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Tax Schedules (tax + schedule)
Selected AbstractsOn the Popular Support for Progressive TaxationJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 4 2003Esteban F. Klor The "popular support for progressive taxation theorem" (Marhuenda and Ortuño-Ortín, 1995) provides an important formalization of the intuition that a majority of relatively poor voters over rich ones leads to progressive income taxation. Yet the theorem does not provide an equilibrium outcome. In addition, it assumes an overly restrictive domain of tax schedules and no incentive effects of income taxation. This paper shows that none of these assumptions of the theorem can be relaxed completely. Most notably, it is shown that a majority of poor voters does not imply progressive taxation in a more general policy space and that a regressive tax schedule may obtain a majority over a progressive one when individuals' income is endogenous. [source] Tax Reform and ProgressivityTHE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 460 2000Michael Keen The established theory of tax progressivity cannot handle basic tax reform questions, such as whether an increase in personal allowances makes the tax system more progressive, because the core results assume that tax liability is never zero. This paper generalises the core theory to allow for zero tax payments, and applies the new framework to the analysis of allowances, income-related deductions and tax credits. Log concavity of the tax schedule,a property quite distinct from any existing notion of progressivity,emerges as the critical determinant of whether the distribution of the tax burden becomes more progressive as allowances are increased. [source] Estimating the price elasticity of expenditure for prescription drugs in the presence of non-linear price schedules: an illustration from Quebec, CanadaHEALTH ECONOMICS, Issue 9 2005Paul Contoyannis Abstract The price elasticity of demand for prescription drugs is a crucial parameter of interest in designing pharmaceutical benefit plans. Estimating the elasticity using micro-data, however, is challenging because insurance coverage that includes deductibles, co-insurance provisions and maximum expenditure limits create a non-linear price schedule, making price endogenous (a function of drug consumption). In this paper we exploit an exogenous change in cost-sharing within the Quebec (Canada) public Pharmacare program to estimate the price elasticity of expenditure for drugs using IV methods. This approach corrects for the endogeneity of price and incorporates the concept of a ,rational' consumer who factors into consumption decisions the price they expect to face at the margin given their expected needs. The IV method is adapted from an approach developed in the public finance literature used to estimate income responses to changes in tax schedules. The instrument is based on the price an individual would face under the new cost-sharing policy if their consumption remained at the pre-policy level. Our preferred specification leads to expenditure elasticities that are in the low range of previous estimates (between ,0.12 and ,0.16). Naïve OLS estimates are between 1 and 4 times these magnitudes. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Nonlinear taxation and punishmentINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 1 2007Tommy Andersson D82; H21 The paper analyzes nonlinear tax schedules that are identified by maximizing a welfare function represented by a weighted summation of net utilities over a set of n , 3 differing individuals. It is demonstrated that some of the feasible and Pareto efficient tax schedules that satisfy self-selection can only be identified by maximizing a welfare function of the above form if (at least) one of the individuals in the economy is assigned a negative weight. [source] On the Popular Support for Progressive TaxationJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 4 2003Esteban F. Klor The "popular support for progressive taxation theorem" (Marhuenda and Ortuño-Ortín, 1995) provides an important formalization of the intuition that a majority of relatively poor voters over rich ones leads to progressive income taxation. Yet the theorem does not provide an equilibrium outcome. In addition, it assumes an overly restrictive domain of tax schedules and no incentive effects of income taxation. This paper shows that none of these assumptions of the theorem can be relaxed completely. Most notably, it is shown that a majority of poor voters does not imply progressive taxation in a more general policy space and that a regressive tax schedule may obtain a majority over a progressive one when individuals' income is endogenous. [source] Electoral Systems, Legislative Process, and Income TaxationJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 1 2000Yan Chen We characterize the equilibrium income tax schedules and the optimality conditions under two types of political institutions, a two-party plurality system with a single district, and one with multiple districts where tax policies are determined through a legislature. It is shown that the exogenous social welfare functions in the optimal taxation literature can be endogenously determined by explicitly modeling the political institutions, which put different welfare weights on different subsets of the population. This paper also extends the Coughlin probabilistic voting model and the Baron,Ferejohn legislative bargaining model to a function space. [source] | ||||||||||