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Very Idea (very + idea)
Selected AbstractsOn the Very Idea of a Science Forming FacultyDIALECTICA, Issue 2 2002John Collins It has been speculated, by Chomsky and others, that our capacity for scientific understanding is not only enabled but also limited by a biologically endowed science forming faculty (SFF). I look at two sorts of consideration for the SFF thesis and find both wanting. Firstly, it has been claimed that a problem-mystery distinction militates for the SFF thesis. I suggest that the distinction can be coherently drawn for cases, but that the purported,evidence'for even a fairly lose general demarcation of problems and mysteries is not best explained by a SFF. Secondly, I consider in detail a range of cognitive considerations for the SFF thesis and contend that it is at best moot whether science can be so construed as to make it feasible that it is a faculty competence. [source] Denationalization and the Very Idea of Democratic Constitutionalism: The Case of the European CommunityRATIO JURIS, Issue 3 2001Oliver Gerstenberg Within the current debates about Euro-constitutionalism, the conventional options are either to defend a vision of the European Union (EU) which separates global economic law from national sovereignty, and thus relies on the legitimizing powers of free markets, or to regard the legitimation problem (at least under current conditions) as beyond solution: This view argues that any further progress towards an ever closer Union would inevitably increase the legitimation deficit and that therefore the capacity for political action of the nation state should be protected or restored. This paper seeks to break the stranglehold of the, as is argued, false dichotomy (global markets vs. national democracy), and it argues that an extension of democracy beyond the nation state is possible. [source] Meaning, Truth, and PhenomenologyMETAPHILOSOPHY, Issue 4 2000Mark Bevir This essay approaches Derrida through a consideration of his writings on Saussure and Husserl. Derrida is right to insist, following Saussure, on a relational theory of meaning: words do not have a one-to-one correspondence with their referents. But he is wrong to insist on a purely differential theory of meaning: words can refer to reality within the context of a body of knowledge. Similarly, Derrida is right to reject Husserl's idea of presence: no truths are simply given to consciousness. But he is wrong to reject the very idea of objective knowledge: we can defend a notion of objective knowledge couched in terms of a comparison of rival bodies of theories. The essay concludes by considering the implications of the preceding arguments for the enterprise of phenomenology. [source] INCOMMENSURABILITY, RELATIVISM, SCEPTICISM: REFLECTIONS ON ACQUIRING A CONCEPTRATIO, Issue 2 2008Nathaniel Goldberg Some opponents of the incommensurability thesis, such as Davidson and Rorty, have argued that the very idea of incommensurability is incoherent and that the existence of alternative and incommensurable conceptual schemes is a conceptual impossibility. If true, this refutes Kuhnian relativism and Kantian scepticism in one fell swoop. For Kuhnian relativism depends on the possibility of alternative, humanly accessible conceptual schemes that are incommensurable with one another, and the Kantian notion of a realm of unknowable things-in-themselves gives rise to the possibility of humanly inaccessible schemes that are incommensurable with even our best current or future science. In what follows we argue that the possibility of incommensurability of either the Kuhnian or the Kantian variety is inescapable and that this conclusion is forced upon us by a simple consideration of what is involved in acquiring a concept. It turns out that the threats from relativism and scepticism are real, and that anyone, including Davidson himself, who has ever defended an account of concept acquisition is committed to one or the other of these two possibilities.1 [source] KIERKEGAARD, INDIRECT COMMUNICATION, AND AMBIGUITYTHE HEYTHROP JOURNAL, Issue 1 2009JAMIE TURNBULL Notoriously, Kierkegaard claims his project to be one of indirect communication. This paper considers the idea that Kierkegaard's distinction between direct and indirect communication is to be accounted for in terms of ambiguity. I begin by outlining the different claims Kierkegaard makes about his method, before examining the textual evidence for attributing such a distinction to him. I then turn to the work of Edward Mooney, who claims that the distinction between direct and indirect communication is to be drawn in just this way. I argue that Mooney misinterprets the type of ambiguity Kierkegaard holds to be involved in indirect communication, and consequently ends up with an unsatisfactory account of Kierkegaard's method. Finally I seek to cast doubt on the very idea that ambiguity might do justice to the claims Kierkegaard makes about his project, and suggest that what is required to do so is a theological interpretation of his work. [source] ,An anthropological concept of the concept': reversibility among the Siberian YukaghirsTHE JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE, Issue 3 2007Alberto Corsín Jiménez This article attempts to sketch a new anthropological epistemology. It does so by revisiting the work that concepts do in economic models, and by suggesting an alternative ,anthropological concept of the concept' for the economy. The article looks to how concepts create their own limits of meaning and uses the very idea of limit to rethink how conceptual thought out-grows and transforms itself. We develop our epistemology by looking at the socio-economic practices and institutions of the Yukaghirs, a small group of indigenous hunters, living along the Kolyma River in northeastern Siberia. The Yukaghirs' moment of creative possibilities is given through the reversibility of every one of their economic practices, informed by the work of a shadow force (ayibii) that aims for the limit. We gain insights from this notion of reversibility to rethink the purchase of the ,economic' in our contemporary world, questioning the validity of such ,conceptual' descriptions as virtualism or the knowledge economy. Résumé Les auteurs tentent ici d'ébaucher une nouvelle épistémologie anthropologique en revisitant l'action des concepts dans les modèles économiques et en suggérant un autre « concept anthropologique du concept » en économie. L'article étudie la manière dans les concepts créent leurs propres limites de signification et utilise cette idée de limite pour revoir la façon dont la pensée conceptuelle se dépasse et se transforme elle-même. Les auteurs développent leur épistémologie par l'étude des pratiques et institutions socio-économiques des Yukaghirs, un petit groupe de chasseurs indigènes vivant le long de la rivière Kolyma, dans le nord-est de la Sibérie. Le moteur des possibilités créatives des Yukaghirs est constitué par la réversibilité de chacune de leurs pratiques économiques, informées par l',uvre d'une force de l'ombre (ayibii) qui tend vers la limite. Cette notion de réversibilité fournit des éléments pour repenser l'emprise de « l'économique » sur notre monde contemporain et remettre en question la validité des descriptions « conceptuelles » telles que l'économie virtuelle ou celle de la connaissance. [source] Die Fotografie , ein neues Bildmedium im Wissenschaftspanorama des 19.BERICHTE ZUR WISSENSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE, Issue 2 2005Jahrhunderts. Abstract Photography , a novel medium of scientific representation in the XIXth century array of arts and sciences. To delve into various nineteenth century academic disciplines under the heading ,photography in the arts and sciences' as did last year's annual conference of the History of Science Society , the interest in such a topic only partly stems from the ,iconic turn' that has generally enlarged the scope of the social sciences in recent years. A more poignant feature in any such present day study will probably be a basic scepticism facing the fact that in public use photographs have been manipulated in many respects. Yet, while shying away from any simple success story, a historically minded approach to changing ,visual paradigms' (Historische Bildwissenschaft) has begun to emerge. In this context, it has proved of considerable heuristic value to reconsider the role of early photography in an array of science, arts and technology: Since the reliance on the traditional ways of sketching reality persisted, in many an instance where photography was introduced, the thoughts the pioneer photographers had about their new, seemingly automated business, call for close attention. Thus scholarship sets up a parallel ,discussion room'; the lively debate on the benefit of academic drawings as opposed to photographic portraits is a case in point. Some fairly specialised reports on photographically based analyses, such as electron microscopy, point to a borderline where the very idea of representation as a correspondence of reality and imagination gets blurred. Even though any ,visual culture' will have to shoulder the ,burden of representation', it is equally likely that it will offer a deeper sensibility for the intricacies entailed in the variegated ways of illustrating or mapping chosen subjects of scientific interest. Scholarship may thus somewhat control the disillusionment that by now has become the epitome of writing on photographic history. Provided with a renewed methodological awareness for the perception process and its photographic transition, historians may strike a better balance between the ever present tendencies of a realistic and an aesthetic way of picturing the world we live in. [source] INTENTION, AUTONOMY, AND BRAIN EVENTSBIOETHICS, Issue 6 2009GRANT GILLETT ABSTRACT Informed consent is the practical expression of the doctrine of autonomy. But the very idea of autonomy and conscious free choice is undercut by the view that human beings react as their unconscious brain centres dictate, depending on factors that may or may not be under rational control and reflection. This worry is, however, based on a faulty model of human autonomy and consciousness and needs close neurophilosophical scrutiny. A critique of the ethics implied by the model takes us towards a ,care of the self' view of autonomy and the subject's attunement to the truth as the crux of reasoning rather than the inner mental/neural state views of autonomy and human choice on offer at present. [source] | ||||||||||