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Bargaining
Kinds of Bargaining Terms modified by Bargaining Selected AbstractsUNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF BARGAINING FOR ADOPTION ASSISTANCE PAYMENTSFAMILY COURT REVIEW, Issue 3 2005Hansen Mary Eschelbach Families that adopt children who are in foster care may receive monthly adoption assistance payments to offset the cost of raising the adopted child. The amount of the adoption assistance payment is the subject of bargaining between the family and the child welfare authority. This article uses a bargaining model to highlight factors that, in addition to the expected costs of raising the child, might influence the outcome of bargaining over adoption assistance payments. Findings indicate that married parents who adopt children already in their care have an advantage in bargaining, and single women who adopt their kin or foster children have a disadvantage in bargaining. [source] LONG-TERM CARE AND FAMILY BARGAINING*INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2002MAXIM ENGERS We present a structural model of how families decide who should care for elderly parents. We use data from the National Long-Term Care Survey to estimate and test the parameters of the model. Then we use the parameter estimates to simulate the effects of the existing long-term trends in terms of the common but untested explanations for them. Finally, we simulate the effects of alternative family bargaining rules on individual utility to measure the sensitivity of our results to the family decision-making assumptions we make. [source] PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE PRESENCE OF PRE-TRIAL BARGAINING,THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2009SYLVAIN BOURJADE We study the effect of encouraging private actions for breaches of competition law. We develop a model of litigation and settlement with asymmetric information. We show that screening liable from non-liable defendants requires the Court to restrict the rules governing admissible evidence. We study how to design the rules so as to enhance the role of private litigation in antitrust enforcement and prove that increasing damages is better than reducing costs of initiating suits. We also find large benefits from introducing a system of compensation for defendants found non-liable, paid by unsuccessful plaintiffs. [source] Bargaining without a Common Prior,An Immediate Agreement TheoremECONOMETRICA, Issue 3 2003Muhamet Yildiz In sequential bargaining models without outside options, each player's bargaining power is ultimately determined by which player will make an offer and when. This paper analyzes a sequential bargaining model in which players may hold different beliefs about which player will make an offer and when. Excessive optimism about making offers in the future can cause delays in agreement. The main result states that, despite this, if players will remain sufficiently optimistic for a sufficiently long future, then in equilibrium they will agree immediately. This result is also extended to other canonical models of optimism. [source] INEQUALITY, REDISTRIBUTION, AND RENT-SEEKINGECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 3 2004Francisco Rodríguez This paper presents a non-median voter model of redistribution in which greater inequality leads to lower redistribution. Bargaining between interest groups and politicians over exemptions implies that individuals with sufficiently high income will not pay taxes in equilibrium. Therefore, voters will set tax rates low enough so as to control the incentives for rent-seeking. An increase in inequality, by putting more income in the hands of individuals that can buy exemptions, will lead to lower equilibrium redistribution. The model can be used to account for a negative relationship between inequality and growth and provides a new explanation of why the poor do not expropriate the rich in democracies. [source] Equality Bargaining: Where, Who, Why?GENDER, WORK & ORGANISATION, Issue 6 2006Edmund Heery It is common to identify a role for trade unions in combating sex inequality at work through collective bargaining. This article uses a survey of paid union officers to identify the context in which equality bargaining by unions is likely to occur, using the specific issue of bargaining on equal pay. It concludes that equality bargaining is a function of women's voice within unions, the characteristics and preferences of bargainers themselves and of a favourable public policy environment. Bargaining on equal pay is also more likely in centralized negotiations that cover multiple employers. [source] Optimal Factor Taxation under Wage Bargaining: A Dynamic PerspectiveGERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2008Erkki Koskela Optimal taxation; imperfectly competitive labour markets; capital accumulation Abstract. We consider the issue of steady-state optimal factor taxation in a Ramsey-type dynamic general equilibrium setting with two distinct distortions: (i) taxes on capital and labour are the only available tax instruments for raising revenues and (ii) labour markets are subject to an inefficiency resulting from wage bargaining. If considered in isolation, the two distortions create conflicting demands on the wage tax, while calling for a zero capital tax. By combining the two distortions, we arrive at the conclusion that both instruments should be used, implying that the zero capital tax result in general is no longer valid under imperfectly competitive labour markets. [source] Centralized Wage Bargaining and the "Celtic Tiger" PhenomenonINDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 3 2007LUCIO BACCARO Drawing on a variety of sources and research methods, this article argues that centralized wage bargaining contributed to the "Celtic Tiger" phenomenon by linking wage increases in the dynamic multinational companies sector to wage and productivity increases in the much more sluggish domestic sector of the economy and, in so doing, considerably increased the competitiveness of foreign multinational companies,a key driver of Irish growth. The article also argues that much-received wisdom about the institutional and organizational preconditions for centralized wage regulation needs to be reconsidered in light of the Irish case. Public sector unions played a pivotal role in initiating and sustaining wage centralization, yet their leadership role did not undermine its effectiveness. Likewise, internal democratic procedures and the absence of wage compression policies, rather than centralized organizational structures, facilitated compliance with centralized wage policies. [source] Bargaining, Bonding, and Partial OwnershipINTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 3 2000Sudipto Dasgupta This article provides a theory of interfirm partial ownership. We consider a setting in which an upstream firm can make two alternative types of investment: either specific investment that only a particular downstream firm can use or general investment that any downstream firm is capable of using. When the benefits from specific and general investments are both stochastic, equity participation by the downstream firm in the upstream firm can lead to more efficient outcomes than take-or-pay contracts. The optimal ownership stake of the downstream firm is less than 50 percent under a natural assumption about relative bargaining power. [source] The EU Comitology System: Intergovernmental Bargaining and Deliberative Supranationalism?JCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 4 2009JENS BLOM-HANSEN Two images exist of the day-to-day practice of the EU comitology system. The first claims that comitology is deliberation by policy experts in which informal norms, deliberation and good arguments matter more than economic interests and formal voting rules. The second image portrays comitology as an arena for intergovernmental bargaining designed by the Member States to control the Commission. The article systematically investigates these images based on survey evidence from a questionnaire to the Danish and Dutch national representatives on nearly all comitology committees in 2006. The evidence suggests that both images hold and that their relative importance is determined by the nature of the issues dealt with by the individual comitology committees. [source] Bargaining and Efficiency in SharecroppingJOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2001Jon Reiersen In this paper the Nash bargaining solution is used to derive solutions for the rental share and labour input in sharecropping. The bargaining is modeled as a two-stage process. First there is a bargain about the rental share, and then a bargain about labour input. The power of the landlord to ensure an outcome favourable to himself may differ in the two stages. By imposing particular assumptions about this bargaining power, some popular models of sharecropping, that have been treated as completely separate in the literature, can be derived as special cases in our model. However, we also generate a new class of models. It is also demonstrated that it is not the tenant's influence in the labour input decision per se which causes inefficiency in sharecropping, but differences in the tenant's influence over different issues in the contract. This is in contrast to the popular view which states that if the tenant controls the level of labour input, sharecropping will result in an inefficient resource allocation. [source] Bargaining When Exchange Affects the Value of Future TradeJOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 4 2003Charles J. Hadlock We examine bargaining in a dynamic context where exchange between two parties affects the potential surplus from future trade. In this setting traders negotiate current contracts anticipating the impact of their agreement on future exchanges. We show that in growing environments these dynamic considerations will often ameliorate bargaining inefficiencies associated with private information and facilitate exchange as both parties cooperate to nurture the relationship. In contrast, we find that in declining environments dynamic considerations will often exacerbate bargaining inefficiencies and hinder trade, as both parties are hesitant to let the relationship mature. These findings have implications for preferences to form long-lived relationships. [source] The Symbolic Capital of Social Identities: The Genre of Bargaining in an Urban Guatemalan MarketJOURNAL OF LINGUISTIC ANTHROPOLOGY, Issue 2 2000Brigittine M. French This article examines bartering speech in a Guatemalan market as a particular type of discourse, the genre of bargaining. It also investigates marketers' uses of that discourse as facilitating a process of negotiating their identities as social actors. The article examines, first, how the invocation of the genre of bargaining orders marketers' speech into a stable and coherent discourse; second, how the genre's connections with social, ideological, and political-economic relations invest marketers' speech with pre-established associations; and third, how marketers may manipulate social and ideological associations established by past conventions in order to negotiate the social value of their identities at present. [source] Welfare Effects of Local versus Central Wage BargainingLABOUR, Issue 1 2010Marcus Dittrich The paper analyses the welfare effects of union bargaining (de)centralization in a dual labour market with a unionized and a competitive sector. We show that social welfare depends on both the structure of the union's objective function and the elasticities of labour demand in both sectors. The welfare-maximizing employment allocation can be obtained under a high degree of centralization if the union maximizes the total wage-bill. Otherwise, if the union is rent maximizing, welfare is higher under local bargaining. However, in that case neither central nor local wage setting yields the social optimum. [source] Do Participants and Observers Assess Intentions Differently During Bargaining and Conflict?AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 4 2009Eric S. Dickson Political actors in conflict settings are often uncertain about their counterparts' intentions. This article explores the psychology of how intentions are assessed using a novel experimental design that randomly assigns subjects to one of three roles,"proposer,""recipient," or "observer." Recipients and observers are given identical noisy information about proposers' actions, and make postplay assessments of proposers' intentions that are rewarded based on accuracy. A first experiment explores a context of ambiguity, while a second experiment explores a context of uncertainty. The results suggest that actors' perceptions can sometimes be directly affected by the set of strategic alternatives they possess. When signals about proposer behavior appear "negative," recipients' assessments of proposers' intentions are more negative than observers' assessments if recipients have the ability to respond to the proposer's action,but not if recipients lack this ability. The ability to respond to proposer behavior appears to cause recipients to make more negative inferences about the proposer than circumstances warrant. Interestingly, recipients' and observers' assessments are indistinguishable when signals about proposer behavior instead appear "positive." [source] Collective Bargaining and The Performance of the Public SchoolsAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2009Terry M. Moe Students of American politics rarely study public sector unions and their impacts on government. The literature sees bureaucratic power as rooted in expertise, but largely ignores the fact that bureaucrats often join unions to promote their own interests, and that the power of their unions may affect government and its performance. This article focuses on the public schools, which are among the most numerous government agencies in the country, and investigates whether collective bargaining by teachers,the key bureaucrats,affects the schools' capacity to educate children. Using California data, analysis shows that, in large school districts, restrictive labor contracts have a very negative impact on academic achievement, particularly for minority students. The evidence suggests, then, that public sector unions do indeed have important consequences for American public education. Whether they are consequential in other areas of government remains to be seen, but it is an avenue well worth pursuing. [source] Centralization of Bargaining and Wage Inequality: A Correction of WallersteinAMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 1 2006Miriam A. Golden First page of article [source] The Efficiency Principle in Non-Cooperative Coalitional BargainingTHE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2000Akira Okada Applying the non-cooperative theory of coalitional bargaining, I examine a widely held view in economic literature that an efficient outcome can be agreed on in voluntary bargaining among rational agents in the absence of transaction costs. While this view is not always true, owing to the strategic formation of subcoalitions, I show that it can hold under the possibility of successive renegotiations of agreements. Renegotiation may, however, motivate bargainers to form a subcoalition first and to exploit the first-mover rent. This strategic behaviour in the process of renegotiation may distort the equity of an agreement. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, C78, D23, D61, D63. [source] Capital Structure as a Strategic Variable: Evidence from Collective BargainingTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 3 2010DAVID A. MATSA ABSTRACT I analyze the strategic use of debt financing to improve a firm's bargaining position with an important supplier,organized labor. Because maintaining high levels of corporate liquidity can encourage workers to raise their wage demands, a firm with external finance constraints has an incentive to use the cash flow demands of debt service to improve its bargaining position with workers. Using both firm-level collective bargaining coverage and state changes in labor laws to identify changes in union bargaining power, I show that strategic incentives from union bargaining appear to have a substantial impact on corporate financing decisions. [source] Jury Trials and Plea Bargaining: A True History by Mike McConville and Chester L. MirskyTHE MODERN LAW REVIEW, Issue 5 2006Lindsay Farmer No abstract is available for this article. [source] Bargaining with Baraka: Persian Sufism, "Mysticism," and Pre-modern PoliticsTHE MUSLIM WORLD, Issue 3-4 2000Omid Safi First page of article [source] Efficiency and Program-Contract Bargaining in Spanish Public HospitalsANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2004Juan Ventura The results demonstrate that a significant improvement has occurred. The decomposition of the Malmquist productivity index shows that efficiency change has been the main contributor to productivity improvement. We also analyse the dynamic implications of program-contract bargaining. In particular, the data support the hypothesis that the bargaining process has been subject to a ratchet effect, i.e., the more a hospital does today, the more the hospital is asked to do in the future. This result threatens the credibility of the program-contract as an incentive system. [source] Bargaining with Patriarchy: Taiwanese Women Hiring Migrant Domestic WorkersANTHROPOLOGY OF WORK REVIEW, Issue 3 2000Pei-Chia Lan First page of article [source] The Effectiveness of Incomes Policies, in Australia Bargaining and Inflation Targetting EnterpriseAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 1 2004Jenny N. Lye This paper updates earlier estimates that show the existence of a range of equilibrium rates of unemployment in Australia. Within the range of equilibria framework, the paper goes on to test the effectiveness of incomes policies, enterprise bargaining and inflation-target based monetary policy for influencing the rate of inflation in Australia in the period 1965 to 2001. Incomes policies, especially the Accord, and enterprise bargaining are shown to have caused permanent reductions in the rate of inflation. The inflation-target based monetary policy is shown to be associated with, but is not shown to have caused, a reduced impact on inflation of changes in the level of activity. [source] The Organisation of Wage Bargaining in Divisionalised FirmsAUSTRALIAN ECONOMIC PAPERS, Issue 3 2002Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz This paper analyses the organisation of wage bargaining in multiproduct firms since it affects the distribution of power between workers and firms. We assume that each firm has two plants and chooses who bargains the wage with the workers: either the head of the firm or the manager of each plant. Similarly, in each firm, its workers choose whether they set up plant unions or a single union. [source] Pattern Bargaining: An Investigation into its Agency, Context and EvidenceBRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 1 2008Franz Traxler Pattern bargaining stands out as both an under-researched and controversial subject. This article is an analytical and empirical contribution to this debate. Theoretically, it provides a conceptual framework, which enables analysis to systematically differentiate between distinct forms of pattern bargaining in terms of scope, agency, development and function, which arise from differing contexts in terms of interest configuration, power relations and economic conditions. This framework is used to develop testable hypotheses on pattern bargaining as a mechanism of inter-industry bargaining co-ordination. The empirical part of the article examines these hypotheses for collective bargaining from 1969 to 2004 in Austria, which is commonly seen as a paradigm case of pattern bargaining. The article concludes by highlighting the broader implications its findings have from a cross-nationally comparative perspective. [source] Collective Bargaining and Wage Dispersion in EuropeBRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 1 2007Carlo Dell'Aringa The level at which collective bargaining takes place is usually considered important in determining wage levels and wage inequalities. Two different situations are considered: a first in which bargaining is only ,multi-employer', and a second in which it is ,multi-level', in the sense that workers can be covered by both a ,multi-employer' and a ,single-employer' contract at the same time. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of these different institutional settings on pay dispersion. The study is carried out using the European Structure of Earnings Survey, which is a large dataset containing detailed matched employer,employee information for the year 1995. The countries analysed are Italy, Belgium and Spain. The empirical results generally show that wages of workers covered by only a ,multi-employer' contract are no more compressed than those of workers covered by both ,multi-employer' and ,single-employer' contracts. This implies that where workers are not covered by single-employer bargaining, they receive wage supplements paid unilaterally by their employers. [source] Global Collective Bargaining on Flag of Convenience ShippingBRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 1 2004Nathan Lillie The most significant case of transnational union bargaining co-ordination in existence is in the maritime shipping industry. A global union association, the International Transport Workers' Federation (ITF), and a global employers' federation, the International Maritime Employers' Committee (IMEC), now negotiate over pay scales for seafarers on Flag of Convenience (FOC) ships. These negotiations set the pattern for pay and working conditions for a signifi-cant portion of the global seafaring work-force. The ITF brought about global wage bargaining by building and enforcing a global inter-union consensus between developed and developing countries around a uniform wage rate. [source] Bargaining (De)centralization, Macroeconomic Performance and Control over the Employment RelationshipBRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 1 2003Franz Traxler Based on data for 20 OECD countries, this paper analyses the effect of bargaining centralization on performance and control over the employment relationship. Rejecting both the corporatist thesis and the hump,shape thesis, the paper finds that performance either increases or decreases with centralization, depending on the ability of the higher level to bind lower levels. There is a clear effect on control in that bargaining coverage significantly declines with decentralization. Employers can therefore expect to extend management prerogatives, rather than improve performance, when enforcing decentralization. Hence the literature on bargaining structures when focusing on performance has lost sight of their contested nature. [source] Co-ordinated Bargaining: A Process for Our Times?BRITISH JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 2 2002Keith Sisson This article draws on past as well as present to offer a systematic overview of co-ordinated bargaining, which many commentators see as a likely vehicle for the ,Europeanization' of industrial relations. It argues that co-ordinated bargaining is indeed likely to play a major role within the EU, reflecting not only trade union pressures but also management's use of benchmarking to promote organizational change and competitiveness. The pace with which co-ordinated bargaining develops is likely to vary considerably both within and between sectors, however, leading to multi-speed ,Europeanization' and further decentralization of collective bargaining within national systems. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||