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Tax Authorities (tax + authority)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting80%

Selected Abstracts

US state alcohol sales compared to survey data, 1993,2006

ADDICTION, Issue 9 2010
David E. Nelson
ABSTRACT Aims Assess long-term trends of the correlation between alcohol sales data and survey data. Design Analyses of state alcohol consumption data from the US Alcohol Epidemiologic Data System based on sales, tax receipts or alcohol shipments. Cross-sectional, state annual estimates of alcohol-related measures for adults from the US Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System using telephone surveys. Setting United States. Participants State alcohol tax authorities, alcohol vendors, alcohol industry (sales data) and randomly selected adults aged , 18 years 1993,2006 (survey data). Measurements State-level per capita annual alcohol consumption estimates from sales data. Self-reported alcohol consumption, current drinking, heavy drinking, binge drinking and alcohol-impaired driving from surveys. Correlation coefficients were calculated using linear regression models. Findings State survey estimates of consumption accounted for a median of 22% to 32% of state sales data across years. Nevertheless, state consumption estimates from both sources were strongly correlated with annual r-values ranging from 0.55,0.71. State sales data had moderate-to-strong correlations with survey estimates of current drinking, heavy drinking and binge drinking (range of r-values across years: 0.57,0.65; 0.33,0.70 and 0.45,0.61, respectively), but a weaker correlation with alcohol-impaired driving (range of r-values: 0.24,0.56). There were no trends in the magnitude of correlation coefficients. Conclusions Although state surveys substantially underestimated alcohol consumption, the consistency of the strength of the association between sales consumption and survey data for most alcohol measures suggest both data sources continue to provide valuable information. These findings support and extend the distribution of consumption model and single distribution theory, suggesting that both sales and survey data are useful for monitoring population changes in alcohol use. [source]

Under-reporting of Income and Labor Market Performance

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 2 2008
ANN-SOFIE KOLM
To examine the effects on labor market performance of government tax and enforcement policies, this paper develops an equilibrium model featuring tax evasion, matching frictions, and worker,firm wage bargains. In the wage bargains, workers and firms can agree on the amount of remuneration that should not be reported to the tax authorities. We find that increased taxation actually reduces unemployment, whereas more zealous enforcement has the opposite effect. [source]

Direkte Demokratie, Steuermoral und Steuerhinterziehung: Erfahrungen aus der Schweiz

PERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 1 2007
Gebhard Kirchgässner
Especially in German-speaking countries, tax morale is often mixed with tax compliance. But the first is a moral conviction while the second denotes actual behaviour, and both do not necessarily need to be congruent. Then it is shown how direct popular rights empower Swiss citizens to influence their tax burden. Finally, we discuss the impact of direct popular rights on tax morale and on tax compliance as well as the impact of the trust between citizens and tax authorities on the latter. It is shown that direct democracy leads to higher tax morale and compliance, even if tax morale is today rather low in Switzerland compared to other countries. [source]

Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution

ECONOMICA, Issue 283 2004
Inés Macho-Stadler
It is often argued that, even if optimal ex post, settlement dilutes deterrence ex ante. We analyse the interest for the tax authority of committing, ex ante, to a settlement strategy. We show that to commit to the use of settlements is ex ante optimal when the tax authority receives signals that provide statistical information about the taxpayers' true tax liability. The more informative the signal, the larger the additional expected revenue raised by the tax authority when using settlement as a policy tool. [source]

The Organization of Public Service Provision

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2004
William Jack
This paper addresses the question of how the responsibility for the delivery of social services, including health, education, and welfare programs, should be divided between state and central governments. We combine a random voting model and the incomplete contracts paradigm to formalize the trade-off between central and state responsibility for service delivery, and find that authority should rest with the party for whom the marginal impact of the service on re-election chances is greater. This in turn means that, other things equal, states with lower than average health, education, or welfare status should be given responsibility for service delivery, while authority in states with above average indicators should reside with the central government. Also, we show that there is no presumption that states that are given authority for service delivery should necessarily be granted expanded tax authority. [source]