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Terror Attacks (terror + attack)
Selected AbstractsDemographic Data on the Victims of the September 11, 2001 Terror Attack on the World Trade Center, New York CityPOPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW, Issue 3 2002Article first published online: 27 JAN 200 The magnitude of the death toll resulting from the attack on the World Trade Center is without precedent in the history of terrorist acts. Because of the scale and destructiveness of the buildings' collapse, a final list of the victims required a lengthy process, more so than was the case at the other sites of terrorist violence on the same day,at the Pentagon, Virginia (193 killed, 68 of these on American Airlines Flight 77), and near Shanksville, Pennsylvania (45 killed in the crash of United Airlines Flight 93). After the passing of a year, the list of the victims in New York, while essentially complete, is still not officially closed. On August 19, 2002, the city's medical examiner's office issued a list containing 2,819 names. Reproduced below are some data, released by the city's office of vital statistics, on the demographic characteristics of 2,723 victims (59 of these on United Airlines Flight 175 and 89 on American Airlines Flight 11) for whom a death certificate had been issued,an exacting procedure,as of August 16,2002. The cause of death, in each instance, was entered as homicide. The age distribution reflects the character of the World Trade Center,a workplace,and the time of day,early for tourist visits. The youngest victims perished as passengers in the two airplanes flown into the twin towers. [source] The intergenerational effects of trauma from terror: A real possibility,INFANT MENTAL HEALTH JOURNAL, Issue 2 2009Marsha Kaitz The goals of this article are to discuss the potential risk of children whose parents were traumatized by terror, to present literature on parenting in the context of terror, and to consider factors that may mediate the transmission of trauma-effects from parents to children. Mediators considered are parents' traumatic distress, disturbed parent,child interactions, trauma-related disturbances in parents' thinking, and effects of stress on children's neural functioning. Also discussed are genetic and environmental factors that may moderate the transmission of intergenerational effects and promote children's risk and resilience. Points raised during the discussion are illustrated with segments from interviews of women who were pregnant or gave birth some time after direct exposure to a terror attack. The authors conclude that empirical studies are needed to learn more about the intergenerational transmission of trauma-effects and processes that underlie it. The authors join others in the call to improve evaluation, treatment, and support of trauma victims and their children to stymie the transmission of problems from one generation to the next. [source] Israeli Kindergarten Teachers Cope With Terror and War: Two Implicit Models of ResilienceCURRICULUM INQUIRY, Issue 1 2007DAVID BRODY ABSTRACT The resilience of teachers in the face of terror was examined in a narrative study of two Israeli kindergarten teachers over the course of one school year. During this time, there occurred frequent terror attacks as well as the threat of impending war with Iraq and the concomitant threat of chemical warfare. Each teacher's unique pattern of coping based on her own personal theory of resilience was examined. One teacher actively processed with her students stressful news items that the children had encountered. This was based on her belief that children would become more resilient if they had experience dealing with stress in a mediated fashion. The second teacher chose to create what she perceived to be a comfort zone for her students by actively avoiding open discussion about stressful events. She chose to focus on enhancing self-esteem, self-efficacy, and optimism, which she believed would produce greater resilience in her students. In developing these personal resilience theories, both teachers were able to move out of a paralyzed position that is typical of crisis and the immediate posttraumatic period, and move into active coping, thereby incorporating their unique theories of resilience into their personal professional knowledge. These practices were examined in light of current resilience theory. [source] The police officer's terrorist dilemma: trust resilience following fatal errorsEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, Issue 6 2008Mathew P. White Suicide attacks have raised the stakes for officers deciding whether or not to shoot a suspect (,Police Officer's Terrorist Dilemma'). Despite high-profile errors we know little about how trust in the police is affected by their response to the terrorist threat. Building on a conceptualisation of lay observers as intuitive signal detection theorists, a general population sample (N,=,1153) were presented with scenarios manipulated in terms of suspect status (Armed/Unarmed), officer decision (Shoot/Not Shoot) and outcome severity (e.g. suspect armed with Bomb/Knife; police shoot suspect/suspect plus child bystander). Supporting predictions, people showed higher trust in officers who made correct decisions, reflecting good discrimination ability and who decided to shoot, reflecting an ,appropriate' response bias given the relative costs and benefits. This latter effect was moderated by (a) outcome severity, suggesting it did not simply reflect a preference for a particular type of action, and (b) preferences for a tough stance towards terrorism indexed by Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). Despite loss of civilian life, failure to prevent minor terror attacks resulted in no loss of trust amongst people low in RWA, whereas among people high in RWA trust was positive when police erroneously shot an unarmed suspect. Relations to alternative definitions of trust and procedural justice research are discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Bolt from the Blue or Avoidable Failure?FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 3 2005Revisiting September 1, the Origins of Strategic Surprise Drawing on the strategic surprise, warning-response, and foreign policy literature, this article argues that the September 11 terror attacks should be regarded as a strategic surprise and examines a number of key factors that contributed to vulnerability and inhibited vigilance. Three broad explanatory "cuts" derived from the literature,psychological, bureau-organizational, and agenda-political,are deployed to sift through the rapidly expanding empirical record in an effort to shed light on the processes and contextual factors that left the United States vulnerable to the attacks. The article aims to improve our understanding of generic processes and practices that enhance or detract from vulnerability and vigilance. [source] Security Zones and New York City's Shrinking Public SpaceINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF URBAN AND REGIONAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2010JEREMY NÉMETH Abstract Urban scholars lament the loss of public space due to heightened security and behavioral controls borne of economic priorities and anti-terror concerns after September 11th 2001. Owners and managers of government buildings, banks and courthouses have closed streets and fitted the surrounding space with concrete barriers, bollards and moat-like structures to prevent potential terror attacks. These are reasonable protections in emergency situations, but, as threat levels fall, these zones fail to incorporate a diversity of users, privatizing the space for those with security clearance. The ubiquity of these zones encourages us to consider them as a new type of land use. To test this statement, we describe the results of site visits to two high-profile New York City neighborhoods (one with numerous civic buildings, the other populated with corporate headquarters). Using a simple tool we developed, we find that 27% of aggregate non-building area in the two districts is now in a security zone. Interestingly, the percentage of space within each district that can be classed as a security zone is reasonably similar, providing insight into the way in which terror targets are internally and externally defined and justified. We argue that this new type of land use is an important and permanent feature of twenty-first century global cities. Résumé Les chercheurs en sciences urbaines regrettent la perte d'espace public, incriminant souvent les contrôles accrus de sécurité et de comportement suscités par des priorités économiques ou des préoccupations anti-terroristes depuis le 11 septembre 2001. Propriétaires et gestionnaires de bâtiments publics, banques et tribunaux ont fermé des rues et équipé l'espace environnant d'obstacles en béton, de plots et de quasi-fossés afin de parer aux attaques terroristes potentielles. Ces protections sont normales en situations d'urgence, mais lorsque la menace décroît, les zones concernées ne parviennent pas à diversifier leurs usagers, l'espace étant réservé aux détenteurs de droits d'accès. L'ubiquité de ces zones pousse à les considérer comme un nouveau type d'occupation des sols. Pour vérifier cette affirmation, nous présentons les résultats de visites dans deux quartiers éminents de New York, l'un regroupant de nombreux bâtiments publics, l'autre une multitude de sièges sociaux. Au moyen d'un outil simple développé par nos soins, nous constatons que 27% de la surface cumulée non bâtie dans les deux secteurs sont désormais dans une zone sécurisée. Il faut noter que, dans chaque secteur, la proportion de l'espace qui peut être classé en zone sécurisée est relativement similaire, donnant un éclairage sur la façon dont les cibles terroristes sont définies et justifiées sur les plans intérieur et extérieur. Selon nous, ce nouveau type d'occupation des sols constitue un caractère important et permanent des villes planétaires du xxie siècle. [source] Negotiations and the Anti-Taliban Counterinsurgency in PakistanASIAN POLITICS AND POLICY, Issue 2 2010Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi This article engages with the Pakistani government's tendency to negotiate peace settlements with Taliban militants as a primary element of their counterinsurgency (COIN) policy. These peace settlements have consistently broken down, exacerbating a causal spiral of violence, as elaborated by an analytical matrix by the author. This COIN strategy has been seen by many, particularly in the United States, as a beacon for militants to regroup, with a consequent renewal of insurgency and terror attacks. This article attempts to contextualize the peace processes reached by negotiations of the Pakistani government with the militants, with projections for a successful COIN policy being articulated at the empirical level. [source] | ||||||||||