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Wage Contracts (wage + contract)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting87%

Selected Abstracts

Risk Aversion and the Efficiency Wage Contract

LABOUR, Issue 1 2004
Ouassila Chouikhi
This could be due to informational problems. Reformulating the Shapiro and Stiglitz model as a sequential game, this paper examines the relations between the terms of the efficiency wage contract offered by a firm and the responses of a worker, under incomplete information about the degree of risk aversion of the firm and the worker. It shows that under incomplete information about the degree of risk aversion of the worker, shirking can emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon. For any efficiency wage contract, a worker will shirk if the degree of risk aversion of the worker is less than that corresponding to the contract. [source]

Pay Policies of Firms and Collective Wage Contracts,An Uneasy Partnership?

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 1 2006
KNUT GERLACH
Theoretical considerations suggest that firms establish consistent internal wage structures and pay wage premiums of similar size across occupational groups. Strong evidence for the existence of coherent employer pay policies across occupations is found using a German employer,employee data set. However, firm-specific elements of wage policies are less prevalent in firms applying industry-level collective contracts than in firms with individual-level wage contracts. [source]

Risk Aversion and the Efficiency Wage Contract

LABOUR, Issue 1 2004
Ouassila Chouikhi
This could be due to informational problems. Reformulating the Shapiro and Stiglitz model as a sequential game, this paper examines the relations between the terms of the efficiency wage contract offered by a firm and the responses of a worker, under incomplete information about the degree of risk aversion of the firm and the worker. It shows that under incomplete information about the degree of risk aversion of the worker, shirking can emerge as an equilibrium phenomenon. For any efficiency wage contract, a worker will shirk if the degree of risk aversion of the worker is less than that corresponding to the contract. [source]

Seasonality and Wage Responsiveness in a Developing Agrarian Economy

OXFORD BULLETIN OF ECONOMICS & STATISTICS, Issue 2 2004
Sunil Kanwar
Abstract This paper studies the wage responsiveness of labour supply and demand, simultaneously addressing the twin issues of the non-clearing of developing rural labour markets and seasonality. It employs a data set pertaining to south-central India, and limits itself to the agricultural market for daily-rated labour (by far the predominant form of wage contract in the sample villages). Estimating a theoretically robust and empirically justified disequilibrium model of the agricultural labour market, we find no evidence of backward-bending supply curves or ,vertical' demand curves, contrary to findings in the literature. Further, while the agricultural labour market appears to be in equilibrium during the kharif (or rainy) season, it manifests excess supply in the rabi (or post-rainy) season. [source]

Pay Policies of Firms and Collective Wage Contracts,An Uneasy Partnership?

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 1 2006
KNUT GERLACH
Theoretical considerations suggest that firms establish consistent internal wage structures and pay wage premiums of similar size across occupational groups. Strong evidence for the existence of coherent employer pay policies across occupations is found using a German employer,employee data set. However, firm-specific elements of wage policies are less prevalent in firms applying industry-level collective contracts than in firms with individual-level wage contracts. [source]

Tenant characteristics and the choice of tenurial contracts in rural India

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, Issue 2 2001
Ananish Chaudhuri
Existing theoretical models of land tenancy predict that more experienced workers will be offered tenancy contracts while the less experienced ones will be offered wage contracts. Using data from three Indian villages we map from the set of agent and plot-level characteristics to the set of contracts offered on each plot. We find that tenants are older than wage labourers. In the set of tenants, older workers tend to be cash renters. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

On-the-job leisure as a cause of asymmetric observed-effort distributions

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 6 2006
David L. DickinsonArticle first published online: 18 SEP 200
When employers observe imperfect measures of worker effort, theorists typically assume that observed effort is unimodal and symmetrically distributed. Though observable effort may be distributed in different ways within a work day, for example, available field data on these effort distributions are rare. The symmetry assumption is largely untestable as a result. This paper presents empirical data from two experimental work environments that question the validity of such assumptions. For these piece-rate work environments the author finds that observed effort is significantly negatively-skew (i.e. modal>mean effort). The author's hypothesis is that on-the-job leisure causes this skewness in observed effort distributions. There are both theoretical and practical implications of this asymmetry. Some implications from the theoretical agency literature that we discuss include: self-selection into rank-order tournaments, optimal wage spreads in rank-order tournaments, and optimal wage contracts with asymmetric information. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Political Business Cycles and Central Bank Independence*

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 486 2003
John Maloney
This paper develops a dynamic model of Rational Partisan Business Cycles in which wage contracts overlap elections and wage setters have to make a prediction about the election result. Empirical analysis of 20 OECD countries supports the theoretical implication that left wing incumbents increase output, but increased expectation of a left wing regime reduces it. The model is extended to incorporate the effects of alternative measures of Central Bank Independence (CBI). The measure of objective independence outperforms the other measures and it is found that CBI reduces politically induced business cycles. [source]