Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Wage Bargaining (wage + bargaining)
Selected AbstractsOptimal Factor Taxation under Wage Bargaining: A Dynamic PerspectiveGERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2008Erkki Koskela Optimal taxation; imperfectly competitive labour markets; capital accumulation Abstract. We consider the issue of steady-state optimal factor taxation in a Ramsey-type dynamic general equilibrium setting with two distinct distortions: (i) taxes on capital and labour are the only available tax instruments for raising revenues and (ii) labour markets are subject to an inefficiency resulting from wage bargaining. If considered in isolation, the two distortions create conflicting demands on the wage tax, while calling for a zero capital tax. By combining the two distortions, we arrive at the conclusion that both instruments should be used, implying that the zero capital tax result in general is no longer valid under imperfectly competitive labour markets. [source] Centralized Wage Bargaining and the "Celtic Tiger" PhenomenonINDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 3 2007LUCIO BACCARO Drawing on a variety of sources and research methods, this article argues that centralized wage bargaining contributed to the "Celtic Tiger" phenomenon by linking wage increases in the dynamic multinational companies sector to wage and productivity increases in the much more sluggish domestic sector of the economy and, in so doing, considerably increased the competitiveness of foreign multinational companies,a key driver of Irish growth. The article also argues that much-received wisdom about the institutional and organizational preconditions for centralized wage regulation needs to be reconsidered in light of the Irish case. Public sector unions played a pivotal role in initiating and sustaining wage centralization, yet their leadership role did not undermine its effectiveness. Likewise, internal democratic procedures and the absence of wage compression policies, rather than centralized organizational structures, facilitated compliance with centralized wage policies. [source] Welfare Effects of Local versus Central Wage BargainingLABOUR, Issue 1 2010Marcus Dittrich The paper analyses the welfare effects of union bargaining (de)centralization in a dual labour market with a unionized and a competitive sector. We show that social welfare depends on both the structure of the union's objective function and the elasticities of labour demand in both sectors. The welfare-maximizing employment allocation can be obtained under a high degree of centralization if the union maximizes the total wage-bill. Otherwise, if the union is rent maximizing, welfare is higher under local bargaining. However, in that case neither central nor local wage setting yields the social optimum. [source] The Organisation of Wage Bargaining in Divisionalised FirmsAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 3 2002Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz This paper analyses the organisation of wage bargaining in multiproduct firms since it affects the distribution of power between workers and firms. We assume that each firm has two plants and chooses who bargains the wage with the workers: either the head of the firm or the manager of each plant. Similarly, in each firm, its workers choose whether they set up plant unions or a single union. [source] Optimal Factor Taxation under Wage Bargaining: A Dynamic PerspectiveGERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2008Erkki Koskela Optimal taxation; imperfectly competitive labour markets; capital accumulation Abstract. We consider the issue of steady-state optimal factor taxation in a Ramsey-type dynamic general equilibrium setting with two distinct distortions: (i) taxes on capital and labour are the only available tax instruments for raising revenues and (ii) labour markets are subject to an inefficiency resulting from wage bargaining. If considered in isolation, the two distortions create conflicting demands on the wage tax, while calling for a zero capital tax. By combining the two distortions, we arrive at the conclusion that both instruments should be used, implying that the zero capital tax result in general is no longer valid under imperfectly competitive labour markets. [source] Centralized Wage Bargaining and the "Celtic Tiger" PhenomenonINDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 3 2007LUCIO BACCARO Drawing on a variety of sources and research methods, this article argues that centralized wage bargaining contributed to the "Celtic Tiger" phenomenon by linking wage increases in the dynamic multinational companies sector to wage and productivity increases in the much more sluggish domestic sector of the economy and, in so doing, considerably increased the competitiveness of foreign multinational companies,a key driver of Irish growth. The article also argues that much-received wisdom about the institutional and organizational preconditions for centralized wage regulation needs to be reconsidered in light of the Irish case. Public sector unions played a pivotal role in initiating and sustaining wage centralization, yet their leadership role did not undermine its effectiveness. Likewise, internal democratic procedures and the absence of wage compression policies, rather than centralized organizational structures, facilitated compliance with centralized wage policies. [source] Trade Unions, Wage Bargaining Coordination, and Foreign Direct InvestmentLABOUR, Issue 4 2008Roxana Radulescu Conventional wisdom is that a high trade union bargaining strength and a system of coordinated wage bargaining reduce the attractiveness of an economy as a location for foreign direct investment, although there is limited evidence for this. The paper takes panel data for 19 OECD economies to examine the relationship between trade union bargaining strength, bargaining coordi nation, and a range of incentives for inward foreign direct investment. It finds a strong negative effect of trade union density on inward foreign direct investment, which is dependent on the degree of wage bargaining coordination. A high degree of coordination weakens the deterrent effect of high union density, which is consistent with the notion that under certain circumstances a coordinated increase in wages can increase profits of the multinationals by hurting domestic firms. [source] Wage formation and employment in a cointegrated VAR modelTHE ECONOMETRICS JOURNAL, Issue 2 2001Thórarinn G. Pétursson This paper uses a general equilibrium, monopolistic competition model of wage bargaining between trade unions and firms to derive two steady state relations which are estimated within a cointegrated VAR framework using quarterly Danish data. The first cointegrating relation is the marginal productivity condition for labour, derived from profit maximization of firms who face a downward sloping demand curve for their product. The second cointegrating relation is a real wage relation, derived from the bargaining between trade unions and firms over wages, in the right-to-manage manner. The theoretical model is not rejected and the model displays parameter constancy throughout the estimation period and is able to forecast out-of-sample. [source] R&D INVESTMENTS AND SEQUENTIAL WAGE NEGOTIATIONS,AUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 3 2009JUAN CARLOS BÁRCENA-RUIZ This paper analyses how the structure of wage bargaining affects R&D investment by firms that increases the productivity of labour in a Cournot duopoly. We find that total expenditure on R&D is greater when wages are set simultaneously than when they are set sequentially. Thus sequential wage negotiations reduce the incentive for firms to innovate and affect the productivity of labour. When wage negotiations are sequential the productivity of labour is greater (lower) in the follower (leader) firm than when negotiations are simultaneous. We also obtain that for same parameter values it is possible for the firm with the lower productivity to end up paying a higher wage than the firm with the higher level of labour productivity. [source] Gender Earnings and Part-Time Pay in Australia, 1990,1998BRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 3 2003Alison Preston This paper studies the effects of enterprise bargaining on the pay position of women and other target equity groups. Contrary to a priori expectations the paper shows a convergence in full-time and part-time gross gender pay gaps following the adoption of decentralized wage bargaining. Convergence in the latter reflects compositional (human capital) effects: the entry of less qualified and less experienced males into part-time employment. Overall the results show a deterioration in the pay position of men employed full-time relative to women and part-timers (men and women) brought about by slower wage growth amongst men in full-time employment. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||