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Voting Rights (voting + right)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting62%
Humanities and Social Sciences37%

Selected Abstracts

ZIMBABWE: IMF Restores Voting Rights

AFRICA RESEARCH BULLETIN: ECONOMIC, FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL SERIES, Issue 2 2010
Article first published online: 1 APR 2010
No abstract is available for this article. [source]

Taming the Tiger: Voting Rights and Political Instability in Latin America

LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 2 2004
Josep M. Colomer
ABSTRACT This article discusses the relationship between certain institutional regulations of voting rights and elections, different levels of electoral participation, and the degree of political instability in several Latin American political experiences. A formal model specifies the hypotheses that sudden enlargements of the electorate may provoke high levels of political instability, especially under plurality and other restrictive electoral rules, while gradual enlargements of the electorate may prevent much electoral and political innovation and help stability. Empirical data illustrate these hypotheses. A historical survey identifies different patterns of political instability and stability in different countries and periods, which can be compared with the adoption of different voting rights regulations and electoral rules either encouraging or depressing turnout. [source]

Price Differentials between Dual-class Stocks: Voting Premium or Liquidity Discount?

EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2003
Robert Neumann
G32; G34 Abstract A series of papers suggest that private benefits can explain the price differentials between stock classes carrying different voting rights. However, in Denmark the premium is negative for several firms over long periods. This indicates that in the absence of takeover contests, where the voting right becomes crucial in a transfer of corporate control, the price differential in stock classes with identical dividend rights is more likely to reflect investors' liquidity risks. Whereas the existing literature tends to focus primarily on corporate control-related explanations, this paper documents the impact of liquidity on price spreads between dual-class shares. [source]

Two Faces of Liberalism: Kant, Paine, and the Question of Intervention

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2008
Thomas C. Walker
Compared with the realist tradition, relatively few students of international relations explore variations within liberalism. This paper introduces a particular interpretation of Immanuel Kant's evolutionary liberalism and then compares it with Thomas Paine's revolutionary liberalism. Paine was an ebullient optimist while Kant was more guarded and cautious. These different assumptions lead to distinct liberal views on voting rights, how trade fosters peace, and defense policies. The most striking disagreement, and one that endures in contemporary liberal circles, revolves around the question of military interventions to spread democratic rule. Kant advocated nonintervention while Paine actively pursued military intervention to spread democratic rule. Differences between Kant and Paine represent some enduring tensions still residing within the liberal tradition in international relations. [source]

Large Shareholder Entrenchment and Performance: Empirical Evidence from Canada

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1-2 2008
Yves Bozec
Abstract:, Recent empirical evidence indicates that the largest publicly traded companies throughout the world have concentrated ownership. This is the case in Canada where voting rights are often concentrated in the hands of large shareholders, mostly wealthy families. Such concentrated ownership structures can generate specific agency problems, such as large shareholders expropriating wealth from minority shareholders. These costs are aggravated when large shareholders don't bear the full costs of their decisions because of the presence of mechanisms (dual class voting shares, pyramids) which lead to voting rights being greater than the cash flow rights (separation). We assess the impact of separation on various performance metrics while controlling for situations when the large shareholder has (1) the opportunity to expropriate (high free cash flows in the firm) and (2) the incentive to expropriate (low cash flow rights). We also control for when the large shareholder has the power to expropriate (high voting rights, outright control and insider management) and for the presence of family ownership. The results support our hypotheses and indicate that firm performance is lower when large shareholders have both the incentives and the opportunity to expropriate minority shareholders. [source]

To Signal or to Control: The Determinants of Open-Market Share Repurchases in Japan,

ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Issue 1 2009
Dong Keun Choi
Abstract Using listed firm-level data in the Tokyo Stock Exchange for the 1995,2006 period, we show that ultimate owners of firms with large cash flow and voting rights deviations announce and repurchase stocks more aggressively than do those of firms with small deviations. We also find that Keiretsu (business group)-affiliated firms are most aggressive in repurchasing their own shares when large deviations exists between cash flow rights and voting rights. Consistent with the view of the takeover deterrence hypothesis, our findings suggest that firms with greater deviations in these two rights are likely to make large stock repurchases to increase both the cost of toehold and the price of the offer. [source]