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Kinds of Voters Terms modified by Voters Selected AbstractsThe Myth of the Rational Voter , By Bryan CaplanPOLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 1 2010Andrew Gelman First page of article [source] From individual attitudes towards migrants to migration policy outcomes: Theory and evidenceECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 56 2008Giovanni Facchini SUMMARY Attitudes and migration policy We are experiencing a wave of globalization that includes everything but labour. In this paper, we argue that this is the result of restrictive migration policies implemented by destination countries. In democratic societies individual attitudes of voters represent the foundations of policy making. To understand policy outcomes, we analyse the patterns and determinants of voters' opinions on immigration. We find that, across countries of different income levels, only a small minority of voters favour more open policies. Furthermore, our analysis supports the role played by economic channels in shaping public opinion. We next investigate how attitudes translate into policy outcomes, considering two alternative frameworks: the median voter and the interest groups model. On the one hand, the very low percentages of voters favouring immigration are, in light of the existing restrictive policies, consistent with the median voter framework. At the same time, given the extent of opposition to immigration that appears in public opinion, it is somewhat surprising in a median voter framework that immigration takes place at all. We find that interest-groups dynamics have the potential to explain this puzzle. , Giovanni Facchini and Anna Maria Mayda [source] THE NON-TRADED SECTOR, LOBBYING, AND THE CHOICE BETWEEN THE CUSTOMS UNION AND THE COMMON MARKETECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2008CYRILLE SCHWELLNUS This paper models immigration policy as the outcome of political competition between interest groups representing individuals employed in different sectors. In standard positive theory, restrictive immigration policy results from a low-skilled median voter voting against predominantly low-skilled immigration. In the present paper, in contrast, once trade policies are liberalized, restrictive immigration policy results from anti-immigration lobbying by interest groups representing the non-traded sectors. It is shown that this is in line with empirical regularities from recent episodes of restrictive immigration legislation in the European Union. It is further shown that if governments negotiate bilaterally over trade and migration policy regimes, the equilibrium regime depends (i) on the sequencing of the international negotiation process and (ii) on the set of available trade and migration policy regimes. In particular, the most comprehensive and most welfare-beneficial type of liberalization may be rejected only because a less comprehensive type of liberalization is available. [source] IS INEQUALITY HARMFUL FOR THE ENVIRONMENT IN A GROWING ECONOMY?ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 1 2007HUBERT KEMPF In this paper, we investigate the relationship between inequality and the environment in a growing economy from a political-economy perspective. We consider an endogenous growth economy, where growth generates pollution and a deterioration of the environment. Public expenditures may either be devoted to supporting growth or abating pollution. The decision over the public programs is made in a direct democracy, with simple majority rule. We prove that the median voter is decisive and show that inequality is harmful for the environment: the poorer the median voter relative to the average individual, the less she will tax and devote resources to the environment, preferring to support growth. [source] Campaign War Chests, Entry Deterrence, and Voter RationalityECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2002Dhammika Dharmapala It is often claimed that the accumulation of "war chests" by incumbents deters entry by high,quality challengers in Congressional elections. This paper presents a game,theoretic analysis of the interaction between an incumbent, potential challengers, an interest group, and a representative (rational) voter, where the incumbent's "quality" (or "legislative effectiveness") is known to the interest group, but not to the voter or to potential challengers. Under certain conditions, a perfectly revealing equilibrium exists; the incumbent signals her quality by raising funds from the interest group to accumulate a war chest. The entry deterrence effect thus operates solely through the role of war chests in signaling incumbent quality. [source] From doves to hawks: A spatial analysis of voting in the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of EnglandEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 6 2010SIMON HIX This article examines the making of monetary policy in the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2008 by analysing voting behaviour in the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). It provides a new set of measures for the monetary policy preferences of individual MPC members by estimating a Bayesian item response model. The article demonstrates the usefulness of these measures by comparing the ideal points of outgoing MPC members with their successors and by looking at changes over time in the median ideal point on the MPC. The analysis indicates that the British Government has been able to move the position of the median voter on the MPC through its appointments to the Committee. This highlights the importance of central bank appointments for monetary policy. [source] Systemic polarisation and spatial votingEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 6 2010SERGI PARDOS-PRADO The controversy between proximity and directional models of issue voting has not been settled. Instead of appointing an ultimate winner, this article explores the conditioning impact of the level of systemic polarisation and provides evidence that proximity is a more relevant determinant of voter behaviour in less polarised systems, whereas there is a centrifugal and directional dynamic in more polarised contexts. By so doing, the article shows how a largely forgotten notion , namely Sartori's idea of the spatial elasticity of the political spectrum , leads to different spatial viewpoints. In distinguishing between party (supply side) and voter (demand side) polarisation, this framework provides a comprehensive picture about the conditions that turn a centripetal electoral dynamic into a purely centrifugal one. [source] Lobbying with conflicting interests: Norwegian local-central relationsEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2008LEIF HELLAND A total of 239 interactions are studied. Survey responses by a large number of voters and politicians, as well as registry data on fiscal standing, demographics and elections are utilised. Two of the main predictions of the costly lobbying model gain support in the data. The probability of obtaining substantial discretionary funding from the central level increases: with decreasing conflict of interest between local and central politicians; and with the lobbying cost incurred by local politicians. For a given conflict and cost, however, the rate of lobbying success depends crucially on structural characteristics of the municipality. In particular, the success rate is significantly higher for poor municipalities located in national electoral districts with many seats per voter than for rich municipalities located in districts with few seats per voter. [source] Centralisation versus Decentralisation of Public Policies: Does the Heterogeneity of Individual Preferences Matter?,FISCAL STUDIES, Issue 1 2008Carlo Mazzaferro This paper explores the role of the heterogeneity of fiscal preferences in the assignment of policy tasks to different levels of government (decentralisation versus centralisation). With reference to a sample of European countries, a median-voter mechanism of collective decision is assumed to work at both a national and a supranational level. Using data from a large international survey (the International Social Survey Programme, ISSP), a series of econometric models are estimated in order to make individual attitudes representative of different categories of public expenditure and of different countries. The dominance of decentralisation over centralisation or vice versa is determined on the basis of the utility loss that each individual suffers in connection with the distance between his or her own most preferred level of public expenditure and that chosen by the national/supranational median voter. The main finding is that, differently from the predictions of Oates's decentralisation theorem, the assignment of responsibilities at the supranational level (centralisation) for a number of public expenditure programmes (healthcare, education, unemployment benefits) dominates (or is close to dominating) decentralisation, even in the absence of economies of scale and interregional spillovers. However, when the possibility of interjurisdictional mobility is explicitly considered, in line with the predictions of Tiebout's model, decentralisation dominance becomes more and more substantial and also prevails in the sectors where, under the nonmobility assumption, the assignment of responsibilities at the supranational level is efficient. [source] Office-seeking politicians, interest groups and split contributions in a campaign finance modelINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 4 2007Shino Takayama D72; D82; M37 The present paper investigates an extended version of Prat's campaign finance models. In this model, interest groups make contributions to politicians to influence policy decisions. Voters are assumed to judge candidates on two aspects: policy promises and nonpolicy personal qualities referred to as valence. There are two types of voters. Among these, uninformed voters only observe campaign contributions that take the role of a signaling medium. We solve the equilibrium of the game between politicians and interest groups. We then specify conditions under which a separating equilibrium exists and study the effect of split contributions on the welfare of the median voter. [source] Immigration as Local Politics: Re-Bordering Immigration and Multiculturalism through Deterrence and IncapacitationINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN AND REGIONAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2009LIETTE GILBERT Small town governments in North America have, in recent years, posed the most aggressive challenge to national immigration policy and multiculturalism. Immigration-related municipal ordinances were introduced by local officials to defend the rights of local residents from the adverse effects of (unauthorized) immigration. Municipal measures proposed to control im/migrants not only present a constitutional challenge to the federal pre-emption in matters of immigration law (which ineptitude they purport to redress), they expand on what Didier Bigo called a ,governmentality of unease', where migration is increasingly rationalized as a security problem. Municipal measures are re-bordering the inclusion/exclusion of (unauthorized) migrants by expanding the territorial and political rationality of immigration control from the border to the interior, and by imposing and dispersing new mechanisms of control into the everyday spaces and practices of im/migrants regarded as ,illegal' and undesirable. This article examines two immigration-related municipal measures (Hazleton, PA and Hérouxville, QC) which impose a logic of immigration control and identity protection through deterrence and incapacitation strategies, and thus erode civil rights of im/migrants. Résumé Certaines petites municipalités nord-américaines ont récemment bousculé les politiques d'immigration nationales et le multiculturalisme. Les autorités locales en question ont fait voter des arrêtés municipaux liés à l'immigration afin de défendre les droits de leurs concitoyens contre les perceptions néfastes de l'immigration (irrégulière). Tout en représentant un défi constitutionnel à l'égard de la préemption fédérale en matière de législation sur l'immigration (dont l'inadéquation est censée être corrigée), les propositions municipales de contrôler les (im)migrants prolongent ce que Didier Bigo a appelé une ,gouvernementalité du malaise' qui voit de plus en plus la migration comme un problème de sécurité. Les mesures municipales redessinent les limites de l'inclusion-exclusion des migrants (irréguliers) en amenant, de la frontière jusqu'à l'intérieur, la logique territoriale et politique propre au contrôle de l'immigration, tout en imposant et en diffusant de nouveaux mécanismes de contrôle dans les pratiques et espaces quotidiens des (im)migrants jugés ,illégaux' et indésirables. L'article étudie deux mesures municipales liées à l'immigration (à Hazleton en Pennsylvanie et à Hérouxville au Québec), lesquelles dictent une logique de contrôle de l'immigration et de protection identitaire au travers de stratégies de dissuasion et de création d'incapacités; ce faisant, ces dispositions amoindrissent les droits civils des (im)migrants. [source] Party loyalty as habit formationJOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMETRICS, Issue 3 2003Ron Shachar In most democracies, at least two out of any three individuals vote for the same party in sequential elections. This paper presents a model in which vote-persistence is partly due to the dependence of the utility on the previous voting decision. This dependence is termed ,habit formation'. The model and its implications are supported by individual-level panel data on the presidential elections in the USA in 1972 and 1976. For example, it is found that the voting probability is a function of the lagged choice variable, even when the endogeneity of the lagged variable is accounted for, and that the tendency to vote for different parties in sequential elections decreased with the age of the voter. Furthermore, using structural estimation the effect of habit is estimated, while allowing unobserved differences among respondents. The structural habit parameter implies that the effect of previous votes on the current decision is quite strong. The habit model fits the data better than the traditional ,party identification' model. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Taking Television Seriously: A Sound and Image Bite Analysis of Presidential Campaign Coverage, 1992,2004JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, Issue 4 2007Erik P. Bucy This study updates and builds on Hallin's landmark investigation of sound-bite news by documenting the prevalence of candidate image bites, where candidates are shown but not heard (as opposed to being shown and heard), in general election news over 4 election cycles. A visual analysis of broadcast network (ABC, CBS, and NBC) news coverage of the 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004 U.S. presidential elections finds that image bites constituted a greater percentage of total campaign coverage than sound bites, with candidates appearing in image bites significantly more than sound bites. Even as candidate sound bites continue to shrink over time, image-bite time is increasing in duration,and candidates are being presented in image bites almost twice as much as journalists. Sound bites are also found to be largely attack and issue focused. Based on these findings, we call for greater appreciation of visual processing, nonverbal communication, and voter learning from television news in the study of media and politics. Résumé Prendre la télévision au sérieux : Une analyse des clips sonores et visuels de la couverture des campagnes électorales présidentielles, 1992-2004 Cette étude met à jour et raffine l,enquête qu'avait faite Hallin sur les clips sonores d,actualités en documentant la prévalence des clips visuels des candidats, dans lesquels ceux-ci sont montrés mais non entendus (par opposition àêtre montrés et entendus), dans les bulletins d'information sur les élections générales au travers de quatre cycles électoraux. Une analyse visuelle de la couverture par les bulletins d,information des réseaux de télédiffusion (ABC, CBS et NBC) des élections présidentielles américaines de 1992, 1996, 2000 et 2004 démontre que les clips visuels ont constitué un plus grand pourcentage de la couverture électorale totale que les clips sonores, les candidats apparaissant plus fréquemment (de façon significative) dans les clips visuels que dans les clips sonores. Alors que les clips sonores des candidats ne cessent de raccourcir au fil du temps, la durée des clips visuels augmente , et les candidats sont présentés dans des clips visuels dans une proportion presque deux fois plus grande que les journalistes. L'étude démontre également que les clips sonores sont largement centrés sur les attaques et les enjeux. D'après ces résultats, nous réclamons une plus grande compréhension du traitement visuel, de la communication non verbale et de l,apprentissage que font les électeurs à partir des bulletins de nouvelles, dans l'étude des médias et de la politique. Abstract Fernsehen ernst nehmen: Eine Analyse der Sound und Bild Bites der Präsidentschaftskampagnenberichterstattung 1992-2004 Diese Untersuchung basiert auf und erweitert die zentrale Studie von Hallin zu Sound Bite Nachrichten, indem sie über 4 Wahlzyklen hinweg die Verbreitung von Kandidaten Bild Bites dokumentiert. Bild Bites sind dabei Nachrichtenteile, in denen die Kandidaten zwar sichtbar, aber nicht hörbar sind (im Gegensatz zu sichtbar und hörbar). Eine visuelle Analyse der Nachrichtenberichterstattung zu den Präsidentschaftswahlen von 1992, 1996, 2000 und 2004 auf ABC, CBS und NBC zeigte, dass Bild Bites einen größeren Anteil der Kampagnengesamtberichterstattung ausmachen als Sound Bites, und dass die Kandidaten signifikant häufiger in Bild Bites erscheinen als in Sound Bites. Auch wenn die Zahl der Sound Bites der Kandidaten über die Jahre hinweg abnahmen, nehmen die Bild Bites in diesem Zeitraum zu - und Kandidaten werden in Bild Bites fast doppelt so oft gezeigt wie Journalisten. Sound Bites konzentrieren sich inhaltlich außerdem eher auf Angriffe und Themen. Basierend auf diesen Ergebnissen, fordern wir eine Konzentration auf die Untersuchung von visueller Verarbeitung, nonverbaler Kommunikation und dem Aspekt des Lernens von Fernsehnachrichten in der Erforschung von Medien und Politik. Resumen Tomando a la Televisión Seriamente: Un Análisis de los fragmentos de Sonido e Imagen de la Cobertura de Campañas Presidenciales, 1992-2004 Este estudio actualiza y extiende la investigación pionera de Hallin sobre los fragmentos de sonidos de noticias a través de la documentación de la prevalencia de las imágenes fragmentadas de los candidatos, en las cuales los candidatos fueron mostrados pero no escuchados (en vez de ser mostrados y escuchados), en las noticias de las elecciones generales durante 4 ciclos electivos. Un análisis visual de la cobertura de noticias de las redes de televisión (ABC, CBS, y NBC) y de las elecciones presidenciales de los Estados Unidos de 1992, 1996, 2000, y 2004 encontró que los fragmentos de imágenes, más que los de los sonidos, constituían un gran porcentaje de la cobertura total de la campaña, con los candidatos apareciendo más significativamente en los fragmentos de imágenes que en los fragmentos de sonido. Aún cuando los fragmentos de sonidos de los candidatos continúan reduciéndose a través del tiempo, el tiempo del fragmento de la imagen está incrementando en duración-y los candidatos son presentados en fragmentos de imágenes casi dos veces más que los periodistas. Los fragmentos de sonido, en su mayoría, se enfocan en ataques y asuntos. Basados en estos resultados, hacemos un llamado a la apreciación del procesamiento visual, de la comunicación no-verbal, y del aprendizaje del votante por medio de las noticias televisivas en el estudio de los medios y la política. ZhaiYao Yo yak [source] Voting on Pensions: A SurveyJOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS, Issue 2 2005Grégory De Walque Abstract., The paper presents a nonexhaustive survey of the literature designed to explain emergence, size and political sustainability of pay-as-you-go pension systems. It proposes a simple framework of analysis (a small, open, two overlapping generation economy model), around which some variants are displayed. Dictatorship of the median voter is assumed. The text is organized to answer the following questions: (i) Do political equilibria with PAYG pension schemes exist? (ii) Why do they emerge? (iii) What are the conditions for the participation constraint of the pension game to be verified?, and finally, (iv) What is the size of the pension system chosen by the median voter and how is this size influenced by an exogenous (e.g. demographic) shock? [source] Indecision Theory: Weight of Evidence and Voting BehaviorJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2006PAOLO GHIRARDATO In this paper, we show how to incorporate weight of evidence, or ambiguity, into a model of voting behavior. We do so in the context of the turnout decision of instrumentally rational voters who differ in their perception of the ambiguity of the candidates' policy positions. Ambiguity is reflected by the fact that the voter's beliefs are given by a set of probabilities, each of which represents in the voter's mind a different possible scenario. We show that a voter who is averse to ambiguity considers abstention strictly optimal when the candidates' policy positions are both ambiguous and they are "ambiguity complements." Abstaining is preferred since it is tantamount to mixing the prospects embodied by the two candidates, thus enabling the voter to "hedge" the candidates' ambiguity. [source] THE FUTURE TRAJECTORY OF U.S. CO2 EMISSIONS: THE ROLE OF STATE VS.JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2007AGGREGATE INFORMATION ABSTRACT This paper provides comparisons of a variety of time-series methods for short-run forecasts of the main greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, for the United States, using a recently released state-level data set from 1960,2001. We test the out-of-sample performance of univariate and multivariate forecasting models by aggregating state-level forecasts versus forecasting the aggregate directly. We find evidence that forecasting the disaggregate series and accounting for spatial effects drastically improves forecasting performance under root mean squared forecast error loss. Based on the in-sample observations we attempt to explain the emergence of voluntary efforts by states to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. We find evidence that states with decreasing per capita emissions and a "greener" median voter are more likely to push toward voluntary cutbacks in emissions. [source] Elections and Economic Turbulence in Brazil: Candidates, Voters, and InvestorsLATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 4 2006Anthony P. Spanakos ABSTRACT The relation between elections and the economy in Latin America might be understood by considering the agency of candidates and the issue of policy preference congruence between investors and voters. The preference congruence model proposed in this article highlights political risk in emerging markets. Certain risk features increase the role of candidate campaign rhetoric and investor preferences in elections. When politicians propose policies that can appease voters and investors, elections may have a limited effect on economic indicators, such as inflation. But when voter and investor priorities differ significantly, deterioration of economic indicators is more likely. Moreover, voter and investor congruence is more likely before stabilization, when an inverted Philips curve exists, as opposed to following stabilization, when a more traditional Philips curve emerges. [source] Minority Representation and Majority-Minority Districts after Shaw v. Reno: Legal Challenges, Empirical Evidence and Alternative ApproachesPOLITICS & POLICY, Issue 2 2001Michael A. Smith One of the most vexing problems of American federalism is the process by which representatives get elected from the respective states. This paper discusses the muddled precedent on gerrymandering established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Shaw v. Reno and upheld in subsequent cases. After conditionally upholding gerrymandering for political purposes in Davis v. Bandemer, the Court now rejects racial gerrymandering if the resulting districts have a particularly contorted appearance on a map. These rulings lack a clear definition of representation, though the Court has hinted that it may be necessary to move beyond the stark procedural view of one-person, one-vote. Although the concept of substantive representation may seem difficult to apply at first, it may be operationalized by considering the chances that a voter or coalition has of influencing an election. Given the obvious preferences of legislators and parties for "safe seats," along with this vague Court precedent, voters may be tempted to refer districting controversies to nonpartisan or bipartisan commissions. [source] Don't Forget to Vote: Text Message Reminders as a Mobilization ToolAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 4 2009Allison Dale Current explanations of effective voter mobilization strategies maintain that turnout increases only when a potential voter is persuaded to participate through increased social connectedness. The connectedness explanation does not take into account, however, that registered voters, by registering, have already signaled their interest in voting. The theory presented in this article predicts that impersonal, noticeable,messages can succeed in increasing the likelihood that a registered voter will turn out by reminding the recipient that Election Day is approaching. Text messaging is examined as an example of an impersonal, noticeable communication to potential voters. A nationwide field experiment (n = 8,053) in the 2006 election finds that text message reminders produce a statistically significant 3.0 percentage point increase in the likelihood of voting. While increasing social connectedness has been shown to positively affect voter turnout, the results of this study, in combination with empirical evidence from prior studies, suggest that connectedness is not a necessary condition for a successful mobilization campaign. For certain voters, a noticeable reminder is sufficient to drive them to the polls. [source] The Role of Indigenous Peoples in Guatemalan Political Advertisements: An Ethnographic Content AnalysisCOMMUNICATION, CULTURE & CRITIQUE, Issue 3 2010Colleen Connolly-Ahern This study investigates the current status of indigenous peoples within Guatemalan society, as articulated in one of the most relevant forms of modern communication, political advertising, and defined by one of the most relevant forms of self-expression to the indigenous peoples of Guatemala, the traje. Using ethnographic content analysis, the study examines the roles and characterizations of indigenous people in 67 television commercials from across the Guatemalan political spectrum. Results indicate that indigenous people are most often seen as "crowd members," and are never given important roles, such as "candidate endorser" or "undecided voter." Overall, wearing traje is associated with helplessness and separateness. The commercials of Q'iché Maya candidate Rigoberta Menchú exhibited many of the same characteristics of other candidates. Le rôle des peuples autochtones dans les publicités politiques guatémaltèques : une analyse de contenu ethnographique Colleen Connolly-Ahern & Antoni Castells i Talens Cette étude explore le statut actuel des peuples autochtones dans la société guatémaltèque, telle qu'elle est articulée dans l'une des formes les plus appropriées de communication moderne, les publicités politiques, et telle que définie par l'une des formes d'expression des peuples autochtones du Guatemala les plus pertinentes, le «traje». Par une analyse de contenu ethnographique, l'étude explore les rôles et les représentations des peuples autochtones dans 67 publicités télévisées couvrant le spectre politique du Guatemala. Les résultats indiquent que les peuples autochtones sont le plus souvent vus comme des «membres de la foule». Ils n'ont jamais de rôles importants comme celui de «partisan d'un candidat» ou d'«électeur indécis'. Dans l'ensemble, le port du «traje» est associéà l'impuissance et à la différence. Les publicités de la candidate maya k'iche' Rigoberta Menchú présentaient plusieurs des mêmes caractéristiques que celles des autres candidats. El Rol de las Personas Indígenas en la Publicidad Política de Guatemala: Un Análisis de Contenido Etnográfico Colleen Connolly-Ahern & Antoni Castells i Talens Advertising and Public Relations College of Communications, Penn State University, State College, PA 16802, USA Resumen Este estudio investiga el estado corriente de las personas indígenas dentro de la sociedad Guatemalteca, articulado en una de las formas más relevantes de la comunicación moderna, la publicidad política, y definido por una de las formas más relevantes de auto expresión de las personas Indígenas de Guatemala, el traje. Usando un análisis de contenido etnográfico, este estudio examina los roles y las caracterizaciones de las personas indígenas en 67 comerciales de televisión a través del espectro político Guatemalteco. Los resultados indican que las personas indígenas son vistas más a menudo como "miembros de la multitud'' y nunca se les da roles importantes tales como ,,el candidato de la representación'' o ,,el votante indeciso. '' En general, el uso del traje está asociado con la impotencia y la separación. Los comerciales de la candidata Q'ich,e Maya Rigoberta Menchú exhibieron muchas de las mismas características de los otros candidatos. [source] Demographic change and the demand for environmental regulationJOURNAL OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2002Matthew E. Kahn Environmental regulation in the United States has increased pollution abatement expenditure as a percentage of gross national product from 1.7 percent in 1972 to an estimated 2.6 percent in the year 2000. This rise in regulation has coincided with demographic and economic changes that include rising educational levels, a growing minority population, an aging population, and decreasing employment in polluting industries. This paper examines whether these trends have contributed to increasing aggregate demand for environmental regulation. New evidence on voting on environmental ballots in California, local government environmental expenditures across the United States, and 25 years of congressional voting on environmental issues is examined to document the demographic correlates of environmental support. Minorities and the more educated are more pro-green, whereas manufacturing workers oppose environmental regulation. While demographics help explain observed differences in environmental support and thus can help predict long trends in the "average voter's" environmentalism, environmentalism varies substantially year to year unrelated to population demographics. © 2002 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management. [source] Indecision Theory: Weight of Evidence and Voting BehaviorJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2006PAOLO GHIRARDATO In this paper, we show how to incorporate weight of evidence, or ambiguity, into a model of voting behavior. We do so in the context of the turnout decision of instrumentally rational voters who differ in their perception of the ambiguity of the candidates' policy positions. Ambiguity is reflected by the fact that the voter's beliefs are given by a set of probabilities, each of which represents in the voter's mind a different possible scenario. We show that a voter who is averse to ambiguity considers abstention strictly optimal when the candidates' policy positions are both ambiguous and they are "ambiguity complements." Abstaining is preferred since it is tantamount to mixing the prospects embodied by the two candidates, thus enabling the voter to "hedge" the candidates' ambiguity. [source] Plebiscites, Fiscal Policy and the Poor: Learning from US Experience with Direct DemocracyDEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 5 2005Arthur A. Goldsmith Many countries are contemplating direct political participation as a way of giving marginalised people more say in national fiscal policies. The United States is a natural laboratory for studying how large-scale direct democracy actually works in this regard. Every state allows voters to decide certain ballot questions about how to raise and spend public revenue. The 100-year record shows, however, that state-wide plebiscites fail to produce uniformly equitable or financially sustainable government budgets, or to mobilise low-income groups to defend their economic interests. When called upon to make decisions about state government spending, the electorate is apt to disregard any hardship for poor people. Traditional political parties and advocacy organisations are usually a more promising avenue for promoting anti-poverty budgets. [source] Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive CandidatesECONOMETRICA, Issue 4 2003Ronny Razin In this paper we focus on strategic voting behavior when both an election and a signaling motivation affect voters' behavior. We analyze a model of elections with two candidates competing on a one-dimensional policy space. Voters are privately and imperfectly informed about a common shock affecting the electorate's preferences. Candidates are assumed to choose policy in response to information gleaned from election results and according to exogenous factors that may lead to polarization in candidates' policy choices. We analyze a subset of symmetric equilibria in which strategies are symmetric to candidates' names and private signals (CSS equilibria). We show that signaling and election motivations pull voters to vote in different directions. We provide conditions that show the relation between the amount of information aggregated in the election and the motivation that influences voting behavior the most. Finally, we show that when candidates are responsive and polarized, all CSS equilibria are inefficient in the limit. [source] THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS AND THE FRENCH/DUTCH REJECTION OF THE EU CONSTITUTIONECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 1 2006Jean-Luc Migué In seeking to protect their failed social model by rejecting the EU constitution, French and Dutch voters ironically contributed to promoting the very ,liberal' order they misunderstand and despise. When, as in federalist politics, functions overlap, two levels of government compete for the same votes in the same territory in the supply of similar services. Not unlike the tragedy of the commons in oil extraction, it is in the interest of both political authorities to seek to gain votes in implementing the programme first. The overall equilibrium supply of public services is excessive and both levels of government have a tendency to invade every field. Short of effective constitutional limits on the powers of the central government, a more decentralised EU offers an opportunity to overcome the common-pool problem of multi-level government. [source] From individual attitudes towards migrants to migration policy outcomes: Theory and evidenceECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 56 2008Giovanni Facchini SUMMARY Attitudes and migration policy We are experiencing a wave of globalization that includes everything but labour. In this paper, we argue that this is the result of restrictive migration policies implemented by destination countries. In democratic societies individual attitudes of voters represent the foundations of policy making. To understand policy outcomes, we analyse the patterns and determinants of voters' opinions on immigration. We find that, across countries of different income levels, only a small minority of voters favour more open policies. Furthermore, our analysis supports the role played by economic channels in shaping public opinion. We next investigate how attitudes translate into policy outcomes, considering two alternative frameworks: the median voter and the interest groups model. On the one hand, the very low percentages of voters favouring immigration are, in light of the existing restrictive policies, consistent with the median voter framework. At the same time, given the extent of opposition to immigration that appears in public opinion, it is somewhat surprising in a median voter framework that immigration takes place at all. We find that interest-groups dynamics have the potential to explain this puzzle. , Giovanni Facchini and Anna Maria Mayda [source] Lessons for an ageing society: the political sustainability of social security systemsECONOMIC POLICY, Issue 38 2004Vincenzo Galasso SUMMARY Politics, ageing and pensions What is the future of social security systems in OECD countries? We suggest that the answer belongs to the realm of politics, and evaluate how political constraints and ageing shape the social security system. The increasing ratio of retirees to workers lowers the rate of returns of unfunded pay-as-you-go social security, and induces citizens to prefer smaller such systems and a larger role for private savings. An ageing electorate, however, increases the relevance of pension spending on the agenda of office-seeking policy-makers and tends to increase the size of unfunded pension systems. Calibrating the strength of these effects for France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the UK and the US, we find that the latter political aspect always outweighs the former. The relative size of the effects depends on country-specific characteristics and modelling details: when labour market distortions are accounted for the political effect still dominates but becomes less sizeable; the different redistributive character of pension systems and the strength of family ties also play a role in determining politico-economic outcomes. A higher effective retirement age always decreases the size of the system chosen by the voters, often increases its generosity, and may be the only viable solution to pension system problems in the face of population ageing. [source] POLICY COMPROMISES: CORRUPTION AND REGULATION IN A DEMOCRACYECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2008TOKE S. AIDT This paper evaluates the extent of regulation in a democracy with corruption. Elected politicians can restrict entry of firms in exchange for bribes from entrepreneurs. Full liberalization implies free entry and allocative efficiency. Voters re-elect politicians based on observed performance. We demonstrate that voters agree to tolerate corruption and inefficient regulation; that efficient policies can be promoted by productivity growth; that productivity growth reduces the cost of providing wage incentives; and that corruption is procyclical and economic policy is countercyclical in a corrupt democracy. [source] ON THE ROLE OF THE PRIMARY SYSTEM IN CANDIDATE SELECTIONECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2006MANDAR P. OAK How does the type of the primary system affect political outcomes? We address this issue by constructing a simple model that accounts for intra-party as well as inter-party political competition. Our model suggests that allowing non-partisan voters to participate in the primaries (i.e. a semi-open primary system) indeed improves the chances of a moderate candidate getting elected. However, this need not necessarily happen in the case of a completely open primary system. Under such a system there arise multiple equilibria, some of which may lead to a greater degree of extremism than the closed primary system. Thus, our model contributes to the current debate on the choice of primary systems from an analytical perspective and helps explain some of the empirical findings. [source] INEQUALITY, REDISTRIBUTION, AND RENT-SEEKINGECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2004Francisco Rodríguez This paper presents a non-median voter model of redistribution in which greater inequality leads to lower redistribution. Bargaining between interest groups and politicians over exemptions implies that individuals with sufficiently high income will not pay taxes in equilibrium. Therefore, voters will set tax rates low enough so as to control the incentives for rent-seeking. An increase in inequality, by putting more income in the hands of individuals that can buy exemptions, will lead to lower equilibrium redistribution. The model can be used to account for a negative relationship between inequality and growth and provides a new explanation of why the poor do not expropriate the rich in democracies. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||