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Top Executives (top + executive)
Selected AbstractsInvestment Decisions and Managerial Discipline: Evidence from the Takeover MarketFINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2005Ralph Scholten This article focuses on the relative importance of boards of directors and the hostile takeover market in disciplining managers who make poor acquisition decisions. The evidence shows a weak inverse relationship between acquisition performance and the likelihood of becoming a takeover target, but only after it becomes clear that the internal control mechanism has failed. A forced turnover of a top executive was more likely in the 1990s, the more negative the abnormal return associated with an acquisition announcement. The relationship between forced turnover and negative acquisition returns is stronger when hostile takeover activity is less intense. Hence, it appears that being disciplined for making a poor acquisition is a function more of the internal control mechanism than of the workings of the takeover market. [source] Will Executive Pay Globalise Along American Lines?CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2003Brian R. Cheffins In the United States, the remuneration packages of top executives are characterised by a strong emphasis on pay,for,performance and by a highly lucrative "upside". There is much discussion of the possibility that executive pay practices will globalise in accordance with this pattern. This paper assesses whether such convergence is likely to occur. It does so by considering market,oriented dynamics that could constitute a "global compensation imperative". It also takes into account possible obstacles to the Americanisation of executive pay, such as legal regulation, "soft law" and "culture". The paper concludes with a brief series of normative observations. [source] Option Expensing and Managerial Equity IncentivesFINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, Issue 3 2009Yi Feng We examine the impact of mandatory option expensing on managerial equity incentives. Though effective only after June 15, 2005, there is evidence that U.S. firms begin preparing for option expensing as early as 2002 by making changes to their equity incentive plans. We find that (1) CEO option incentives exhibit a sharp reversal during the period 1993-2005, with the median CEO option incentives increasing 25% a year before 2002 but declining 17% a year after 2001; (2) the reduction in option incentives after 2001 is larger for firms that use excessive levels of equity incentives prior to 2002; (3) firms make similar reductions to options granted to CEOs, other top executives and lower-level employees; (4) CEO stock incentives increase throughout the entire 13-year period, rising at an even greater rate after 2001; and (5) the increase in stock incentives after 2001 is far from offsetting the corresponding decrease in option incentives. These findings are robust to controls for firm and CEO characteristics and for concurrent regulatory, business and market events such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the option backdating scandal, and the 2000 stock market crash. We also provide a theoretical explanation for the documented changes in option incentives. [source] Philanthropy, social capital or strategic alliance?INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR MARKETING, Issue 3 2002The involvement of senior UK business executives with the voluntary sector, implications for corporate fundraising Although corporate fundraising is popular there has been very little discussion in the voluntary sector literature of its context. Using questionnaire data from senior executives representing one-third of the FTSE350 companies, and in-depth interviews with a number of top level business men, this paper reports the first UK survey of the personal involvement of senior executives with charities, voluntary and community organisations,[Walker, C. and Pharoah, C. (2000) ,Making time for charity: A survey of top business leaders' involvement with voluntary organisations', Charities Aid Foundation, Kent.] and pinpoints messages about corporate involvement which may help fundraisers develop corporate fundraising strategies. The data give the first indications of how many of the UK's top business executives give time to charity, how much time they give and what they do. It also addresses what there is to gain for and from the charity, the senior executive and their company. The results present a picture of widespread and enthusiastic involvement of senior executives with the voluntary sector; a picture of both a deep personal commitment and of a strong sense of corporate benefit. The survey also raises several important issues and implications for corporate fundraising: should charities be doing more to attract top executives into an active relationship with them? How can they do this? What are the pros and cons of an alliance between corporate figureheads and charitable organisations; how might this relationship be viewed by the public; and how might it best be managed? This paper draws on the results of the survey to illustrate and discuss these issues. Copyright © 2002 Henry Stewart Publications [source] The threat of global white-collar crimeJOURNAL OF CORPORATE ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 6 2009Jo Ann McGee There is no completely safe place in the world to do business. Most top executives accept this fact as a risk they have to manage. But how many understand the true scope of global white-collar crime (WCC),and its potential threats? For example, did you know that, according to PricewaterhouseCoopers, WCC is the most problematic issue for businesses worldwide? © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. [source] Boards of Directors and Shark Repellents:Assessing the Value of an Agency Theory PerspectiveJOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 3 2000Steven A. Frankforter Because shark repellents decrease the vulnerability of firms (and their incumbent managers) to the market for corporate control, the decision to adopt these devices represents an excellent test of agency theory. In this empirical study, we examined the relationships between the adoption of shark repellents and several mechanisms that, according to agency theory, should align the interests of corporate board members and shareholders and/or make directors more effective monitors of management behaviour. Of the variables included, only board stock ownership (especially by employee directors) was linked to a reduced propensity to adopt shark repellents in the predicted manner. Two variables not immediately as- sociated with agency theory , the proportion of inside directors appointed by the incumbent chief executive officer (CEO) and a lower ratio of CEO compensation to the compensation of other top executives , were linked to higher rates of shark repellent adoption. Given that agency theory explains relatively little of the variance in shark repellent adoption, we advocate serious consideration of other theoretical formulations for corporate governance, including two approaches , stewardship theory and agent morality , that take the moral (,other regarding') obligations of directors seriously. [source] The influence of top management team attention patterns on global strategic posture of firmsJOURNAL OF ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR, Issue 7 2005Orly Levy Drawing upon the managerial cognition and the upper echelons perspectives, this study proposes that the cognitive capabilities of top executives significantly affect globalization efforts. Specifically, the study suggests that managerial attention patterns or the cognitive processes of [noticing and constructing meaning] about the environment influence strategic posture of firms. Based on a longitudinal sample of U.S. firms operating in technologically intensive industries, the results indicate that firms were more likely to develop an expansive global strategic posture when their top management paid attention to the external environment and considered a diverse set of elements in this environment. On the other hand, firms led by top management that paid more attention to the internal environment were less likely to be global. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Is there a ,New Managerial Work'?JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 7 2006A Comparison with Henry Mintzberg's Classic Study 30 Years Later abstract This comparative study of top executives' work aimed at examining the stability of top managerial behaviour reveals a relatively different pattern of behaviour compared with the study by Henry Mintzberg. The main differences are a much larger workload, a contact pattern to a larger degree oriented towards subordinates in group-settings, a greater emphasis on giving information, and less preoccupation with administrative work. One important finding is that fragmentation of time , in previous studies highlighted as a central tenet of managerial work , was not as prevalent in the new study. The different results can be attributed (with caution) to the impact of the management discourse about leadership and corporate culture, and to factors such as organizational structure and geographical dispersion of companies. However, there are also significant similarities between the two studies which indicate that claims of the emergence of a radically different managerial work are much exaggerated. Instead the empirical data shows that new work-practices are combined with older practices, both in a complex and context-specific ways. Therefore, there is a need for better integration between theoretical development and empirical investigations in this field of inquiry. [source] | ||||||||||