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Vickrey Auction (vickrey + auction)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting75%

Selected Abstracts

Package Auctions and Exchanges

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 4 2007
Paul Milgrom
We report recent advances concerning the package allocation problem, in which traders seek to buy or sell combinations of goods. The problems are most difficult when some goods are not substitutes. In that case, competitive equilibrium typically fail to exist but the core is non-empty and comprises the competitive solutions. Also in that case, the Vickrey auction fails to select core allocations and yield revenues that are less than competitive. The Ausubel-Milgrom auction generally selects core allocations and, when goods are substitutes, prescribes the Vickrey allocation. We also evaluate the problems and promise of mechanisms for the package exchange problem. [source]

Parental response to health risk information: experimental results on willingness-to-pay for safer infant milk formula

HEALTH ECONOMICS, Issue 5 2009
Isabell Goldberg
Abstract Enterobacter sakazakii, a pathogen that can be found in powdered infant milk formula, can cause adverse health effects on infants. Using Vickrey auction, this study examines parents' willingness to pay (WTP) for a quality assurance label on powdered infant milk formula. The influence of ambiguity with the incidence rate information and provision of safe-handling information on WTP are also evaluated using three experimental treatments. Our findings generally imply that parents significantly value a quality assurance label. The mean price premium parents are willing to pay for the safer and quality assurance labelled powdered infant milk formula ranges from 61 to 133 Eurocents per 100 grams (53,116% of the base price per 100 grams) depending on the treatment. While no ambiguity effects are generally found, provision of safe-handling information significantly reduced WTP to 39,69 Eurocents per 100 grams depending on the treatment. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Multiunit Pay-Your-Bid Auction with One-Dimensional Multiunit Demands*

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2003
Bernard Lebrun
An arbitrary number of units of a good is sold to two bidders through a discriminatory auction. The bidders are homogeneous ex ante and their demand functions are two-step functions that depend on a single parameter. We characterize the symmetric Bayesian equilibrium and prove its existence and uniqueness. We compare this equilibrium with the equilibrium of the multiunit Vickrey auction and with the equilibria of the single-unit first price and second price auctions. We examine the consequences of bundling all units into one package. We study the impacts that variations of the "relative" supply have on the equilibrium, on the bidders' average payoffs per unit, and on the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation. [source]

An experimental examination of demand reduction in multi-unit versions of the Uniform-price, Vickrey, and English auctions

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 6 2006
David Porter
Demand reduction in Uniform-price and English auctions are strategic reactions by participants to reduce price and thus increase potential profits. Laboratory experiments similar to the field experiments performed by List and Reiley (Am. Econ. Rev. 2000; 9(4): 961,972) in which two individuals with demands for two units vie for two units through a Uniform-price, English or Vickrey auction are conducted. We find strong support for demand reduction in both the English and Uniform-price auctions, with significantly more dramatic reductions in the English auction. However, there is significant overbidding in both the Vickrey and Uniform-price auction. This overbidding solves a puzzle found by List and Reiley in their field experiment data. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]