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Virtue Ethics (virtue + ethics)
Selected AbstractsIMAGINING CONFUCIUS: PARADIGMATIC CHARACTERS AND VIRTUE ETHICSJOURNAL OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2005SOR-HOON TAN [source] BHAGAVAD G,TÄ€ AS DUTY AND VIRTUE ETHICSJOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 3 2006Some Reflections ABSTRACT The paper examines the ethical conception of the most well-known and much discussed Hindu text, the Bhagavad G,t,, in the context of the Western distinction between duty ethics and virtue ethics. Most of the materials published on the G,t, make much of its conception of duty; however, there is no systematic investigation of the notion of virtue in the G,t,. The paper begins with a discussion of the fundamental characteristics of virtue ethics, before undertaking a discussion of the conceptions of duty and virtue in the G,t,. The paper clearly demonstrates that (1) both duty and virtue coexist in the G,t,, and (2) the G,t, accords virtue an important place. [source] AN ARISTOTELIAN ACCOUNT OF VIRTUE ETHICS: AN ESSAY IN MORAL TAXONOMYPACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2007SEAN MCALEER My account is Aristotelian because it avoids the excessive inclusivity of Martha Nussbaum's account and the deficient inclusivity of Gary Watson's account. I defend the account against the objection that Aristotle does not have a virtue ethics by its lights, and conclude with some remarks on moral taxonomy. [source] The Unhappy Marriage of Care Ethics and Virtue EthicsHYPATIA, Issue 4 2006Maureen Sander-Staudt The proposal that care ethic(s) (CE) be subsumed under the framework of virtue ethic(s) (VE) is both promising and problematic for feminists. Although some attempts to construe care as a virtue are more commendable than others, they cannot duplicate a freestanding feminist CE. Sander-Staudt recommends a model of theoretical collaboration between VE and CE that retains their comprehensiveness, allows CE to enhance VE as well as be enhanced by it, and leaves CE open to other collaborations. [source] Confucian Ethics and Virtue EthicsJOURNAL OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2001Wong Wai-Ying [source] Truth-telling, honesty and compassion: A virtue-based exploration of a dilemma in practiceINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF NURSING PRACTICE, Issue 5 2008Ann M Begley In this paper a discussion of the strengths of a virtue-based approach to ethics in nursing is discussed. Virtue ethics is often depicted as vague and lacking in any convincing application to the reality of practice. It is argued that exploring issues from a virtue perspective offers the possibility of a sensitive moral response which is grounded in the context of the client and his family. Far from being vague, virtue ethics offers guidance in practice, but this guidance acknowledges the complexity of individual lives as opposed to the impartiality and abstract nature of traditional moral theory, rules and principles. The vehicle for discussion is a case in practice. The position presented here is that in taking account of the salient features of each individual case, withholding the truth from adults with a life threatening illness can be justified for compassionate reasons. [source] From CR-psychopaths to responsible corporations: waking up the inner Sleeping Beauty of companiesCORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2006Tarja Ketola Many large companies seem to fulfil the psychiatric criteria for psychopaths in their corporate responsibility (CR) practices. Are they really incurable psychopaths, or is it possible that they could be counselled into accepting their responsibilities? CR studies have so far paid little attention to the variations in the CR emphases between different companies. This article, based on a conference paper (Ketola, 2005b), presents a CR emphasis model, pinpointing eight different approaches to corporate responsibility. Some companies do not voluntarily take any responsibilities. Companies acting like psychopaths need a Prince of Virtues to kiss awake their inner Sleeping Beauty from its 100-year irresponsibility sleep. All companies could take advantage of virtue ethics, which present the values shared by all humans, and hence exemplify the natural law (lex naturae). Counselling top managers and key individuals on their personal and professional values enables all personnel to integrate virtues into the company's CR practices. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source] Virtues and Oppression: A Complicated RelationshipHYPATIA, Issue 3 2008MARILYN FRIEDMAN This paper raises some minor questions about Lisa Tessman's book, Burdened Virtues. Friedman's questions pertain, among other things, to the adequacy of a virtue ethical focus on character, the apparent implication of virtue ethics that oppressors suffer damaged characters and are not any better off than the oppressed, the importance of whether privileged persons may have earned their privileges, and the oppositional anger that movement feminists sometimes direct against each other. [source] Reconciling situational social psychology with virtue ethicsINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT REVIEWS, Issue 3 2008Surendra Arjoon For the past four decades, debate has occurred in respect of situational social psychology and virtue ethics. This paper attempts to reconcile this debate. Situationists propose a fragmentation theory of character (each person has a whole range of dispositions, each of which has a restricted situational application) and do not subscribe to a regularity theory of character (behaviour is regulated by long-term dispositions). In order to support this view, they cite a number of experiments. It is proposed that the substantive claims made by situationist social psychologists, for the most part, do not undermine or disagree with an Aristotelian virtue ethics perspective, but stem from a misunderstanding of concepts of moral character, faulty conclusions and generalizations in respect of experimental results. Situationists take a narrow view of character and morality. Evidence from organizational behaviour and managerial research literature supports the view that both situational (organizational) features and inner characteristics (including virtues) are powerful influences and determinants of morally upright and morally deviant behaviour. The role of practical judgement in bridging these views is discussed. As a way forward in reconciling situational social psychology with virtue ethics, the paper proposes an Aristotelian,Thomistic framework to overcome some of the problems associated with inadequate regulative ideals in building a normative moral theory. [source] Mindsets, rationality and emotion in Multi-criteria Decision AnalysisJOURNAL OF MULTI CRITERIA DECISION ANALYSIS, Issue 4 2005Fred WenstøpArticle first published online: 21 SEP 200 Abstract This paper discusses the paradigm of multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA), and relates it to other disciplines. It concludes that MCDA needs a larger, not smaller, emphasis on values and subjectivity to increase rationality in decision-making. The paper bases the argument on a conciliation of ethics, philosophy, neuro-psychology and management paradigms. It observes that the MCDA ,mindset' relates to consequentialism, as opposed to virtue ethics and rule based ethics. Virtues and rules play an important role in practical decision-making, however. Findings in neuro-psychology show that reliable decision-making requires emotions. Elicitation of emotions is therefore required in MCDA value trade-off processes. This leads to a concept of emotional rationality, which defines rationality as a four-dimensional concept that includes well-founded values and breaks radically with common notions of rationality. Virtues do not easily lend themselves to value trade-off, but questions of virtue usually creates strong social emotions, as opposed to the feebler global emotions that may arise in connection conventional trade-off of end values. The conclusion is that MCDA should not be shy of subjectivity and emotion, but instead put more emphasis on it to increase rationality. A part of this challenge is how to deal with questions of virtue in decision-making. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] BHAGAVAD G,TÄ€ AS DUTY AND VIRTUE ETHICSJOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 3 2006Some Reflections ABSTRACT The paper examines the ethical conception of the most well-known and much discussed Hindu text, the Bhagavad G,t,, in the context of the Western distinction between duty ethics and virtue ethics. Most of the materials published on the G,t, make much of its conception of duty; however, there is no systematic investigation of the notion of virtue in the G,t,. The paper begins with a discussion of the fundamental characteristics of virtue ethics, before undertaking a discussion of the conceptions of duty and virtue in the G,t,. The paper clearly demonstrates that (1) both duty and virtue coexist in the G,t,, and (2) the G,t, accords virtue an important place. [source] ANTHROPOS AND ETHICS Categories of Inquiry and Procedures of ComparisonJOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 2 2005Thomas A. Lewis ABSTRACT Building on influential work in virtue ethics, this collection of essays examines the categories of self, person, and anthropology as foci for comparative analysis. The papers unite reflections on theory and method with descriptive work that addresses thinkers from the modern West, Christian and Jewish Late Antiquity, early China, and other settings. The introduction sets out central methodological issues that are subsequently taken up in each essay, including the origin of the categories through which comparison proceeds, the status of these categories in the process of comparison, and the goals of comparison. In considering the question of goals, the introduction draws connections between comparative study and historical study within one tradition. Both types of analysis can bridge the gap between historical and normative work by attending to the ways in which the questions a scholar asks,not just the answers found,vary from one context to another. [source] Passion and Reason: Aristotelian Strategies in Kierkegaard's EthicsJOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS ETHICS, Issue 2 2002Norman Lillegard Both Aristotle and Kierkegaard show that virtues result, in part, from training which produces distinctive patterns of salience. The "frame problem" in AI shows that rationality requires salience. Salience is a function of cares and desires (passions) and thus governs choice in much the way Aristotle supposes when he describes choice as deliberative desire. Since rationality requires salience it follows that rationality requires passion. Thus Kierkegaard is no more an irrationalist in ethics than is Aristotle, though he continues to be charged with irrationalism. The compatibility of an Aristotelian reading of Kierkegaard with the "suspension of the ethical" and general problems with aretaic ethical theories are treated briefly. The author argues that it is possible to preserve a realist ethics in the face of the "tradition relativism" which threatens the version of virtue ethics here attributed to Kierkegaard. [source] Scepticism about the virtue ethics approach to nursing ethicsNURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2010D.Phil, Stephen Holland MA (Oxon) Abstract Nursing ethics centres on how nurses ought to respond to the moral situations that arise in their professional contexts. Nursing ethicists invoke normative approaches from moral philosophy. Specifically, it is increasingly common for nursing ethicists to apply virtue ethics to moral problems encountered by nurses. The point of this article is to argue for scepticism about this approach. First, the research question is motivated by showing that requirements on nurses such as to be kind, do not suffice to establish virtue ethics in nursing because normative rivals (such as utilitarians) can say as much; and the teleology distinctive of virtue ethics does not transpose to a professional context, such as nursing. Next, scepticism is argued for by responding to various attempts to secure a role for virtue ethics in nursing. The upshot is that virtue ethics is best left where it belongs , in personal moral life, not professional ethics , and nursing ethics is best done by taking other approaches. [source] Towards a strong virtue ethics for nursing practiceNURSING PHILOSOPHY, Issue 3 2006Alan E. Armstrong rn(g) ba(hons) ma phd Abstract, Illness creates a range of negative emotions in patients including anxiety, fear, powerlessness, and vulnerability. There is much debate on the ,therapeutic' or ,helping' nurse,patient relationship. However, despite the current agenda regarding patient-centred care, the literature concerning the development of good interpersonal responses and the view that a satisfactory nursing ethics should focus on persons and character traits rather than actions, nursing ethics is dominated by the traditional obligation, act-centred theories such as consequentialism and deontology. I critically examine these theories and the role of duty-based notions in both general ethics and nursing practice. Because of well-established flaws, I conclude that obligation-based moral theories are incomplete and inadequate for nursing practice. I examine the work of Hursthouse on virtue ethics' action guidance and the v-rules. I argue that the moral virtues and a strong (action-guiding) version of virtue ethics provide a plausible and viable alternative for nursing practice. I develop an account of a virtue-based helping relationship and a virtue-based approach to nursing. The latter is characterized by three features: (1) exercising the moral virtues such as compassion; (2) using judgement; and (3) using moral wisdom, understood to include at least moral perception, moral sensitivity, and moral imagination. Merits and problems of the virtue-based approach are examined. I relate the work of MacIntyre to nursing and I conceive nursing as a practice: nurses who exercise the virtues and seek the internal goods help to sustain the practice of nursing and thus prevent the marginalization of the virtues. The strong practice-based version of virtue ethics proposed is context-dependent, particularist, and relational. Several areas for future philosophical inquiry and empirical nursing research are suggested to develop this account yet further. [source] AN ARISTOTELIAN ACCOUNT OF VIRTUE ETHICS: AN ESSAY IN MORAL TAXONOMYPACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 2 2007SEAN MCALEER My account is Aristotelian because it avoids the excessive inclusivity of Martha Nussbaum's account and the deficient inclusivity of Gary Watson's account. I defend the account against the objection that Aristotle does not have a virtue ethics by its lights, and conclude with some remarks on moral taxonomy. [source] The Angelic Doctor and the Stagirite: Thomas Aquinas and Contemporary ,Aristotelian' EthicsPROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (HARDBACK), Issue 1 2001M. W. F. Stone To what extent, if any, is the moral thought of Thomas Aquinas ,Aristotelian'? This question is not simply of historical interest, since it directs our attention to those areas of contemporary English-speaking moral philosophy where Thomas is discussed. In some quarters there is a tendency to classify Thomas as a thinker in the ,Aristotelian tradition', and his debt to Aristotle is thought to be apparent in his remarks on moral reasoning and virtue. Nowhere is this tendency more evident than in discussions of Thomas by supporters of modern virtue ethics. In this paper, I will argue that the relationship of Thomas's ethics to Aristotle is much more complicated than these discussions assume. Despite the strong and interesting affinities that exist between the practical philosophies of Thomas and Aristotle, the sum total of their common features can never disguise nor dilute the profound differences that separate them. The paper will conclude with some suggestions as to how an appreciation of these differences can enable us to cast Thomas's remarks on virtue in a different light. [source] PARENTAL VIRTUE: A NEW WAY OF THINKING ABOUT THE MORALITY OF REPRODUCTIVE ACTIONSBIOETHICS, Issue 4 2007ROSALIND MCDOUGALL ABSTRACT In this paper I explore the potential of virtue ethical ideas to generate a new way of thinking about the ethical questions surrounding the creation of children. Applying ideas from neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics to the parental sphere specifically, I develop a framework for the moral assessment of reproductive actions that centres on the concept of parental virtue. I suggest that the character traits of the good parent can be used as a basis for determining the moral permissibility of a particular reproductive action. I posit three parental virtues and argue that we can see the moral status of a reproductive action as determined by the relationship between such an action and (at least) these virtues. Using a case involving selection for deafness, I argue that thinking in terms of the question ,would a virtuous parent do this?' when morally assessing reproductive action is a viable and useful way of thinking about issues in reproductive ethics. [source] Guidance and Justification in Particularistic EthicsBIOETHICS, Issue 4 2000Ulrik Kihlbom This paper argues that, contrary to a common line of criticism followed by scholars such as Helga Kuhse, a particularistic version of virtue ethics properly elaborated, can provide sound moral guidance and a satisfactory account for moral justification of our opinions regarding, for instance, health care practice. In the first part of the paper, three criteria for comparing normative theories with respect to action-guiding power are outlined, and it is argued that the presented particularistic version of virtue ethics actually can provide more guidance than the universalistic theories favoured by Kuhse and others. In the second part of the paper it is claimed that universalist normative theories have serious problems accounting for the role that moral principles are supposed to play in the justification, of moral opinions, whereas the present version of virtue ethics accommodates a plausible alternative idea of justification without invoking moral principles or eschewing objectivity. [source] | ||||||||||||||||