Trade Politics (trade + politics)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY AND TRADE POLITICS: CAPITAL FLOWS, POLITICAL COALITIONS, AND LOBBYING

ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2004
Michael J. Hiscox
Conventional wisdom holds that increasing international capital mobility reduces incentives for firms to lobby for trade protection. This paper argues that the effects of increased international capital mobility on the lobbying incentives of firms depend critically upon levels of inter-industry mobility. General-equilibrium analysis reveals that if capital is highly industry-specific, greater international mobility among some types of specific capital may increase lobbying incentives for owners of other specific factors and thereby intensify industry-based rent-seeking in trade politics. Evidence on levels of inward and outward investment in US manufacturing industries between 1982 and 1996, and on industry lobbying activities, indicate that these effects may be quite strong. [source]


Trade Politics Ain't What It Used to Be: The European Union in the Doha Round,

JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 4 2007
ALASDAIR R. YOUNG
The European Union is a key player in the Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations. This article argues that its negotiating position reflects distinctive patterns of politics underlying three aspects of trade policy , traditional trade policy, commercial policy and social trade policy , characterized by different sets of actors and political dynamics. Although there is significant variation in the substance of the EU's position within each aspect of trade policy, their distinctive patterns of politics help to explain why the EU's negotiating position is most liberal in traditional trade policy and least in social trade policy. [source]


INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MOBILITY AND TRADE POLITICS: CAPITAL FLOWS, POLITICAL COALITIONS, AND LOBBYING

ECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2004
Michael J. Hiscox
Conventional wisdom holds that increasing international capital mobility reduces incentives for firms to lobby for trade protection. This paper argues that the effects of increased international capital mobility on the lobbying incentives of firms depend critically upon levels of inter-industry mobility. General-equilibrium analysis reveals that if capital is highly industry-specific, greater international mobility among some types of specific capital may increase lobbying incentives for owners of other specific factors and thereby intensify industry-based rent-seeking in trade politics. Evidence on levels of inward and outward investment in US manufacturing industries between 1982 and 1996, and on industry lobbying activities, indicate that these effects may be quite strong. [source]


Government,Business Strategies in EU,US Economic Relations:

JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 3 2002
The Lessons of the Foreign Sales Corporations Issue
The increasingly complex character of the US,EU economic relationship is well understood. Within this relationship, trade politics is an important setting for the interaction of firms, states and civil society. Focusing on a highly significant transatlantic trade dispute relating to a US tax policy (called foreign sales corporations), the article explores the business,government interactions generated. We conclude that such cases illustrate how the integrated character of the transatlantic economy limits the tactical options for all policy players and produces patterns of interaction between public and private actors in which both can come to assume significant roles. [source]


When trade liberalization turns into regulatory reform: The impact on business,government relations in international trade politics

REGULATION & GOVERNANCE, Issue 2 2007
Cornelia Woll
Abstract Business,government relations on trade issues are generally characterized as protectionist lobbying or , less often , lobbying for the liberalization of markets. However, with the evolution of the trading system, negotiations today concern not just market opening, but also the regulatory frameworks that structure international trade. This transformation has important consequences for the ways in which private interests can contribute to trade negotiations. Instead of simply trying to exert pressure, businesses and other private actors now form working relationships with governments based on expertise, learning, and information exchange. This article illustrates these new forms of public,private interactions with examples from the USA, the European Union, and Brazil. [source]