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Tax Benefits (tax + benefit)
Selected AbstractsESTIMATING THE TAX BENEFITS OF DEBTJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2001John Graham The standard approach to valuing interest tax shields assumes that full tax benefits are realized on every dollar of interest deduction in every scenario. The approach presented in this paper takes account of the possibility that interest tax shields cannot be used in some scenarios, in part because of variations in the firm's profitability. Because of the dynamic nature of the tax code (e.g., tax-loss carrybacks and carryforwards), it is necessary to consider past and future taxable income when estimating today's effective marginal tax rate. The paper uses a series of numerical examples to show that (1) the incremental value of an extra dollar of interest deduction is equal to the marginal tax rate appropriate for that dollar; and (2) a firm's effective marginal tax rate (and therefore the marginal benefit of incremental interest deductions) can actually decline as the firm takes on additional debt. Based on marginal benefit functions for thousands of firms from 1980,1999, the author concludes that the tax benefits of debt averaged approximately 10% of firm value during the 1980s, while declining to around 8% in the 1990s. By taking maximum advantage of the interest tax shield, the average firm could have increased its value by approximately 15% over the 1980s and 1990s, suggesting that the consequences of being underlevered are significant. Surprisingly, many of the companies that appear best able to service debt (i.e., those with the lowest apparent costs of debt) use the least amount of debt, on average. Treasurers and CFOs should critically reevaluate their companies' debt policies and consider the benefits of additional leverage, even if taking on more debt causes their credit ratings to slip a notch. [source] The Spatial Distribution of Housing-Related Ordinary Income Tax BenefitsREAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2003Joseph Gyourko We estimate how tax subsidies to owner-occupied housing are distributed spatially across the United States and find striking skewness. At the state level, the mean tax benefit per owned unit in 1990 ranged from $917 in South Dakota to $10,718 in Hawaii. The dispersion is slightly greater when benefit flows are measured at the metropolitan-area level. Even assuming the subsidies are funded in an income progressivity-neutral manner, a relatively few metro areas, primarily in California and the New York,Boston corridor, are shown to gain considerably while the vast majority of areas have relatively small gains or losses. [source] How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt?THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 5 2000John R. Graham I integrate under firm-specific benefit functions to estimate that the capitalized tax benefit of debt equals 9.7 percent of firm value (or as low as 4.3 percent, net of personal taxes). The typical firm could double tax benefits by issuing debt until the marginal tax benefit begins to decline. I infer how aggressively a firm uses debt by observing the shape of its tax benefit function. Paradoxically, large, liquid, profitable firms with low expected distress costs use debt conservatively. Product market factors, growth options, low asset collateral, and planning for future expenditures lead to conservative debt usage. Conservative debt policy is persistent. [source] The optimal timing of the transfer of hidden reserves in the German and Austrian tax systemsINTELLIGENT SYSTEMS IN ACCOUNTING, FINANCE & MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2002Manfred FrühwirthArticle first published online: 16 DEC 200 The lower-of-cost-or-market principle implies that assets may be sold above book value, by which hidden reserves are disclosed. To avoid taxation of these hidden reserves, in German-speaking countries companies are allowed to transfer them to a newly purchased asset within a fixed time period. In this paper, the optimal timing of hidden reserves transfers is developed with special attention to the term structure of interest rates and interest rate risk, and using the replicating principle known from the field of finance. The paper presents one model under certainty and, as a generalization of this model, another model under interest rate risk. In both models, the criterion used for decision-making is the value of the right to transfer, which can be interpreted as the initial cost of a replicating/hedging strategy for tax payments saved/incurred. In the model under certainty, the net present value concept is used to derive the value of the right to transfer. The procedure used in the model under interest rate risk is a combination of flexible planning and the no-arbitrage approach common in derivatives pricing. It is shown that the right to transfer hidden reserves with flexible timing is equivalent to an American-style exchange option. In addition, the impact of term-structure volatility on the value of the right to transfer is analyzed. The technique presented in this paper can also be used to solve other timing problems resulting from trade-offs between early and late tax payments/tax benefits. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] The Take-Up of Multiple Means-Tested Benefits by British Pensioners: Evidence from the Family Resources SurveyFISCAL STUDIES, Issue 3 2004RUTH HANCOCK Non-take-up of means-tested benefits among pensioners is of long-standing concern. It has assumed increased importance from October 2003 with the introduction of the new means-tested pension credit to which about half of pensioners are expected to be entitled. We use Family Resources Survey data from April 1997 to March 2000 to investigate patterns of pensioner take-up of income support (IS) (subsequently renamed the minimum income guarantee and now subsumed in pension credit), housing benefit (HB) and council tax benefit (CTB). Although 36 per cent of pensioners in our sample failed to claim their entitlements to at least one of these benefits, only 16 per cent failed to claim amounts worth more than 10 per cent of their disposable income. Generally, take-up is high where entitlement is high. But there are exceptions which may reflect the claims process and/or a greater degree of social stigma associated with IS than with HB or CTB. [source] Taxes, Leverage, and the Cost of Equity CapitalJOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 4 2006DAN DHALIWAL ABSTRACT We examine the associations among leverage, corporate and investor level taxes, and the firm's implied cost of equity capital. Expanding on Modigliani and Miller [1958, 1963], the cost of equity capital can be expressed as a function of leverage and corporate and investor level taxes. Based on this expression, we predict that the cost of equity is increasing in leverage, and that corporate taxes mitigate this leverage-related risk premium, while the personal tax disadvantage of debt increases this premium. We empirically test these predictions using implied cost of equity estimates and proxies for the firm's corporate tax rate and the personal tax disadvantage of debt. Our results suggest that the equity risk premium associated with leverage is decreasing in the corporate tax benefit from debt. We find some evidence that the equity risk premium from leverage is increasing in the personal tax penalty associated with debt. [source] The Spatial Distribution of Housing-Related Ordinary Income Tax BenefitsREAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2003Joseph Gyourko We estimate how tax subsidies to owner-occupied housing are distributed spatially across the United States and find striking skewness. At the state level, the mean tax benefit per owned unit in 1990 ranged from $917 in South Dakota to $10,718 in Hawaii. The dispersion is slightly greater when benefit flows are measured at the metropolitan-area level. Even assuming the subsidies are funded in an income progressivity-neutral manner, a relatively few metro areas, primarily in California and the New York,Boston corridor, are shown to gain considerably while the vast majority of areas have relatively small gains or losses. [source] How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt?THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 5 2000John R. Graham I integrate under firm-specific benefit functions to estimate that the capitalized tax benefit of debt equals 9.7 percent of firm value (or as low as 4.3 percent, net of personal taxes). The typical firm could double tax benefits by issuing debt until the marginal tax benefit begins to decline. I infer how aggressively a firm uses debt by observing the shape of its tax benefit function. Paradoxically, large, liquid, profitable firms with low expected distress costs use debt conservatively. Product market factors, growth options, low asset collateral, and planning for future expenditures lead to conservative debt usage. Conservative debt policy is persistent. [source] The Contributions of Stewart Myers to the Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance,JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2008Franklin Allen In a 40-plus year career notable for path-breaking work on capital structure and innovations in capital budgeting and valuation, MIT finance professor Stewart Myers has had a remarkable influence on both the theory and practice of corporate finance. In this article, two of his former students, a colleague, and a co-author offer a brief survey of Professor Myers's accomplishments, along with an assessment of their relevance for the current financial environment. These contributions are seen as falling into three main categories: ,Work on "debt overhang" and the financial "pecking order" that not only provided plausible explanations for much corporate financing behavior, but can also be used to shed light on recent developments, including the reluctance of highly leveraged U.S. financial institutions to raise equity and the recent "mandatory" infusions of capital by the U.S. Treasury. ,Contributions to capital budgeting that complement and reinforce his research on capital structure. By providing a simple and intuitive way to capture the tax benefits of debt when capital structure changes over time, his adjusted present value (or APV) approach has not only become the standard in LBO and venture capital firms, but accomplishes in practice what theorists like M&M had urged finance practitioners to do some 30 years earlier: separate the real operating profitability of a company or project from the "second-order" effects of financing. And his real options valuation method, by recognizing the "option-like" character of many corporate assets, has provided not only a new way of valuing "growth" assets, but a method and, indeed, a language for bringing together the disciplines of corporate strategy and finance. ,Starting with work on estimating fair rates of return for public utilities, he has gone on to develop a cost-of-capital and capital allocation framework for insurance companies, as well as a persuasive explanation for why the rate-setting process for railroads in the U.S. and U.K. has created problems for those industries. [source] CREATING VALUE IN PENSION PLANS (OR, GENTLEMEN PREFER BONDS)JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 4 2003Jeremy Gold Pension funds are typically one-half to two-thirds invested in equities because equities are expected to outperform other financial assets over the long term, and the long-term nature of pension fund liabilities seems well suited to absorbing any short-term return volatility. What's more, U.S. GAAP currently makes it possible to take credit in advance for the higher anticipated earnings on equity investments without acknowledging their inherent risk. But by allowing the higher expected returns from stocks to reduce a company's current pension expenses, the accounting treatment conflicts with some very basic principles of finance (in particular, the idea that investors must earn higher returns on riskier investments just to "break even"), conceals systematic biases in the actuarial analysis, and gives managers considerable latitude to manipulate the bottom line. The authors suggest a startlingly different approach. They argue that pension assets should be invested entirely in duration-matched debt instruments for two reasons: (1) to capture the full tax benefits of pre-funding their pension obligations and (2) to improve overall corporate risk profiles by converting general stock market risk into firm-specific operating risk, where corporate managers should have a comparative advantage and can generate real value. Investing exclusively in bonds would take better advantage of the tax-exempt status of pension plans and greatly reduce fund management costs, while at the same time helping o shore up fund quality and sharpening corporate executives' focus on their real operating assets. [source] THE CAPITAL STRUCTURE CHOICE: NEW EVIDENCE FOR A DYNAMIC TRADEOFF MODELJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2002Armen Hovakimian Most academic insights about corporate capital structure decisions come from models that focus on the trade-off between the tax benefits and financial distress costs of debt financing. But empirical tests of corporate capital structure indicate that actual debt ratios are considerably different from those predicted by the models, casting doubt on whether most companies have leverage targets at all. In particular, there is considerable evidence that corporate leverage ratios reflect in large part the tendency of profitable companies to use their excess cash flow to pay down debt, while unprofitable companies build up higher leverage ratios. Such behavior is consistent with a competing theory of capital structure known as the "pecking order" model, in which management's main objectives are to preserve financing flexibility and avoid issuing equity. The results of the authors' recent study suggest that although past profits are an important predictor of observed debt ratios at any given time, companies nevertheless often make financing and stock repurchase decisions designed to offset the effects of past profitability and move their debt ratios toward their target capital structures. This evidence provides support for a compromise theory called the dynamic tradeoff model, which says that although companies often deviate from their leverage targets, over the longer run they take measures to close the gap between their actual and targeted leverage ratios. [source] ESTIMATING THE TAX BENEFITS OF DEBTJOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 1 2001John Graham The standard approach to valuing interest tax shields assumes that full tax benefits are realized on every dollar of interest deduction in every scenario. The approach presented in this paper takes account of the possibility that interest tax shields cannot be used in some scenarios, in part because of variations in the firm's profitability. Because of the dynamic nature of the tax code (e.g., tax-loss carrybacks and carryforwards), it is necessary to consider past and future taxable income when estimating today's effective marginal tax rate. The paper uses a series of numerical examples to show that (1) the incremental value of an extra dollar of interest deduction is equal to the marginal tax rate appropriate for that dollar; and (2) a firm's effective marginal tax rate (and therefore the marginal benefit of incremental interest deductions) can actually decline as the firm takes on additional debt. Based on marginal benefit functions for thousands of firms from 1980,1999, the author concludes that the tax benefits of debt averaged approximately 10% of firm value during the 1980s, while declining to around 8% in the 1990s. By taking maximum advantage of the interest tax shield, the average firm could have increased its value by approximately 15% over the 1980s and 1990s, suggesting that the consequences of being underlevered are significant. Surprisingly, many of the companies that appear best able to service debt (i.e., those with the lowest apparent costs of debt) use the least amount of debt, on average. Treasurers and CFOs should critically reevaluate their companies' debt policies and consider the benefits of additional leverage, even if taking on more debt causes their credit ratings to slip a notch. [source] The Information Content of Method of Payment in Mergers: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2001Robert D. Campbell We provide evidence on the information content of the method of payment in mergers by examining shareholder returns in a sample of REIT mergers over the period 1994,1998. When the target firm is publicly held, we find that transactions are always stock-financed, and that acquiring firm shareholders sustain small negative returns around the announcement date. When the target is privately held, cash financing, mixed (stock and cash) financing, and placement of blocks of acquirer stock with target owners are more prevalent. Acquirer returns are positive in stock-financed mergers when the target is private, which is consistent with both the information signaling and monitoring by blockholders hypotheses. Further analysis supports the information signaling hypothesis as the dominant explanation. The effects of other explanatory variables are similar whether the target is public or private. Most significantly, acquiring shareholder returns are negatively related to the acquirer's size, but positively related to the acquirer's use of the UPREIT organizational structure. The positive wealth effects of the UPREIT structure are not fully explained as the capitalization of tax benefits. [source] The Risk-Adjusted Cost of Financial DistressTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 6 2007HEITOR ALMEIDA ABSTRACT Financial distress is more likely to happen in bad times. The present value of distress costs therefore depends on risk premia. We estimate this value using risk-adjusted default probabilities derived from corporate bond spreads. For a BBB-rated firm, our benchmark calculations show that the NPV of distress is 4.5% of predistress value. In contrast, a valuation that ignores risk premia generates an NPV of 1.4%. We show that marginal distress costs can be as large as the marginal tax benefits of debt derived by Graham (2000). Thus, distress risk premia can help explain why firms appear to use debt conservatively. [source] How Big Are the Tax Benefits of Debt?THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 5 2000John R. Graham I integrate under firm-specific benefit functions to estimate that the capitalized tax benefit of debt equals 9.7 percent of firm value (or as low as 4.3 percent, net of personal taxes). The typical firm could double tax benefits by issuing debt until the marginal tax benefit begins to decline. I infer how aggressively a firm uses debt by observing the shape of its tax benefit function. Paradoxically, large, liquid, profitable firms with low expected distress costs use debt conservatively. Product market factors, growth options, low asset collateral, and planning for future expenditures lead to conservative debt usage. Conservative debt policy is persistent. [source] Valuation and optimal strategies of convertible bondsTHE JOURNAL OF FUTURES MARKETS, Issue 9 2006Szu-Lang Liao This article presents a contingent claim valuation of a callable convertible bond with the issuer's credit risk. The optimal call, voluntary conversion, and bankruptcy strategies are jointly determined by shareholders and bondholders to maximize the equity value and the bond value, respectively. This model not only incorporates tax benefits, bankruptcy costs, refunding costs, and a call notice period, but also takes account of the issuer's debt size and structure. The numerical results show that the predicted optimal call policies are generally consistent with recent empirical findings; therefore, calling convertible bonds too late or too early can be rational. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:895,922, 2006 [source] | ||||||||||