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Bank's Preferences (bank + preference)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Kinds of Bank's Preferences

  • central bank preference
    		•

    Selected Abstracts

    Transparency of Central Bank Preferences

    GERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2009
    Volker Hahn
    Central bank objectives; transparency Abstract. In this paper, we examine whether the transparency of the central bank's preferences is desirable. We make two major points. First, in the literature on preference transparency variance-reduction frameworks are often adopted. As a consequence a change in the degree of transparency affects the magnitude of information asymmetries, but at the same time it implies a rather arbitrary effect on the distribution of preferences. We present a clean framework without this problem. Second, using a very general specification of shocks to the central bank's preferences, we show that society prefers transparency if it sufficiently values the employment target, whereas it prefers opacity if it estimates inflation as sufficiently important. [source]

    What does Monetary Policy Reveal about a Central Bank's Preferences?

    ECONOMIC NOTES, Issue 3 2003
    Efrem Castelnuovo
    The design of monetary policy depends on the targeting strategy adopted by the central bank. This strategy describes a set of policy preferences, which are actually the structural parameters to analyse monetary policy making. Accordingly, we develop a calibration method to estimate a central bank's preferences from the estimates of an optimal Taylor,type rule. The empirical analysis on US data shows that output stabilization has not been an independent argument in the Fed's objective function during the Greenspan's era. This suggests that the output gap has entered the policy rule only as leading indicator for future inflation, therefore being only instrumental (to stabilize inflation) rather than important per se. (J.E.L.: C61, E52, E58). [source]

    Transparency of Central Bank Preferences

    GERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2009
    Volker Hahn
    Central bank objectives; transparency Abstract. In this paper, we examine whether the transparency of the central bank's preferences is desirable. We make two major points. First, in the literature on preference transparency variance-reduction frameworks are often adopted. As a consequence a change in the degree of transparency affects the magnitude of information asymmetries, but at the same time it implies a rather arbitrary effect on the distribution of preferences. We present a clean framework without this problem. Second, using a very general specification of shocks to the central bank's preferences, we show that society prefers transparency if it sufficiently values the employment target, whereas it prefers opacity if it estimates inflation as sufficiently important. [source]