powers were reduced under the influence of deregulatory labour market policies, prior to their abolition in 1993. The British national minimum wage (,NMW'), which was introduced in 1998, despite appearances, is not a universal national minimum of the kind which the Webbs and other Fabian writers argued for a century ago. Notwithstanding a growing consensus that the supposed negative economic effects of the minimum wage have not been borne out by the experience of the NMW, public policy has yet to take fully on board its potential benefits, including the reduction of social costs and the promotion of social partnership. [source] Social Partnership and Local Development in Ireland: The Limits to DeliberationBRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 3 2006Paul Teague The Irish model of social partnership is considered distinctive as it is based on the principles of deliberative democracy more than adversarial bargaining. The deliberative features of the model are considered to be threefold. First, the negotiations to conclude national social agreements are not confined to the government, trade unions and employers, but also include a wide range of civil associations. Second, agreements are not simply concerned with wage determination, but cover a wide range of matters designed to promote social inclusion. Third, there is an effort to avoid agreements being overly centralized by promoting programmes at the local, territorial level. This paper examines the validity of this argument by assessing efforts to forge a local dimension to the social partnership model. The conclusions suggest that while the model has improved the delivery of public services, it is premature to claim that Irish social partnership represents a new model of labour market governance based on deliberative democracy. [source] |