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Transaction Costs (transaction + cost)
Kinds of Transaction Costs Terms modified by Transaction Costs Selected AbstractsTAXI DEREGULATION AND TRANSACTION COSTSECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 2 2006Christian Seibert Deregulation of taxi markets has the potential to deliver significant benefits. However, it presents the problem of transaction costs and in particular problems linked with imperfect information and co-ordination. This article argues that the use of a centralised intermediary in deregulated taxi markets can overcome these problems so that the benefits of competition are maximised, without the need for government fare regulation. [source] HOMEOWNERSHIP IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD WITH SUBSTANTIAL TRANSACTION COSTS,JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 5 2007Margaret H. Smith ABSTRACT This paper presents a dynamic model of residential real estate tenure decisions that takes into account the substantial transaction costs and the uncertain time paths of rents and prices. By temporarily postponing decisions, buyers and sellers obtain additional information and may avoid transactions that are costly to reverse. One implication is that the combination of high transaction costs and substantial uncertainty can create a large wedge between a household's reservation prices for buying and selling a home, which can explain why households do not switch back and forth between owning and renting as home prices fluctuate. [source] Legal and Illegal Production and Trade Under Monopoly with Transaction CostMETROECONOMICA, Issue 3 2000Amit Bhaduri Using illegal trade in narcotics as an example, where regular seizure of part of the merchandise by the law-enforcing authorities imposes a transaction cost on the monopolist supplier, this paper demonstrates the result that a higher transaction cost might increase the volume supplied for trade. The result of the formal model also applies to the opposite situation, e.g. when trade is legal, as in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century maritime trade, but pirates illegally seize part of the merchandise to impose a transaction cost on the traders. The more general implications of this analysis are also discussed. [source] External Transaction Costs and Large-scale Farming in Moscow Oblast Coûts de transaction externes et agriculture à grande échelle dans la région de Moscou Externe Transaktionskosten und landwirtschaftliche Großbetriebe in der Oblast MoskauEUROCHOICES, Issue 2 2010Nikolai SvetlovArticle first published online: 3 AUG 2010 Summary External Transaction Costs and Large-scale Farming in Moscow Oblast The article addresses the reasons for the domination of large-scale corporate farms in the Moscow oblast of Russia and concludes that high external transaction costs are likely to be an important determining factor. Over the nine year period studied, larger farms are shown to achieve higher performance. Increasing returns to scale, however, were not significant in explaining the superior performance of the larger farms. It is hypothesised that high external transaction costs due to lack of transparency in the milk market, typical of underdeveloped markets, give the larger farms a competitive advantage. Their search costs per unit of output are relatively low and they are able therefore to achieve higher farm-gate prices for milk as a result. The results confirm the dependence of the farm-gate milk price on farm size due to the presence of high transaction costs in the market of milk, the major output of the studied farms. The high performance farms were able to grow during the study period whereas the lower performing farms had limited growth capacity. A more competitive and transparent market environment along with improved infrastructure could lower transaction costs and entry barriers and provide opportunities for smaller scale corporate farms to compete more effectively. Cet article essaie d'expliquer les raisons de la domination des grandes exploitations agricoles constituées en société de la région de Moscou et conclut que l'ampleur des coûts de transaction externes est probablement un facteur explicatif important. Au cours de la période étudiée qui couvre neuf années, les exploitations les plus grandes ont enregistré les performances les plus élevées. Les rendements d'échelle croissants n'ont cependant pas expliqué de manière significative la meilleure performance de ces exploitations. Nous faisons l'hypothèse que les forts coûts de transaction externes liés au manque de transparence sur le marché laitier, typique des marchés incomplètement développés, donnent à ces plus grandes exploitations un avantage compétitif. Leur coût de recherche par unité de produit est relativement bas et elles sont donc capables d'obtenir des prix au niveau de la ferme plus élevés pour le lait. Les résultats confirment la dépendance des prix à la ferme envers la taille de l'exploitation du fait de la présence de coûts de transaction élevés sur le marché laitier, le lait étant le principal produit des exploitations étudiées. Les exploitations très performantes ont pu croître au cours de la période examinée tandis que les capacités de développement des exploitations les moins performantes étaient limitées. Un environnement de marché plus concurrentiel et transparent ainsi que de meilleures infrastructures pourraient réduire les coûts de transaction et les barrières à l'entrée dans le secteur, et fournir des opportunités aux exploitations constituées en société de plus petite taille d'être concurrentielles de manière plus efficace. Dieser Beitrag untersucht, weshalb es in der russischen Oblast Moskau hauptsächlich große Corporate Farms gibt, und kommt zu dem Schluss, dass dafür wahrscheinlich hohe externe Transaktionskosten ausschlaggebend sind. Über den neunjährigen Untersuchungszeitraum waren größere Betriebe erfolgreicher. Steigende Skalenerträge waren jedoch bei der Begründung für den höheren Erfolg der größeren Betriebe nicht maßgeblich. Es wird angenommen, dass hohe externe Transaktionskosten aufgrund von fehlender Transparenz auf dem Milchmarkt , typisch für unterentwickelte Märkte , den größeren Betrieben einen Wettbewerbsvorteil verschaffen. Ihre Suchkosten pro Produkteinheit sind relativ gering, daher sind sie in der Lage, höhere Preise für Milch ab Hof zu erzielen. Die Ergebnisse bestätigen die Abhängigkeit des Preises für Milch ab Hof von der Betriebsgröße, weil es auf dem Markt für Milch (dem wichtigsten Produkt der untersuchten Betriebe) hohe Transaktionskosten gibt. Den erfolgreichen Betrieben gelang es, über den Untersuchungszeitraum zu wachsen, während die leistungsschwächeren Betriebe nur eingeschränkt wachstumsfähig waren. Ein wettbewerbsfähigeres und transparenteres Marktumfeld in Kombination mit einer besseren Infrastruktur könnte die Transaktionskosten und Marktzugangsbeschränkungen senken sowie kleineren Corporate Farms Möglichkeiten eröffnen, um effektiver am Wettbewerb teilzunehmen. [source] New Evidence of the Effect of Transaction Costs on Residential Mobility,JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 4 2005Jos Van Ommeren Transaction costs are thought to cause suboptimal consumption of housing but may also negatively affect labor market outcomes. In the current paper, we demonstrate empirically for the Netherlands that transaction costs have a strong negative effect on the owners' probability of moving. Under a range of different specifications, it appears that a 1 percent-point increase in the value of transaction costs,as a percentage of the value of the residence,decreases residential mobility rates by (at least) 8 percent. The estimates imply that ownership to ownership mobility rates would be substantially higher in the absence of the current 6 percent ad valorem buyer transaction tax. Our estimates are consistent with the observation that in the Netherlands ad valorem transaction costs mainly consist of buyer transaction costs. [source] The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing under Proportional Transaction Costs in Finite Discrete TimeMATHEMATICAL FINANCE, Issue 1 2004Walter SchachermayerArticle first published online: 24 DEC 200 We prove a version of the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing, which applies to Kabanov's modeling of foreign exchange markets under transaction costs. The financial market is described by a d×d matrix-valued stochastic process (,t)Tt=0 specifying the mutual bid and ask prices between d assets. We introduce the notion of "robust no arbitrage," which is a version of the no-arbitrage concept, robust with respect to small changes of the bid-ask spreads of (,t)Tt=0. The main theorem states that the bid-ask process (,t)Tt=0 satisfies the robust no-arbitrage condition iff it admits a strictly consistent pricing system. This result extends the theorems of Harrison-Pliska and Kabanov-Stricker pertaining to the case of finite ,, as well as the theorem of Dalang, Morton, and Willinger and Kabanov, Rásonyi, and Stricker, pertaining to the case of general ,. An example of a 5 × 5 -dimensional process (,t)2t=0 shows that, in this theorem, the robust no-arbitrage condition cannot be replaced by the so-called strict no-arbitrage condition, thus answering negatively a question raised by Kabanov, Rásonyi, and Stricker. [source] Hedging under Transaction Costs in Currency Markets: a Discrete-Time ModelMATHEMATICAL FINANCE, Issue 1 2002FREDDY DELBAEN We consider a discrete-time model of a currency market with transaction costs and give a description of initial endowments that allow the investor to hedge a contingent claim in various currencies by a self-financing portfolio. [source] Bounds on Derivative Prices in an Intertemporal Setting with Proportional Transaction Costs and Multiple SecuritiesMATHEMATICAL FINANCE, Issue 3 2001George M. Constantinides The observed discrepancies of derivative prices from their theoretical, arbitrage-free values are examined in the presence of transaction costs. Analytic upper and lower bounds on the reservation write and purchase prices, respectively, are obtained when an investor's preferences exhibit constant relative risk aversion between zero and one. The economy consists of multiple primary securities with stationary returns, a constant rate of interest, and any number of American or European derivatives with, possibly, path-dependent arbitrary payoffs. [source] Randomized Stopping Times and American Option Pricing with Transaction CostsMATHEMATICAL FINANCE, Issue 1 2001Prasad Chalasani In a general discrete-time market model with proportional transaction costs, we derive new expectation representations of the range of arbitrage-free prices of an arbitrary American option. The upper bound of this range is called the upper hedging price, and is the smallest initial wealth needed to construct a self-financing portfolio whose value dominates the option payoff at all times. A surprising feature of our upper hedging price representation is that it requires the use of randomized stopping times (Baxter and Chacon 1977), just as ordinary stopping times are needed in the absence of transaction costs. We also represent the upper hedging price as the optimum value of a variety of optimization problems. Additionally, we show a two-player game where at Nash equilibrium the value to both players is the upper hedging price, and one of the players must in general choose a mixture of stopping times. We derive similar representations for the lower hedging price as well. Our results make use of strong duality in linear programming. [source] Corporate Bond Market Transaction Costs and TransparencyTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 3 2007AMY K. EDWARDS ABSTRACT Using a complete record of U.S. over-the-counter (OTC) secondary trades in corporate bonds, we estimate average transaction costs as a function of trade size for each bond that traded more than nine times between January 2003 and January 2005. We find that transaction costs decrease significantly with trade size. Highly rated bonds, recently issued bonds, and bonds close to maturity have lower transaction costs than do other bonds. Costs are lower for bonds with transparent trade prices, and they drop when the TRACE system starts to publicly disseminate their prices. The results suggest that public traders benefit significantly from price transparency. [source] Impact of the Change in Tick Size on Transaction Costs and Liquidity: An Empirical Investigation of the Taiwan Stock Exchange,ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Issue 4 2010Su-Wen Kuo C12; G15 Abstract The minimum price variation on the Taiwan Stock Exchange reduced for most price categories on March 1, 2005. The present paper simultaneously examines the institutional and endogenous impacts of tick size changes on transaction costs, market liquidity, and trading activity. The empirical evidence suggests that following a reduction in tick size, uniform declines are discernible in transaction costs and market liquidity. In particular, those stocks with a larger relative tick size reduction, higher trading volume, and higher order handling cost components have greater reductions in spread and market depth. Moreover, endogenous tick size reductions have an adverse effect on the trading activity for low-price stocks, due to the relative disadvantage in explicit transaction costs. Finally, the present study observes a general diminution in trade size resulting from a reduction in tick size in the Taiwan Stock Exchange. This study attributes plausible rationales to the fact that after tick size reductions, informed traders employ a smaller trade size to hide private information, or front-runners place a smaller trade size to avoid market turbulence. [source] Transaction Cost Estimation and International Regimes: Of Crystal Balls and Sheriff's PossesINTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 1 2004Michael Lipson In the aftermath of the 2003 war in Iraq, there is growing concern over the durability of international institutions and their capacity to withstand international change. Transaction costs are a central factor in theoretical explanations of the conditions under which international institutions will persist or be replaced. Rational institutionalists expect regimes to persist after conditions underlying their creation have changed because of the transaction costs of negotiating a replacement regime. Andrew Moravcsik has recently challenged this view, arguing that such costs are generally low and, in any case, arise from domestic and transnational sources rather than interstate bargaining. Others have argued that transaction costs shape the structure of security institutions. All these approaches assume that states can accurately forecast the transaction costs of maintaining or replacing an international regime. However, as an examination of the replacement of the Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) by the Wassenaar Arrangement demonstrates, this assumption is not necessarily warranted. This essay reviews transaction-cost-based theories of international cooperation and proposes that incorporation of a variable concerned with states' capacity to estimate transaction costs would improve our theoretical understanding of institutional persistence and change. Moreover, it considers problems of defining and measuring transaction costs, assesses factors limiting states' accurate estimation of transaction costs, and presents some propositions regarding transaction cost estimation and regime persistence. The essay also examines the implications of inaccurate transaction cost estimation for recent US foreign policy and international order. [source] Market facilities and agricultural marketing: evidence from Tamil Nadu, IndiaAGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2008Forhad Shilpi Market facility; Agricultural markets; Commercialization; Transaction costs Abstract This article analyzes the effect of facilities and infrastructure available at the marketplace on a farmer's decision to sell at the market. The econometric estimation shows that the likelihood of sales at the market increases significantly with an improvement in market facilities and a decrease in travel time from the village to the market. The results suggest that wealth reduces a farmer's cost of accessing market facilities more than it increases her/his opportunity cost of leisure. The policy simulation indicates that the marginal benefits from an improvement in market facility will favor the poorer farmers in the context of India. [source] New Evidence of the Effect of Transaction Costs on Residential Mobility,JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 4 2005Jos Van Ommeren Transaction costs are thought to cause suboptimal consumption of housing but may also negatively affect labor market outcomes. In the current paper, we demonstrate empirically for the Netherlands that transaction costs have a strong negative effect on the owners' probability of moving. Under a range of different specifications, it appears that a 1 percent-point increase in the value of transaction costs,as a percentage of the value of the residence,decreases residential mobility rates by (at least) 8 percent. The estimates imply that ownership to ownership mobility rates would be substantially higher in the absence of the current 6 percent ad valorem buyer transaction tax. Our estimates are consistent with the observation that in the Netherlands ad valorem transaction costs mainly consist of buyer transaction costs. [source] Wie kann die Verbreitung von neuem Wissen in Europa gefördert werden?PERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 3 2001Rainer Durth In knowledge-based economies the effective use of new knowledge is the most important determinant of economic growth, and the capacity to generate and diffuse innovation forms the basis of comparative advantages. Transaction costs are the main reason why new knowledge takes so much time to spread around. Since clusters attract new ideas more easily, transaction costs may also cause regional divergence. European diffusion policies should therefore aim to minimize transaction costs for exchanging knowledge. It is proposed that this could be done by supporting extra-legal contractual relations guaranteed by third parties and by building up a rating system for trustworthiness of transaction partners. [source] CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT AND INTERNATIONAL TRADEECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2007PRIYA RANJAN This paper derives estimating equations from a model where individuals consume two classes of goods, and the degree of contract enforcement affects the transaction cost of trade in the two classes of goods differentially. Empirically, using Rauch's classification, internationally traded goods are classified into differentiated goods and those possessing a reference price, with the presumption that contract enforcement issues are more important for the former. It is verified that the measures of contract enforcement affect the volume of trade in both types of goods, but the impact is larger for differentiated goods. [source] SME Entry Mode Choice and Performance: A Transaction Cost PerspectiveENTREPRENEURSHIP THEORY AND PRACTICE, Issue 3 2004Keith D. Brouthers Although small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) account for a significant portion of international trade, little is know about how they make international entry mode decisions. Transaction cost theory has been widely used to study entry mode selection for large firms. Here we apply the theory to SME mode choices. Further, we set out to determine if SME transaction cost mode choices provide superior performance to other mode choices. We found that transaction cost theory did a good job of explaining SME mode choice and that SMEs that used transaction cost,predicted mode choices performed significantly better than firms using other modes. [source] Workers' Remittances to India: An Examination of Transfer Cost and EfficiencyINTERNATIONAL MIGRATION, Issue 5 2010Bhupal Singh Regarding the time efficiency of remittance transfer channels to India, the evidence suggests that traditional banking instruments are relatively inefficient as compared to the new information technology-enabled products. Transfer arrangement of the Indian banks with overseas exchange houses has reduced the settlement cycle and the cost. Both the banks and money transfer operators (MTOs) are able to keep the transaction cycle low through the use of information technology-enabled formats. Given that the average cost curve of the banks is located to the right of the average cost curve of the MTOs, greater potential exists for the improvement in overall efficiency of the two entities, particularly through the sharing of messaging and the access and disbursement networks to reduce the overhead cost. The estimates of error correction model reveal that the transaction fee and payment infrastructure are significant determinants of remittance flows, underscoring the scope of policy measures in influencing remittance inflows. The estimates indicate that over the medium to long-term horizon, transaction cost emerges as the most dominant variable explaining the variation in remittances. The payments infrastructure also explains about 10 per cent variation in remittances over the medium-term. The impulse response analysis further reveals that the favourable shocks to transaction fees and the payments infrastructure cause steady improvement in remittance inflows over the medium-term horizon, thus underlining the importance of cost and efficiency in affecting the workers' remittances. [source] Examining the Conditional Limits of Relational Governance: Specialized Assets, Performance Ambiguity, and Long-Standing TiesJOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 7 2008Laura Poppo abstract Despite recognition of the benefits of relational governance in inter-organizational exchanges, factors that may erode its value have received little examination. We extend the literature by asking whether self-interested opportunities and long-standing ties erode the positive association between relational governance and performance. Consistent with transaction cost and moral hazard logics, exchange hazards, particularly asset specificity and difficult performance measurement, dampen the positive association of relational governance and performance. We further find, consistent with recent inquiries into the dark side of embedded ties that the performance benefits associated with relational governance decline when parties rely on repeated partnerships. [source] THE COST OF ILLIQUIDITY AND ITS EFFECTS ON HEDGINGMATHEMATICAL FINANCE, Issue 4 2010L. C. G. Rogers Though liquidity is commonly believed to be a major effect in financial markets, there appears to be no consensus definition of what it is or how it is to be measured. In this paper, we understand liquidity as a nonlinear transaction cost incurred as a function of rate of change of portfolio. Using this definition, we obtain the optimal hedging policy for the hedging of a call option in a Black-Scholes model. This is a more challenging question than the more common studies of optimal strategy for liquidating an initial position, because our goal requires us to match a random final value. The solution we obtain reduces in the case of quadratic loss to the solution of three partial differential equations of Black-Scholes type, one of them nonlinear. [source] Legal and Illegal Production and Trade Under Monopoly with Transaction CostMETROECONOMICA, Issue 3 2000Amit Bhaduri Using illegal trade in narcotics as an example, where regular seizure of part of the merchandise by the law-enforcing authorities imposes a transaction cost on the monopolist supplier, this paper demonstrates the result that a higher transaction cost might increase the volume supplied for trade. The result of the formal model also applies to the opposite situation, e.g. when trade is legal, as in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century maritime trade, but pirates illegally seize part of the merchandise to impose a transaction cost on the traders. The more general implications of this analysis are also discussed. [source] Klimapolitik: Kyoto-Protokoll und Emissionshandel für CO2 -Zertifikate in der EU1PERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 3 2005Wolfgang Ströbele Also every economist knows that the institutional conditions and the rules of the game are important. This basic idea stood behind the introduction of a CO2 -emissions trading system within the European Community starting in 2005. Since the starting point is the Kyoto-protocol with its subset of relevant states involved and the rules agreed upon there, one must ask whether the EU CO2-trading system is really an instrument that helps to reach the Kyoto goals more efficiently. A positive answer to this question is very doubtful. The new European subsystem is only valid for CO2 while Kyoto knows six greenhouse gases, the EU trading periods are 2005,2007 and 2008,2012 while Kyoto is only relevant for the second period, the integration with all flexible instruments of Kyoto is not guaranteed from the beginning. The plants involved are power plants and plants with high energy intensity. Since the technological levels of these plants are rather similar in Europe, the difference in marginal abatement cost will not be large enough to offset the rather high transaction cost of the special EU system. Furthermore, the heating systems and small scale plants of industry are not included in the trading system. The same holds true for traffic, households and the service sector. Drawing a borderline between CO2 -policy there and the trading activities will cause inefficiencies. If CO2 -prices are high, the main incentive of the trading system will be a large shift from domestic production to production abroad without any CO2 -restrictions. Leakage-effects will then be dominant. With low CO2 -prices the special European bureaucratic system will not create enough efficiency gains to cover the trading system's cost. [source] A Note on Efficiency Wage Theory and Principal,Agent TheoryBULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 3 2006Uwe Jirjahn J41; J33; D82 Abstract Why are principal,agent models used in some circumstances and efficiency wage models in others? In this note, it is argued that efficiency wages provide incentives based on an evaluation of the agent's input, while the incentives analysed in principal,agent models rely on the agent's output. The choice between the two incentive schemes depends on the probability that the agent is caught shirking. Moreover, we demonstrate that a combination of input- and output-related elements provides stronger incentives than payment schemes based on merely one of these elements. However, the combination requires a more complex labour contract involving an increased cost of writing the contract. The interaction between this transaction cost and a hiring cost is analysed. [source] Obstacles to Bottom-Up Implementation of Marine Ecosystem ManagementCONSERVATION BIOLOGY, Issue 5 2008KIRSTEN E. EVANS manejo de ecosistemas; manejo marino basado en ecosistemas; participación de partes interesadas; planificación de la conservación Abstract:,Ecosystem management (EM) offers a means to address multiple threats to marine resources. Despite recognition of the importance of stakeholder involvement, most efforts to implement EM in marine systems are the product of top-down regulatory control. We describe a rare, stakeholder-driven attempt to implement EM from the bottom up in San Juan County, Washington (U.S.A.). A citizens advisory group led a 2-year, highly participatory effort to develop an ecosystem-based management plan, guided by a preexisting conservation-planning framework. A key innovation was to incorporate social dimensions by designating both sociocultural and biodiversity targets in the planning process. Multiple obstacles hindered implementation of EM in this setting. Despite using a surrogate scheme, the information-related transaction costs of planning were substantial: information deficits prevented assessment of some biodiversity targets and insufficient resources combined with information deficits prevented scientific assessment of the sociocultural targets. Substantial uncertainty, practical constraints to stakeholder involvement, and the existence of multiple, potentially conflicting, objectives increased negotiation-related costs. Although information deficits and uncertainty, coupled with underinvestment in the transaction costs of planning, could reduce the long-term effectiveness of the plan itself, the social capital and momentum developed through the planning process could yield unforeseeable future gains in protection of marine resources. The obstacles we identified here will require early and sustained attention in efforts to implement ecosystem management in other grassroots settings. Resumen:,El manejo de ecosistemas es un medio para abordar múltiples amenazas a los recursos marinos. No obstante el reconocimiento de la importancia de la participación de las partes interesadas, la mayoría de los esfuerzos para implementar el manejo de ecosistemas en sistemas marinos son producto del control normativo de arriba hacia abajo. Describimos un intento raro, conducido por las partes interesadas, por implementar el manejo del ecosistema de abajo hacia arriba en el Condado San Juan, Washington (E.U.A.). Un grupo consultivo de ciudadanos dirigió un esfuerzo altamente participativo para desarrollar un plan de manejo basado en el ecosistema, guiados por un marco de planificación de la conservación preexistente. Una innovación clave fue la incorporación de dimensiones sociales al incluir objetivos tanto socioculturales como de biodiversidad en el proceso de planificación. Múltiples obstáculos dificultaron la implementación del manejo del ecosistema en este escenario. No obstante que se utilizó un plan sustituto, los costos de transacción de la planificación relacionados con la información fueron mayores de lo que el grupo pudo superar: los déficits de información impidieron la evaluación de algunos objetivos de biodiversidad y la insuficiencia de recursos combinada con los déficits de información impidieron la evaluación científica de los objetivos socioculturales. Los costos relacionados con la negociación incrementaron por la incertidumbre, por limitaciones prácticas en la participación de partes interesadas y la existencia de objetivos múltiples, potencialmente conflictivos. Aunque los déficits de información y la incertidumbre, aunados con la baja inversión en los costos de transacción de la planificación, pudieran reducir la efectividad a largo plazo del plan mismo, el capital social y el ímpetu desarrollados durante el proceso de planificación podrían producir ganancias futuras imprevisibles para la protección de recursos marinos. Los obstáculos que identificamos aquí requerirán de atención temprana y sostenida en los esfuerzos para implementar el manejo de ecosistemas en otros escenarios de base popular. [source] The Distribution of Subsidized Agricultural Credit in Brazil: Do Interest Groups Matter?DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE, Issue 3 2001Steven M. Helfand This article examines the unequal distribution of credit and credit subsidies in the Brazilian agricultural sector from 1969 to 1990. Total credit subsidies exceeded US$ 40 billion in this period. The distribution across crops is studied econometrically. After controlling for area, the crops that benefited most had superior access to credit institutions, were tradeable, had high prices, and were not perennials. Proxies for collective action by crop were an unimportant determinant of credit policy, while a bias in favour of large producers was evident. Alternative explanations for this bias are discussed, including collective action by farm size and transaction costs in lending. [source] The Return of Non-DAC Donors to Africa: New Prospects for African Development?DEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 5 2008Peter Kragelund This article examines the consequences of the return to Africa of donors that are not members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC). It categorises these donors according to form, content, size and modality of their aid. It finds that their return increases external financial flows, in particular to countries not targeted by DAC donors. Moreover, for some donors like China and India the flows are closely related to other financial flow s such as trade and investment. Furthermore, it finds that the return of non-DAC donors may conflict with plans to harmonise aid and may simultaneously raise transaction costs for recipients. [source] The Bangladesh Health SWAp: Experience of a New Aid Instrument in PracticeDEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 4 2007Howard White Sector-wide approaches are being widely adopted as a new aid modality, incorporating government ownership, partnership and a move from project to programme support. The literature to date on their performance in practice is, at best, mixed. This article reviews these issues in the light of the experience of arguably the world's oldest and largest SWAp, the Bangladesh health sector programme. A positive picture emerges of an evolutionary institutional adaptation towards a programme approach, with positive systemic effects on government processes and a reduction in transaction costs in dealing with donors. There are, however, negative aspects, notably, donor dominance in ,dialogue', though with limited influence on the government's actual strategy. [source] TAXI DEREGULATION AND TRANSACTION COSTSECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 2 2006Christian Seibert Deregulation of taxi markets has the potential to deliver significant benefits. However, it presents the problem of transaction costs and in particular problems linked with imperfect information and co-ordination. This article argues that the use of a centralised intermediary in deregulated taxi markets can overcome these problems so that the benefits of competition are maximised, without the need for government fare regulation. [source] Is Privately-provided Electronic Money Next?ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 1 2000Catherine England To survive, any new electronic money will need to provide some advantage to its users, such as lower transaction costs, increased privacy, a greater ability to avoid taxes, or a more stable value than its government-provided competitors. Any successful new money will have to overcome substantial barriers to entry, however. These barriers to entry occur primarily in the form of the costs of switching to a different means of payment and require an understanding of the role played by ,network economics.' Unless a substantial number of the individuals and businesses with whom a person trades use the same money, any new means of payment will have little value. A temptation facing government regulators will be to extend and expand regulations to apply to new means of payment and forms of money. A more productive role of governments is to attempt to protect their own money-creation franchises by minimising the advantages offered by privately-provided alternatives. Governments should enforce contracts and punish fraud while remaining vigilant with respect to inflation, keep tax rates low and protect the privacy of their citizens. [source] Regional Monopoly and Interregional and Intraregional Competition: The Parallel Trade in Coca-Cola Between Shanghai and Hangzhou in ChinaECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY, Issue 1 2006Godfrey Yeung Abstract: This article uses a "principal-agent-subagent" analytical framework and data that were collected from field surveys in China to (1) investigate the nature and causes of the parallel trade in Coca-Cola between Shanghai and Hangzhou and (2) assess the geographic and theoretical implications for the regional monopolies that have been artificially created by Coca-Cola in China. The parallel trade in Coca-Cola is sustained by its intraregional rivalry with Pepsi-Cola in Shanghai, where Coca-Cola (China) (the principal) seeks to maximize its share of the Shanghai soft-drinks market. This goal effectively supersedes the market-division strategy of Coca-Cola (China), since the gap in wholesale prices between the Shanghai and Hangzhou markets is higher than the transaction costs of engaging in parallel trade. The exclusive distributor of Coca-Cola in the Shanghai market (the subagent) makes opportunistic use of a situation in which it does not have to bear the financial consequences of the major residual claimants (the principal and other agents) and has an incentive to enter the nondesignated Coca-Cola market of Hangzhou by crossing the geographic boundary between the two regional monopolies devised by Coca-Cola. The existence of parallel trade in Coca-Cola promotes interregional competition between the Shanghai and Hangzhou bottlers (the agents). This article enhances an understanding of the economic geography of spatial equilibrium, disequilibrium, and quasi-equilibrium of a transnational corporation's distribution system and its artificially created market boundary in China. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||