Home  About us  Contact
 

Tender Offer (tender + offer)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

Insider Trading after Repurchase Tender Offer Announcements: Timing versus Informed Trading

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2010
Henock Louis
Abnormally high net insider selling is commonly observed after repurchase tender offer (RTO) announcements although, on average, firms experience positive abnormal returns in the years after the repurchases. We explore two potential explanations: liquidity trade timing and informed trading. Consistent with the notion that fixed price RTOs are more likely than Dutch-auction RTOs to signal undervaluation, the results suggest that insider selling after fixed price RTO announcements are driven largely by insiders who time their trades with the repurchase announcements. In contrast, selling after Dutch-auction RTOs seems to be driven primarily by informed traders who exploit mispricing associated with the repurchase announcements. [source]

Why do Shareholders Allow Their Managers to be Gatekeepers in Corporate Control Contests?,

ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL STUDIES, Issue 6 2008
Kyung Suh Park
Abstract This paper formulates a theoretical model to explain why target shareholders under corporate control contests allow their managers to play the role of a gatekeeper despite the conflicting incentive of the managers to resist takeover attempts that might increase firm value. The paper claims that sometimes the existence of a manager with a conflicting goal can contribute to enhancing the welfare of his shareholders under a corporate control contest where bidders have the choice of takeover methods. We set up a game-theoretical model and derive a separating equilibrium where bidders with higher synergy prefer a tender offer to a merger, and the bidders are forced to pay higher takeover premium in a hostile tender offer due to the existence of informed target managers who can make counteroffers under a merger deal. [source]

Share Repurchase Offers and Liquidity: An Examination of Temporary and Permanent Effects

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2008
Nandkumar Nayar
Open-market repurchase programs do not allow for precise estimates of share buy-back intensity to measure liquidity effects. To circumvent the uncertainty surrounding the quantity and timing of shares truly acquired in repurchase programs and to measure their long-term impact, we examine Dutch auctions and fixed-price tender offers. We investigate both the temporary and permanent liquidity effects of share repurchase programs and find that the improvement in liquidity is transitory and limited to the tender period when the firm's offer to repurchase shares is outstanding. Improvements in liquidity over longer intervals appear to be the result of an overall price improvement and a reduction in volatility rather than the result of structural change in market dynamics. [source]

Determinants of Institutional Responses to Self,Tender Offers

FINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 3 2002
Judith Swisher
I examine how institutional investors respond to self,tender offers for common shares. I find that institutions sell more shares in larger offers and with higher proration factors. Institutions also sell more shares when officer and director holdings are not at risk in the offers. Banks, investment advisors, and other managers respond similarly, selling more shares in larger offers. Although institutions as a group do not respond differently by offer type, insurance companies and investment advisors sell more shares in fixed,price offers. Mutual funds, which differ from other types of institutions, sell more shares for firms with greater increases in leverage. [source]