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Transaction Cost Economics (transaction + cost_economics)
Selected AbstractsTRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS: THE PRECURSORSECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2008Oliver E. Williamson Theories commonly progress through four stages, from informal to pre-formal to semi-formal and fully formal. This paper reports on the earliest stage of transaction cost economics that extended from the 1920s to the 1970s. That the gestation stage lasted so long is partly because transaction cost economics departed significantly from the then-prevailing economic orthodoxy. Also, and related, it is an interdisciplinary undertaking. As reported herein, transaction cost economics selectively combines economics, organisation theory and law and is the product of the contributions of some of the finest minds in those three fields. [source] OUTSOURCING: TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT,JOURNAL OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2008OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON This article examines outsourcing from the transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective. The transaction is made the basic unit of analysis and the procurement decision, as between make and buy, is made (principally) with reference to a transaction cost economizing purpose. As sketched herein, the ease of contracting varies with the attributes of the transaction, with special emphasis on whether preserving continuity between a particular buyer,seller pair is the source of added value. The basic regularity is this: as bilateral dependency builds up, the efficient governance of contractual relations progressively moves from simple market exchange to hybrid contracting (with credibility supports) to hierarchy. This last corresponds to the "make" decision, which, as viewed from the TCE perspective, is viewed as the organization form of last resort. The article successively describes the lens of contract approach to economic organization, the operationalization of TCE, different styles of outsourcing, qualifications to the foregoing and the main lessons of TCE for the supply chain literature. [source] TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS: THE PRECURSORSECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2008Oliver E. Williamson Theories commonly progress through four stages, from informal to pre-formal to semi-formal and fully formal. This paper reports on the earliest stage of transaction cost economics that extended from the 1920s to the 1970s. That the gestation stage lasted so long is partly because transaction cost economics departed significantly from the then-prevailing economic orthodoxy. Also, and related, it is an interdisciplinary undertaking. As reported herein, transaction cost economics selectively combines economics, organisation theory and law and is the product of the contributions of some of the finest minds in those three fields. [source] Professional Employer Organizations and Their Role in Small and Medium Enterprises: The Impact of HR OutsourcingENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE, Issue 1 2003Brian S. Klaas While effective HR services and programs can help firms gain competitive advantage, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) often lack the internal resources required to develop and deliver these services and programs. As a result, SMEs increasingly are outsourcing HR activities to professional employer organizations (PEOs). Questions remain, however, about the conditions under which SMEs will benefit from outsourcing HR to a PEO, as well as about the type of benefits that are potentially available. The very nature of many HR activities raises questions about the risks associated with market governance and a PEO's ability to ensure service quality for SMEs. In order for these questions to be addressed, it is necessary to understand the process by which PEO utilization affects SME outcomes. In this article, we use transaction cost economics, social exchange theory, and the strategic HR literature to develop a framework for understanding the factors and conditions likely to affect whether and how an SME will benefit from using a PEO. [source] OUTSOURCING: TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS AND SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT,JOURNAL OF SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2008OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON This article examines outsourcing from the transaction cost economics (TCE) perspective. The transaction is made the basic unit of analysis and the procurement decision, as between make and buy, is made (principally) with reference to a transaction cost economizing purpose. As sketched herein, the ease of contracting varies with the attributes of the transaction, with special emphasis on whether preserving continuity between a particular buyer,seller pair is the source of added value. The basic regularity is this: as bilateral dependency builds up, the efficient governance of contractual relations progressively moves from simple market exchange to hybrid contracting (with credibility supports) to hierarchy. This last corresponds to the "make" decision, which, as viewed from the TCE perspective, is viewed as the organization form of last resort. The article successively describes the lens of contract approach to economic organization, the operationalization of TCE, different styles of outsourcing, qualifications to the foregoing and the main lessons of TCE for the supply chain literature. [source] A transaction cost perspective on why, how, and when cash impacts firm performanceMANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 7 2009Jonathan P. O'Brien While both financial and behavioral theories suggest that cash holdings may be beneficial to R&D-intensive firms, agency theory would suggest that strong monitoring may be needed to ensure that cash holdings are not squandered. We contend that transaction cost economics provides a valuable lens for understanding the performance implications of cash holdings because not only does it explicate the benefits and costs of cash holdings in a single unified theoretical framework, but it further clarifies how environmental uncertainty critically moderates these relationships. Empirical tests on a large sample of US corporations yield strong support for our theory. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Nonprofit versus corporate governance: An economic approachNONPROFIT MANAGEMENT & LEADERSHIP, Issue 3 2008Gerhard Speckbacher This article proposes a new theoretical concept of nonprofit governance using transaction cost economics and the economic theory of contracts. After a short review of economic approaches to corporate governance, I clarify the specific nature of the governance problem in nonprofit organizations. Based on this analysis, I derive criteria for selecting an organization's relevant stakeholders. If stakeholders provide valuable specific resources without the protection of a comprehensive contract that details exactly how the organization is to use these resources, then such stakeholders seek decision and control rights in order to direct the use of the resources they have provided. I argue that the core problem of governance is how to enhance valuable specific contributions of the relevant stakeholders while keeping the costs of bargaining between stakeholders and the costs of collective decision making low. The theory developed is then applied in a discussion of practically relevant governance mechanisms, and the concept of governance is used to contribute to the discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of the nonprofit character of organizations from a governance perspective. [source] The Power of Networks: Integration and Financial Cooperative PerformanceANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2005by Martin Desrochers We develop a classification scheme based on a theoretical framework that builds on published work using transaction cost economics (TCE) to explain integration of large numbers of financial cooperatives into networks. We identify three critical levels of increasing integration we call respectively atomized systems, consensual networks and strategic networks. Further, we test some of the propositions that result from the theoretical framework on an international sample of financial cooperative systems. Based on this analysis we can conclude that: (i) Integration is less (more) important in developing (more developed) countries and for very small (large) financial cooperatives as a determinant of efficiency. However, integration tends to reduce volatility of efficiency and performance regardless of development. (ii) Integration appears to help control measure of managers' expense preferences that tend to affect performance of FC. (iii) Despite high costs of running hub-like organizations in highly integrated system, these systems economize in bounded rationality and operate at lower costs than less integrated systems. [source] Interpersonal trust and voluntary associations: examining three approachesTHE BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY, Issue 3 2002Helmut Anheier ABSTRACT The relationship between interpersonal trust and membership in voluntary associations is a persistent research finding in sociology. What is more, the notion of trust has become a central issue in current social science theorizing covering such diverse approaches as transaction costs economics or cognitive sociology. In different ways and for different purposes, these approaches address the role of voluntary organizations, although, as this paper argues, much of this thinking remains sketchy and underdeveloped. Against an empirical portrait of this relationship, the purpose of this paper is to assess such theorizing. We first set out to explicate major approaches to trust in economics, sociology and political science, using the non-profit or voluntary organization as a focal point. We then examine the various approaches in terms of their strengths and weaknesses, and, finally, identify key areas for theoretical development. In particular, we point to the social movement literature, the social psychology of trust, and recent thinking about civil society. [source] | ||||||||||