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Voting Decisions (voting + decision)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	57%
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	42%

Selected Abstracts

Party loyalty as habit formation

JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMETRICS, Issue 3 2003
Ron Shachar
In most democracies, at least two out of any three individuals vote for the same party in sequential elections. This paper presents a model in which vote-persistence is partly due to the dependence of the utility on the previous voting decision. This dependence is termed ,habit formation'. The model and its implications are supported by individual-level panel data on the presidential elections in the USA in 1972 and 1976. For example, it is found that the voting probability is a function of the lagged choice variable, even when the endogeneity of the lagged variable is accounted for, and that the tendency to vote for different parties in sequential elections decreased with the age of the voter. Furthermore, using structural estimation the effect of habit is estimated, while allowing unobserved differences among respondents. The structural habit parameter implies that the effect of previous votes on the current decision is quite strong. The habit model fits the data better than the traditional ,party identification' model. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Determinants of Voter Support for a Five-Year Ban on the Cultivation of Genetically Modified Crops in Switzerland

JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2008
Felix Schläpfer
D62; D72; Q26 Abstract While much effort has been devoted to estimating market premiums for non-genetically modified (GM) food, the results of such research are largely silent about the preferences for the public good aspects, or externalities, of GM food production. For public goods, the closest substitute of private consumption decisions is voting on referenda. In November 2005, 55.7% of 2 million Swiss voters approved a five-year moratorium (ban) on the commercial cultivation of GM plants in Switzerland. The present study examines how individual voting decisions were determined by: (i) socioeconomic characteristics; (ii) political preference/ideology; and (iii) agreement with a series of arguments in favour and against the use of GM plants in Swiss agriculture. The analysis is based on the data of the regular voter survey undertaken after the national-level voting in Switzerland. The results suggest that current concerns about the use of genetically engineered plants in agriculture may not automatically decrease with higher levels of education/knowledge and generational change. Furthermore, analysis of voter motives suggests that public support for a ban on GM crops may be even larger in other countries, where industrial interests in crop biotechnology are less pronounced. [source]

Asymmetric Equilibria in a Model with Costly Voting

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 1 2007
FRANCESCO DE SINOPOLI
Most of the voting models limit their analysis to the investigation of symmetric equilibria where "similar" voters make "similar" voting decisions. In this paper we examine the validity of this restriction in a model with costly plurality voting. We first show that in any pure strategy equilibrium every two individuals who have the same preferences and participate in elections, would vote for the same candidate. However, this result does not hold for mixed strategies equilibria. [source]

Political Parties and Governors as Determinants of Legislative Behavior in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies, 1988,2006

LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 1 2009
José Antonio Cheibub
ABSTRACT This article examines the relative importance of regional and national forces in shaping the behavior of Brazilian legislators at the national level. A widely held view is that national legislators respond to state pressures in making decisions, rather than pressures from the national government. Governors not only can influence national debates but also can determine outcomes by exerting control over their states' legislative delegations. This article examines a dataset of all roll-call votes in the Chamber of Deputies between 1989 and 2006 to isolate and evaluate the impact of local pressures on legislative voting. Spanning the terms of five presidents and five different congresses, the data show that the local influence is weaker than the national on the voting decisions of individual legislators and the voting cohesion of state delegations. Alternative institutional resources allow the central government to counteract the centrifugal pressures of federalism and other institutional influences. [source]

"I'm Not Prejudiced, but . . .": Compensatory Egalitarianism in the 2008 Democratic Presidential Primary

POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 4 2010
Corinne Moss-Racusin
The historic 2008 Democratic presidential primary race between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton posed a difficult choice for egalitarian White voters, and many commentators speculated that the election outcome would reflect pitting the effects of racism against sexism (Steinem, 2008). Because self-reported prejudices may be untrustworthy, we used the Implicit Association Test (IAT) to assess White adults' (1) condemnation of prejudices, and (2) attitudes toward the candidates in relation to voting decisions, as part of an online survey. Results supported the proposed compensatory egalitarianism process, such that Whites' voting choice was consistent with their implicit candidate preference, but in an effort to remain egalitarian, participants compensated for this preference by automatically condemning prejudice toward the other candidate's group. Additional findings showed that this process was moderated by participants' ethnicity and level of prejudice, as expected. Specifically, compensatory egalitarianism occurred primarily among Whites and individuals low in explicit prejudice. Implications for candidate support, aversive racism theory, and implicit compensation processes are discussed. [source]

Educating the Least Informed: Group Endorsements in a Grassroots Campaign

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 4 2009
Kevin Arceneaux
Theories of low-information rationality claim that uninformed voters can compensate for their lack of political knowledge by employing heuristics, such as interest group endorsements, to make voting decisions as if they were fully informed. Critics of low-information rationality contend that politically unaware voters are unlikely to use group endorsements effectively as a heuristic since they are unlikely to know the political relevance of interest groups. We address this debate by entertaining the possibility that contextual information coupled with a source cue may enhance the effectiveness of group endorsements as a heuristic. We test competing expectations with a field experiment conducted during the 2006 election in two highly competitive Pennsylvania statehouse races where a well-known liberal interest group endorsed Democratic candidates and canvassed both core supporters and Republicans believed to be likeminded. Our results reveal that Republicans used the endorsement as a negative voting cue and that the group's endorsement helped some Republicans compensate for their lack of awareness about politics. [source]

Does Voting History Matter?

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2009
Analysing Persistence in Turnout
Individuals who vote in one election are more likely to vote in the next. Yet modelling the causal relationship between past and current voting decisions is intrinsically difficult, as this positive association can exist due to habit formation or unobserved heterogeneity. This article overcomes this problem using longitudinal data from the British National Child Development Study (NCDS) to examine voter turnout across three elections. It distinguishes between unobserved heterogeneity caused by fixed individual characteristics and the initial conditions problem, which occurs when voting behavior in a previous, but unobserved, period influences current voting behavior. It finds that, controlling for fixed effects, unobserved heterogeneity has little impact on the estimated degree of habit in voter turnout; however, failing to control for initial conditions reduces the estimate by a half. The results imply that voting in one election increases the probability of voting in a subsequent election by 13%. [source]