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Tax Competition (tax + competition)
Selected AbstractsTAX COMPETITION IN THE PRESENCE OF INTERJURISDICTIONAL EXTERNALITIES: THE CASE OF CRIME PREVENTION,JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 5 2007Santiago M. Pinto ABSTRACT The paper analyzes the effect of fiscal competition when local governments choose the level of public goods that generate spillover effects elsewhere. For instance, law enforcement activities affect both the crime level in the jurisdiction providing the good and in neighboring communities. The model shows that when local governments rely on capital taxation to finance these expenditures the spillover effects may not lead to an inefficient provision of public goods as predicted by the tax competition literature. In the model, capital is costlessly mobile and offenders relocate responding to differential criminal opportunities and differential local law enforcement efforts. [source] Tax Competition, Capital Mobility and Innovation in the Public SectorGERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2007Michael Rauscher Tax competition; economic growth; innovation; Leviathan Abstract. The paper analyses the impact of tax competition on innovation in the public sector. It is shown that the effects of increased mobility of the tax base on innovation and growth are ambiguous. The negative relationship is more likely, however. Moreover, it is shown that a Leviathan government may be induced to spend a larger share of its budget on unproductive activities. [source] The Oecd Model Tax Treaty: Tax Competition And Two-Way Capital Flows*INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2003Ronald B. Davies Model tax treaties do not require tax rate coordination, but do require that either credits or exemptions be applied to repatriated earnings. This contradicts recent models with a single capital exporter where deductions are most efficient. I incorporate the fact that capital flows are typically bilateral. With symmetric countries, credits by both is the unique and efficient treaty equilibrium. This equilibrium weakly dominates the nontreaty equilibrium. With asymmetric countries, the treaty need not offer improvements without tax harmonization. With harmonization, it is always possible to reach efficient capital allocations while increasing both countries' welfares only if neither uses deductions. [source] Leviathan and Capital Tax Competition in FederationsJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 2 2003Michael Keen This paper analyzes a simple model of taxation in a federal system within which policymakers are revenue,maximizing Leviathans and fiscal externalities arise not only horizontally, across the "states," but also vertically between levels of government. Such an economy is characterized by excessively high taxation in the noncooperative equilibrium. Intensifying horizontal competition, by increasing the number of states, unambiguously increases revenues (contrary to the Leviathan wisdom) but nevertheless enhances consumer welfare (consistent with the Leviathan wisdom). Revenue sharing arrangements between policymakers are shown to be,contrary to the Leviathan wisdom,Pareto improving. [source] Common and Private Values of the Firm in Tax CompetitionJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 4 2001David Scoones We develop a simple model of interregional tax competition to explore how the balance between common and region-specific aspects of a project's value affects the magnitudes of tax breaks offered by governments, when the firm possesses private information on the region-specific values. We examine cases in which the tax applies to both the common and private values and to each component separately. The model predicts that when the common and observable part of the value of a project increases relative to the variance of the region-specific private values, the stringency of competition reduces the equilibrium tax rate. Conversely, if the competing regions are sufficiently different, bidding is less aggressive. One interpretation of the results is that firms that are observed to be large get better tax breaks. The intuition is closely related to the Bertrand model of differentiated product market competition. [source] Tax Competition, Capital Mobility and Innovation in the Public SectorGERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2007Michael Rauscher Tax competition; economic growth; innovation; Leviathan Abstract. The paper analyses the impact of tax competition on innovation in the public sector. It is shown that the effects of increased mobility of the tax base on innovation and growth are ambiguous. The negative relationship is more likely, however. Moreover, it is shown that a Leviathan government may be induced to spend a larger share of its budget on unproductive activities. [source] Revenue Mobilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: Challenges from Globalisation I , Trade ReformDEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW, Issue 5 2010Michael Keen This is the first of two articles evaluating the nature and extent of, and possible responses to, two of the central challenges that globalisation poses for revenue mobilisation in sub-Saharan Africa: trade liberalisation, and corporate tax competition. Both articles use a new dataset with the features needed to address these issues meaningfully: a disentangling of tariff from commodity tax revenue, and a distinction between resource-related and other revenues. This first article describes that dataset, and provides a broad picture of revenue developments in the region between 1980 and 2005. Countries' experiences have varied, but the overall picture is of non-resource revenues having been essentially stagnant. Within this, however, and with exceptions, reductions in trade tax revenue have been largely offset by increased revenue from domestic sources. [source] Indirect Taxes on International Aviation,FISCAL STUDIES, Issue 1 2007Michael Keen There has recently been much discussion of the possible use of internationally coordinated indirect taxes, or equivalent charges, on international aviation, whether as a source of finance for development or as part of a response to heightened concerns with climate change. This paper considers the strengths and weaknesses of the leading candidate instruments of this kind. It argues that, on both policy and administration grounds, the case for increasing indirect taxes on international aviation is strong: the indirect tax burden on international aviation is very low, yet aviation contributes significantly to border-crossing environmental damage, is just as proper an object of taxation as any other commodity, and incipient tax competition is likely to result in these taxes being set at inefficiently low levels. But the form(s) in which such taxes are levied matters: a tax on aviation fuel would address the key border-crossing externalities most directly; a tax on final ticket values would have greater revenue potential, and perhaps some distributional advantage; departure/arrival taxes face the least legal obstacles, but are much blunter instruments. Optimal policy, it is shown, typically requires deploying both a fuel tax and a ticket tax, and the paper explores, both in principle and by simulation, the key considerations and trade-offs involved in designing a suitable indirect tax regime for international aviation. [source] Tax Competition, Capital Mobility and Innovation in the Public SectorGERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2007Michael Rauscher Tax competition; economic growth; innovation; Leviathan Abstract. The paper analyses the impact of tax competition on innovation in the public sector. It is shown that the effects of increased mobility of the tax base on innovation and growth are ambiguous. The negative relationship is more likely, however. Moreover, it is shown that a Leviathan government may be induced to spend a larger share of its budget on unproductive activities. [source] ENTREPRENEURS' LOCATION CHOICE AND PUBLIC POLICIES: A SURVEY OF THE NEW ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHYJOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS, Issue 5 2008Fabien Candau Abstract The aim of this paper is to survey what has been done by the New Economic Geography (NEG) on a regional scale in order to answer the three following questions: What are the predictions of the NEG concerning the future of regions in the triad? Are these predictions robust? What can be the optimal public policy on a regional and national scale in a world characterized by agglomeration, trade liberalization and mobility of entrepreneurs? In surveying the most recent contributions in this area, the paper sheds light on several shortcomings of the NEG literature in order to point out new directions for further research, with particular reference to studies concerning welfare and tax competition. [source] Common and Private Values of the Firm in Tax CompetitionJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 4 2001David Scoones We develop a simple model of interregional tax competition to explore how the balance between common and region-specific aspects of a project's value affects the magnitudes of tax breaks offered by governments, when the firm possesses private information on the region-specific values. We examine cases in which the tax applies to both the common and private values and to each component separately. The model predicts that when the common and observable part of the value of a project increases relative to the variance of the region-specific private values, the stringency of competition reduces the equilibrium tax rate. Conversely, if the competing regions are sufficiently different, bidding is less aggressive. One interpretation of the results is that firms that are observed to be large get better tax breaks. The intuition is closely related to the Bertrand model of differentiated product market competition. [source] Competing for a duopoly: international trade and tax competitionCANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2010Ben Ferrett Abstract We analyse the tax/subsidy competition between two potential host governments to attract the plants of firms in a duopolistic industry. While competition between identical countries for a monopolist's investment is known to result in subsidy inflation, two firms can be taxed in equilibrium with the host countries appropriating the entire social surplus generated within the industry, despite explicit non-cooperation between governments. Trade costs mean that the firms prefer dispersed to co-located production, creating these taxation opportunities for the host countries. We determine the country-size asymmetry that changes the nature of the equilibrium, inducing concentration of production in the larger country. On analyse la concurrence de taxes et subventions entre deux pays hôtes potentiels pour attirer des établissements d'entreprise dans une industrie duopoliste. Alors qu'on sait que la concurrence entre pays identiques pour un investissement par un monopole résulte en une inflation des subventions, deux entreprises peuvent être taxées en équilibre et les pays hôtes s'approprier l'entier surplus social engendré dans l'industrie, et ce malgré la non-coopération explicite entre gouvernements. Les coûts du commerce font que les entreprises préfèrent une production dispersée plutôt que co-localisée, créant des opportunités de taxation pour les pays hôtes. On détermine l'asymétrie de taille qui modifie la nature de l'équilibre, déclenchant une concentration de la production dans le grand pays. [source] | |||||||||||||||||||||||||