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Tax Shields (tax + shield)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

ESTIMATING THE TAX BENEFITS OF DEBT

JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2001
John Graham
The standard approach to valuing interest tax shields assumes that full tax benefits are realized on every dollar of interest deduction in every scenario. The approach presented in this paper takes account of the possibility that interest tax shields cannot be used in some scenarios, in part because of variations in the firm's profitability. Because of the dynamic nature of the tax code (e.g., tax-loss carrybacks and carryforwards), it is necessary to consider past and future taxable income when estimating today's effective marginal tax rate. The paper uses a series of numerical examples to show that (1) the incremental value of an extra dollar of interest deduction is equal to the marginal tax rate appropriate for that dollar; and (2) a firm's effective marginal tax rate (and therefore the marginal benefit of incremental interest deductions) can actually decline as the firm takes on additional debt. Based on marginal benefit functions for thousands of firms from 1980,1999, the author concludes that the tax benefits of debt averaged approximately 10% of firm value during the 1980s, while declining to around 8% in the 1990s. By taking maximum advantage of the interest tax shield, the average firm could have increased its value by approximately 15% over the 1980s and 1990s, suggesting that the consequences of being underlevered are significant. Surprisingly, many of the companies that appear best able to service debt (i.e., those with the lowest apparent costs of debt) use the least amount of debt, on average. Treasurers and CFOs should critically reevaluate their companies' debt policies and consider the benefits of additional leverage, even if taking on more debt causes their credit ratings to slip a notch. [source]

Measuring Investment Distortions when Risk-Averse Managers Decide Whether to Undertake Risky Projects

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2005
Robert Parrino
We create a dynamic model in which a self-interested, risk-averse manager makes corporate investment decisions at a levered firm with characteristics typical of public US firms. We examine the magnitude of distortions in those decisions when a new project changes firm risk and find expected changes in the values of future tax shields and bankruptcy costs to be important factors. We evaluate the extent to which these distortions vary with firm leverage, debt duration, project size, managerial risk aversion, managerial non-firm wealth, and the structure of management compensation packages [source]

The Reach of the Disposition Effect: Large Sample Evidence Across Investor Classes,

INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF FINANCE, Issue 1-2 2006
Philip Brown
ABSTRACT We examine detailed daily Australian Stock Exchange share registry data for investors in IPO and index stocks between 1995 and 2000 and find that the ,disposition effect,' investors' reluctance to crystallize losses and relative eagerness to realize gains, is pervasive across investor classes. However, traders instigating larger investments tend to be affected less by the disposition bias. Our novel findings include that (a) the disposition effect ameliorates over time, being undetectable from around 200 trading days after purchase, (b) the ,house money' effect tempers the disposition effect, (c) shareholder loyalty schemes also partially offset investors' relative preference for selling winning stocks, and (d) the reversal of the disposition effect in June (the last month of the Australian tax year) does not occur among investors unable to take advantage of tax shields. In line with earlier research, our results support a tax-related explanation for the June effect rather than window dressing or momentum explanations. Finally, we confirm Odean's finding that the disposition effect is not driven by diversification motives, or by higher transaction costs associated with lower-priced stocks. [source]

ESTIMATING THE TAX BENEFITS OF DEBT

JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2001
John Graham
The standard approach to valuing interest tax shields assumes that full tax benefits are realized on every dollar of interest deduction in every scenario. The approach presented in this paper takes account of the possibility that interest tax shields cannot be used in some scenarios, in part because of variations in the firm's profitability. Because of the dynamic nature of the tax code (e.g., tax-loss carrybacks and carryforwards), it is necessary to consider past and future taxable income when estimating today's effective marginal tax rate. The paper uses a series of numerical examples to show that (1) the incremental value of an extra dollar of interest deduction is equal to the marginal tax rate appropriate for that dollar; and (2) a firm's effective marginal tax rate (and therefore the marginal benefit of incremental interest deductions) can actually decline as the firm takes on additional debt. Based on marginal benefit functions for thousands of firms from 1980,1999, the author concludes that the tax benefits of debt averaged approximately 10% of firm value during the 1980s, while declining to around 8% in the 1990s. By taking maximum advantage of the interest tax shield, the average firm could have increased its value by approximately 15% over the 1980s and 1990s, suggesting that the consequences of being underlevered are significant. Surprisingly, many of the companies that appear best able to service debt (i.e., those with the lowest apparent costs of debt) use the least amount of debt, on average. Treasurers and CFOs should critically reevaluate their companies' debt policies and consider the benefits of additional leverage, even if taking on more debt causes their credit ratings to slip a notch. [source]