Home About us Contact
|
Home About us Contact | ||
|
|
||
Value Judgements (value + judgement)
Selected AbstractsThe emergence of interdisciplinary knowledge in problem-focused researchAREA, Issue 4 2009Anna Wesselink In this paper I explore the specific properties associated with the new knowledge produced by inter- or transdisciplinary research. Using my analysis of a land use planning study in the Meuse valley in The Netherlands, I argue that the process of knowledge integration requires the exercise of value judgement and that the outcomes are emergent. I also show that the selection of a boundary object as objective facilitates interdisciplinary research because it is shared amongst disciplines and because it necessitates judgement in its implementation. [source] Drug classification: science, politics, both or neither?ADDICTION, Issue 7 2010Harold Kalant ABSTRACT Governments currently classify illicit drugs for various purposes: to guide courts in the sentencing of convicted violators of drug control laws, to prioritize targets of prevention measures and to educate the public about relative risks of the various drugs. It has been proposed that classification should be conducted by scientists and drug experts rather than by politicians, so that it will reflect only accurate factual knowledge of drug effects and risks rather than political biases. Although this is an appealing goal, it is inherently impossible because rank-ordering of the drugs inevitably requires value judgements concerning the different types of harm. Such judgements, even by scientists, depend upon subjective personal criteria and not only upon scientific facts. Moreover, classification that is meant to guide the legal system in controlling dangerous drug use can function only if it is in harmony with the values and sentiments of the public. In some respects, politicians may be better attuned to public attitudes and wishes, and to what policies the public will support, than are scientific experts. The problems inherent in such drug classification are illustrated by the examples of cannabis and of salvinorin A. They raise the question as to whether the classification process really serves any socially beneficial purpose. [source] What choices should we be able to make about designer babies?HEALTH EXPECTATIONS, Issue 3 2006A Citizens' Jury of young people in South Wales Abstract Background, Young people will increasingly have the option of using new technologies for reproductive decision making but their voices are rarely heard in debates about acceptable public policy in this area. Capturing the views of young people about potentially esoteric topics, such as genetics, is difficult and methodologically challenging. Design, A Citizens' Jury is a deliberative process that presents a question to a group of ordinary people, allows them to examine evidence given by expert witnesses and personal testimonies and arrive at a verdict. This Citizens' Jury explored designer babies in relation to inherited conditions, saviour siblings and sex selection with young people. Participants, Fourteen young people aged 16,19 in Wales. Results, Acceptance of designer baby technology was purpose-specific; it was perceived by participants to be acceptable for preventing inherited conditions and to create a child to save a sibling, but was not recommended for sex selection. Jurors stated that permission should not depend on parents' age, although some measure of suitability should be assessed. Preventing potential parents from going abroad was considered impractical. These young people felt the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority should have members under 20 and that the term ,designer baby' was not useful. Conclusions, Perspectives on the acceptability of this technology were nuanced, and based on implicit value judgements about the extent of individual benefit derived. Young people have valuable and interesting contributions to make to the debate about genetics and reproductive decision making and a variety of innovative methods must be used to secure their involvement in decision-making processes. [source] Commentary: Accounting Schism or Synthesis?ACCOUNTING PERSPECTIVES, Issue 2 2002A Challenge for the Conditional-Normative Approach ABSTRACT This paper explains the conditional-normative accounting methodology (CoNAM) and its origin, offering a comparison of the normative, positive, and conditional-normative approaches. It also discusses the difference between the pragmatic versus a more scientific treatment of CoNAM. However, the main thrust of the paper is directed toward the schism in academic accounting between the positive accounting theory (PAT) and the critical interpretive view (CIV). To better understand CIV, the paper attempts to explain the philosophic roots that reach from Husserl and some Marxist writers to Foucault, Derrida, and Baudrillard. This schism seems to call for a new synthesis that avoids extreme positions but draws upon insights from both camps. In this search, CoNAM might be helpful by exploring means-end relations and connecting value judgements to accounting theory in a fairly "objective" way. [source] Future eating and country keeping: what role has environmental history in the management of biodiversity?JOURNAL OF BIOGEOGRAPHY, Issue 5 2001D.M.J.S. Bowman In order to understand and moderate the effects of the accelerating rate of global environmental change land managers and ecologists must not only think beyond their local environment but also put their problems into a historical context. It is intuitively obvious that historians should be natural allies of ecologists and land managers as they struggle to maintain biodiversity and landscape health. Indeed, ,environmental history' is an emerging field where the previously disparate intellectual traditions of ecology and history intersect to create a new and fundamentally interdisciplinary field of inquiry. Environmental history is rapidly becoming an important field displacing many older environmentally focused academic disciplines as well as capturing the public imagination. By drawing on Australian experience I explore the role of ,environmental history' in managing biodiversity. First I consider some of the similarities and differences of the ecological and historical approaches to the history of the environment. Then I review two central questions in Australian environment history: landscape-scale changes in woody vegetation cover since European settlement and the extinction of the marsupials in both historical and pre-historical time. These case studies demonstrate that environmental historians can reach conflicting interpretations despite using essentially the same data. The popular success of some environmental histories hinges on the fact that they narrate a compelling story concerning human relationships and human value judgements about landscape change. Ecologists must learn to harness the power of environmental history narratives to bolster land management practices designed to conserve biological heritage. They can do this by using various currently popular environmental histories as a point of departure for future research, for instance by testing the veracity of competing interpretations of landscape-scale change in woody vegetation cover. They also need to learn how to write parables that communicate their research findings to land managers and the general public. However, no matter how sociologically or psychologically satisfying a particular environmental historical narrative might be, it must be willing to be superseded with new stories that incorporate the latest research discoveries and that reflects changing social values of nature. It is contrary to a rational and publicly acceptable approach to land management to read a particular story as revealing the absolute truth. [source] Judgements without rules: towards a postmodern ironist concept of research validityNURSING INQUIRY, Issue 1 2006Gary Rolfe The past decade has seen the gradual emergence of what might be called a postmodern perspective on nursing research. However, the development of a coherent postmodern critique of the modernist position has been hampered by some misunderstandings and misrepresentations of postmodern epistemology by a number of writers, leading to a fractured and distorted view of postmodern nursing research. This paper seeks to distinguish between judgemental relativist and epistemic relativist or ironist positions, and regards the latter as offering the most coherent critique of modernist/(post)positivist nursing research. The writings of poststructuralist philosophers, including Barthes, Lyotard, Derrida, Foucault and Rorty are examined, and a number of criteria for a postmodern ironist concept of research validity or trustworthiness are suggested. Whilst these writers reject the idea of Method as a guarantee of valid research, they nevertheless believe that value judgements can and must be made, and turn to notions of ironism, différance, and the differend. Ultimately, the postmodern ironist reader of the research report must make a judgement without criteria, based on her own practical wisdom or ,prudence'. [source] The Strategic Use of Formal Argumentation in Legal DecisionsRATIO JURIS, Issue 4 2008HARM KLOOSTERHUIS In legal decisions standpoints can be supported by formal and also by substantive interpretative arguments. Formal arguments consist of reasons the weight or force of which is essentially dependent on the authoritativeness that the reasons may also have: In this connection one may think of linguistic and systemic arguments. On the other hand, substantive arguments are not backed up by authority, but consist of a direct invocation of moral, political, economic, or other social considerations. Formal arguments can be analyzed as exclusionary reasons: The authoritative character excludes,in principle,substantial counterarguments. Formal arguments are sometimes used to conceal value judgements based on substantial arguments. This paper deals with reconstructing problems regarding this strategic use of formal arguments in legal decisions, with a focus on linguistic argumentation. [source] The Mythology of Human RightsRATIO JURIS, Issue 3 2008GUNNAR BECK The underlying assumption,the idea that there are some human values that deserve special protection,implies the need for both a normative and a conceptual justification. This paper claims that neither can be provided. The normative justification is needed to support the priority of human rights over other human goods and to rank and balance conflicting human rights, but it can't be provided because of the fact of pervasive value pluralism, the fact that human values are many, incompatible and incommensurable. The conceptual justification is needed to avoid arbitrariness in the interpretation of human rights at the adjudication stage. Such a justification is impossible, however, as the concept of human rights, and the concepts used to justify them and to solve their conflicts are "essentially contested concepts." The paper concludes that, provided that the interpretation of human rights presupposes value judgements and political choices, the special legal status accorded to human rights is not justified. [source] | |||||||||||||