			Home About us Contact

Takeover Bids (takeover + bid)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	91%

Selected Abstracts

Contesting "Corporate Value" Through Takeover Bids in Japan

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 1 2007
D. Hugh Whittaker
Livedoor's attempted takeover of Nippon Broadcasting System in February 2005 marked a watershed in the history of mergers and acquisitions in Japan. The drama was played out in public, changing popular perceptions, influencing policy makers and sending managers scurrying to debate and erect legitimate defence measures in case they themselves should be targeted. Tensions on the investor relations interface were not subsequently reversed by Livedoor's equally dramatic demise. The article considers the rise of takeover bids in Japan, responses to it, and their significance for corporate control and governance, as well as for the "community firm". [source]

Shareholder Wealth Effects of European Domestic and Cross-border Takeover Bids

EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2004
Marc Goergen
G32; G34 Abstract This paper analyses the short-term wealth effects of large intra-European takeover bids. We find announcement effects of 9% for the target firms compared to a statistically significant announcement effect of only 0.7% for the bidders. The type of takeover bid has a large impact on the short-term wealth effects with hostile takeovers triggering substantially larger price reactions than friendly operations. When a UK firm is involved, the abnormal returns are higher than those of bids involving both a Continental European target and bidder. There is strong evidence that the means of payment in an offer has an impact on the share price. A high market-to-book ratio of the target leads to a higher bid premium, but triggers a negative price reaction for the bidding firm. We also investigate whether the predominant reason for takeovers is synergies, agency problems or managerial hubris. Our results suggest that synergies are the prime motivation for bids and that targets and bidders share the wealth gains. [source]

The Takeover Directive: Is a Little Regulation Better Than No Regulation?

EUROPEAN LAW JOURNAL, Issue 2 2009
Blanaid Clarke
This article examines Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids through a regulatory lens in order to determine its effectiveness as a regulatory mechanism. A central regulatory problem for European legislators is to determine the optimal balance between harmonisation and diversity, and the directive reflects the balance which was struck. The article questions whether the resulting ,light regulatory touch' may have jeopardised the existing efficient self-regulatory regime which operates in the UK (the largest European takeover market), while simultaneously undermining the directive's goal of facilitating takeovers and yielding a level playing field. [source]

Shareholder Wealth Effects of European Domestic and Cross-border Takeover Bids

Some Theoretical and Practical Implications of the Attempted Takeover of a Consumer Cooperative Society

ANNALS OF PUBLIC AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2000
J. Birchall
The article begins with some observations about the trend towards demutualization of mutual and co-operative businesses, and then presents a case study of one, rather dramatic, example: the attempted takeover of Europe's largest consumer co-operative, CWS. It draws on original research into the takeover bid to provide a summary of what happened and when, and then asks some important questions about whether consumer co-operatives are inherently less efficient than PLCs in the retail sector; whether they can make themselves safe from takeover; if they do survive, how they can justify their existence as member-owned businesses; and whether there are alternative forms such as worker or multi-stakeholder ownership that can achieve the broad aims of the co-operative sector more effectively. It concludes that if CWS and similar organizations are to survive they must integrate the two aspects of a co-operative,the business and the association,and take seriously the opportunities and responsibilities that being a member-owned organization implies. [source]

Financing Constraints, Ownership Control, and Cross-Border M&As: Evidence from Nine East Asian Economies

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Issue 6 2009
Yenn-Ru Chen
ABSTRACT Manuscript Type: Empirical Research Question/Issue: This study distinguishes between the effects of financial constraint determinants on cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and domestic M&As for all takeover bids announced in nine East Asian economies from 1998 to 2005. Research Findings/Insights: The results of logistic regressions verify that the extent of stock market and governance developments improves corporate financing conditions and subsequently encourages cross-border M&As in East Asia. The results also indicate that, except for ownership control variables, the firm-specific factors of financing constraints reduce the occurrence of cross-border M&As relative to domestic M&As. Although family- and state-controlled firms have better access to external financing, they are reluctant to risk diluting their management control and thus prefer domestic M&As to cross-border deals. Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study enhances the empirical studies of the relation between financing constraints and corporate investments based on the market imperfection hypothesis of corporate finance theories. In addition, this study also addresses the interaction between the market imperfection hypothesis and agency theory in explaining the effects of special ownership control on cross-border M&As relative to domestic deals. Furthermore, by examining the research questions across nine East Asian economies, this study provides an understanding of how such a relation applies to firms in countries where information asymmetry is high. Practitioner/Policy Implications: The findings indicate the importance of corporate governance and verify the effects of unique organizational structures on major corporate decisions. Specifically, family-controlled firms are often free of the financing constraints inherent in investment decisions. Thus, it is necessary to consider such organizational uniqueness when explaining the financing behavior of cross-border M&As conducted by Asian firms. [source]

Contesting "Corporate Value" Through Takeover Bids in Japan

Shareholder Wealth Effects of European Domestic and Cross-border Takeover Bids

Private equity bids in Australia: an exploratory study

ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 1 2010
Larelle Chapple
G34 Abstract In this study, we provide an insight into how private equity players choose their targets and the bid arrangements they prefer. We test our expectations of the unique features of private equity targets using a sample of 23 listed private equity target firms during 2001,2007. We find, relative to a benchmark sample of 81 corporate targets matched by year and industry, the private equity target firms to be larger, more profitable, use their assets more efficiently, more highly levered and have greater cash flow. Multivariate testing indicates that private equity targets have relatively greater financial slack, greater financial stability, greater free cash flow and lower measurable growth prospects. All conclusions are found to be robust to a control sample of 502 takeover bids during 2001,2007. [source]

Takeover activity in Australia: endogenous and exogenous influences

ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 3 2005
Frank Finn
G34 Abstract The present paper analyses the population of takeover bids for listed Australian companies using quarterly data over a 25-year period to re-examine the predictability of takeover activity and to determine if there is a flow on impact on macroeconomic variables. We examine whether takeover activity: (i) is endogenous; that is, determined by own activity; (ii) is jointly determined by macroeconomic and capital market variables; and (iii) has an exogenous spillover impact across the economy. We find that stock prices and takeover activity share a long-term common trend, the relative success of takeover bids is independent of sharemarket activity, and conclude that aggregate takeover activity is driven by fundamental economic factors rather than by speculative activity. [source]

The Disparate Nature of Targeted Repurchases: Evidence from Long-Run Performance

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1-2 2007
Saeyoung Chang
Abstract:, We examine the announcement stock returns and long-run performance of 352 targeted repurchases from 1979 to 1998. For those repurchases of blocks that are non-control related we find a positive announcement stock price response and positive long-run stock performance indicating that these repurchases are timed to occur when the company's shares are undervalued and that the market underreacts to this signal. In contrast, for those repurchases of blocks that are control related we find a negative announcement stock price response and insignificant long-run stock performance indicating that these repurchases occur for a different reason. We conclude that control related repurchases are utilized solely to dismiss potential takeover bids and are not timed when the stock is undervalued. [source]

CLUSTERED SYNERGIES IN THE TAKEOVER MARKET

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, Issue 4 2008
Jeff Madura
Abstract In a competitive market for takeover bids, the takeover premium serves as an effective proxy for the expected synergy. We find that the expected synergy is primarily related to the premiums paid in other recent takeovers in the same industry. This relation is even stronger when considering previous takeovers (especially over the previous three-month horizon) in the same industry that have the same payment method (cash versus stock) or form of takeover (tender offer versus merger). More of the variation in expected synergies among takeovers can be explained by the premiums derived from recent takeovers in the same industry than by all bidder- and target-specific characteristics combined. We also find that the bidder valuation effects are inversely related to the premium paid for targets, implying that abnormally high premiums may reflect overpayment rather than abnormally high synergies. [source]