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Uruguay Round Agreement (uruguay + round_agreement)
Selected AbstractsDeveloping Countries' Position in WTO Agricultural Trade NegotiationsDEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 1 2002Alan Matthews Four themes in the developing countries' position are highlighted. (i) They are seeking meaningful improvements in market access for their agricultural exports. (ii) They have highlighted the asymmetry of current WTO obligations under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, and are seeking greater equality of outcomes in the new round. (iii) Meaningful concessions on special and differential treatment will be necessary to satisfy the interests of both exporters and importers, especially on the scope to be allowed for tariff protection to domestic food production. (iv) Innovative and reliable guarantees will need to be provided to the least developed food importers to protect them against the risk of world price volatility. [source] Do EU direct payments to beef producers belong in the ,blue box'?AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2003Seamus McErlean In the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, so-called ,blue box' support measures were exempted from reduction commitments, provided they were delivered under ,production-limiting' programs. Although classified as ,blue box', the EU system of direct payments (DP) to beef farmers imposes ,claim-limiting' restrictions rather than ,production-limiting' restrictions, allowing farmers to keep additional animals over and above the number upon which they are eligible to claim DP. The present paper provides empirical evidence that EU direct payments capitalise into the market prices of male calves and young steers in Ireland. It is also likely that DP capitalises into the prices of beef cows and heifers. Given this capitalisation process, some farmers can obtain ,capitalised' DP on animals produced over and above the ,claim-limiting' restrictions, by selling these animals through auction markets. Thus, ,capitalised' DP probably encourages production over and above the limiting measures. [source] Tariff Peaks for Agricultural and Food Products: their Incidence and Alternatives for their RemovalJOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2002Javier Fernández The aim of the paper is the analysis of the current market access situation in global agricultural markets for the post-Uruguay Round period. It identifies those commodity groups in the food and agricultural sector for which tariff peaks exist, and examines how various tariff-cutting formulae would affect their levels. The related issues of tariff complexity and of the administration of Tariff Rate Quotas are also reviewed here. Results show that the implementation of the Uruguay Round agreement has not significantly reduced agricultural protection, since high tariff peaks and nontransparent tariff structures still persist. A repetition of the Uruguay Round cuts would not solve the problem of high protection levels either, and only the introduction of more aggressive harmonising formulae could lead to a true liberalisation of world agricultural and food markets. [source] Impacts of WTO restrictions on subsidized EU sugar exportsAGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2000Daneswar Poonyth Abstract The study evaluates the impact of World Trade Organization (WTO) restrictions on the European Union (EU) sugar sector and the world sugar market. A small reduction in production quotas would be sufficient to satisfy the export subsidy limitations of the Uruguay Round agreement. Complete elimination of export subsidies by 2005 would require either a 10% reduction in production quotas or the combination of an 8% reduction in quotas and an 11% reduction in intervention prices. Higher world prices resulting from reduced EU exports would result in increased production of unsubsidized C-sugar, with different impacts across EU member countries explained by differences in institutional pricing arrangements and marginal production costs. [source] | ||||||||||