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Bank Mergers (bank + merger)
Selected AbstractsBank Mergers, Information, Default and the Price of CreditECONOMIC NOTES, Issue 1 2006Margarida Catalão- Lopes This paper addresses the impact of bank mergers on the price of firm credit, through an information channel. It is shown that, as bank mergers imply a wider spreading of information among banks concerning firms' past defaults, they may increase the expected revenue from lending. Therefore, interest rates may decline as long as a sufficiently competitive environment is preserved. A fall in interest rates, in turn, reduces the incentives for firms to strategically default, which reinforces the downward effect on the price of credit. The results are a function of the level of information sharing and of the sensitivity of the default probability to the interest rate. [source] Bank Mergers and Small Firm Finance: Evidence from Lender LiabilityFINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, Issue 2 2008James E. McNulty As a merger approaches, the value of repeat business for the target bank can drop sharply, so loan relationships between this bank and small businesses are often disrupted. Small firms sometimes experience serious value destruction as a consequence of this sudden lack of credit. This paper shows that lender liability may result from bank mergers and bankers involved in mergers often engage in aggressive, scorched-earth defense tactics to discourage further litigation. I summarize six lender liability cases to illustrate these points. Bank mergers have been shown to reduce credit availability in a number of studies. Since small firms depend on credit for their daily existence, owners of small firms do have a reason to fear a merger of their bank with a larger institution. Analyzing merger effects with survey data of firms obtained after a bank merger, an empirical strategy used in a number of studies, raises problems since the only firms considered are the ones that survived the bank merger. Suggesting that the problem will cure itself in the long run, an argument advanced in other studies, ignores small firms' daily dependence on credit. In the long run we are all dead. Bank examiners need to evaluate an institution's litigation experience and measure a bank's organizational architecture , its ethical climate. Banks which are repeatedly involved in lender liability lawsuits should be denied future mergers until there is a change in organizational architecture. To assist in evaluating organizational architecture, banks should be required to report their litigation expense on their call reports. Furthermore, regulators should seriously consider the recent suggestion of Carow, Kane and Narayanan (2006) that they take steps to ensure that participants in bank mergers preserve target bank relationships. Otherwise negative effects on small business lending and economic growth will continue as bank consolidation proceeds. [source] Deal Size, Bid Premium, and Gains in Bank Mergers: The Impact of Managerial MotivationsFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 3 2007Atul Gupta G14; G21; G34 Abstract Do mergers with greater target relative to acquirer size create more value than mergers with smaller relative sized targets? Do larger bid amounts represent wealth transfers from acquirers or do they signal greater expected merger gains? We hypothesize that the relations among aggregate merger gains, relative size, and bid premiums are asymmetric across mergers made by value-enhancing versus value-reducing managers. We use a large sample of bank mergers to test these predictions and find that the value response to different explanatory variables is asymmetric. Our findings provide new insights into how the market values merger bids. [source] Bank Mergers in Europe: The Public Policy IssuesJCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 3 2000Jean Dermine A very large merger wave in the banking industry has taken place in Europe over the last 15 years. Public policy-makers need to assess how bank mergers , be they domestic intra-industry, across-industry, or cross-border , affect their mission of protecting investors and ensuring financial stability, an appropriate level of competition, and the competitiveness of national firms. Moreover, as the banking world is becoming increasingly international, there is a need to reassess the structure of bank regulation and supervision which has been assumed historically by each nation-state. [source] Bank Mergers, Competition, and LiquidityJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 5 2007ELENA CARLETTI credit market competition; bank reserves; internal money market; banking system liquidity; monetary operations We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings, and aggregate liquidity. A merger changes the distribution of liquidity shocks and creates an internal money market, leading to financial cost efficiencies and more precise estimates of liquidity needs. The merged banks may increase their reserve holdings through an internalization effect or decrease them because of a diversification effect. The merger also affects loan market competition, which in turn modifies the distribution of bank sizes and aggregate liquidity needs. Mergers among large banks tend to increase aggregate liquidity needs and thus the public provision of liquidity through monetary operations of the central bank. [source] Bank Mergers and Crime: The Real and Social Effects of Credit Market CompetitionTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 2 2006MARK J. GARMAISE ABSTRACT Using a unique sample of commercial loans and mergers between large banks, we provide micro-level (within-county) evidence linking credit conditions to economic development and find a spillover effect on crime. Neighborhoods that experience more bank mergers are subject to higher interest rates, diminished local construction, lower prices, an influx of poorer households, and higher property crime in subsequent years. The elasticity of property crime with respect to merger-induced banking concentration is 0.18. We show that these results are not likely due to reverse causation, and confirm the central findings using state branching deregulation to instrument for bank competition. [source] Bank Mergers and Small Firm Finance: Evidence from Lender LiabilityFINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, Issue 2 2008James E. McNulty As a merger approaches, the value of repeat business for the target bank can drop sharply, so loan relationships between this bank and small businesses are often disrupted. Small firms sometimes experience serious value destruction as a consequence of this sudden lack of credit. This paper shows that lender liability may result from bank mergers and bankers involved in mergers often engage in aggressive, scorched-earth defense tactics to discourage further litigation. I summarize six lender liability cases to illustrate these points. Bank mergers have been shown to reduce credit availability in a number of studies. Since small firms depend on credit for their daily existence, owners of small firms do have a reason to fear a merger of their bank with a larger institution. Analyzing merger effects with survey data of firms obtained after a bank merger, an empirical strategy used in a number of studies, raises problems since the only firms considered are the ones that survived the bank merger. Suggesting that the problem will cure itself in the long run, an argument advanced in other studies, ignores small firms' daily dependence on credit. In the long run we are all dead. Bank examiners need to evaluate an institution's litigation experience and measure a bank's organizational architecture , its ethical climate. Banks which are repeatedly involved in lender liability lawsuits should be denied future mergers until there is a change in organizational architecture. To assist in evaluating organizational architecture, banks should be required to report their litigation expense on their call reports. Furthermore, regulators should seriously consider the recent suggestion of Carow, Kane and Narayanan (2006) that they take steps to ensure that participants in bank mergers preserve target bank relationships. Otherwise negative effects on small business lending and economic growth will continue as bank consolidation proceeds. [source] The Impact of Bank Consolidation on Commercial Borrower WelfareTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 4 2005JASON KARCESKI ABSTRACT We estimate the impact of bank merger announcements on borrowers' stock prices for publicly traded Norwegian firms. Borrowers of target banks lose about 0.8% in equity value, while borrowers of acquiring banks earn positive abnormal returns, suggesting that borrower welfare is influenced by a strategic focus favoring acquiring borrowers. Bank mergers lead to higher relationship exit rates among borrowers of target banks. Larger merger-induced increases in relationship termination rates are associated with less negative abnormal returns, suggesting that firms with low switching costs switch banks, while similar firms with high switching costs are locked into their current relationship. [source] Bank Mergers and Small Firm Finance: Evidence from Lender LiabilityFINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, Issue 2 2008James E. McNulty As a merger approaches, the value of repeat business for the target bank can drop sharply, so loan relationships between this bank and small businesses are often disrupted. Small firms sometimes experience serious value destruction as a consequence of this sudden lack of credit. This paper shows that lender liability may result from bank mergers and bankers involved in mergers often engage in aggressive, scorched-earth defense tactics to discourage further litigation. I summarize six lender liability cases to illustrate these points. Bank mergers have been shown to reduce credit availability in a number of studies. Since small firms depend on credit for their daily existence, owners of small firms do have a reason to fear a merger of their bank with a larger institution. Analyzing merger effects with survey data of firms obtained after a bank merger, an empirical strategy used in a number of studies, raises problems since the only firms considered are the ones that survived the bank merger. Suggesting that the problem will cure itself in the long run, an argument advanced in other studies, ignores small firms' daily dependence on credit. In the long run we are all dead. Bank examiners need to evaluate an institution's litigation experience and measure a bank's organizational architecture , its ethical climate. Banks which are repeatedly involved in lender liability lawsuits should be denied future mergers until there is a change in organizational architecture. To assist in evaluating organizational architecture, banks should be required to report their litigation expense on their call reports. Furthermore, regulators should seriously consider the recent suggestion of Carow, Kane and Narayanan (2006) that they take steps to ensure that participants in bank mergers preserve target bank relationships. Otherwise negative effects on small business lending and economic growth will continue as bank consolidation proceeds. [source] Bank Mergers, Information, Default and the Price of CreditECONOMIC NOTES, Issue 1 2006Margarida Catalão- Lopes This paper addresses the impact of bank mergers on the price of firm credit, through an information channel. It is shown that, as bank mergers imply a wider spreading of information among banks concerning firms' past defaults, they may increase the expected revenue from lending. Therefore, interest rates may decline as long as a sufficiently competitive environment is preserved. A fall in interest rates, in turn, reduces the incentives for firms to strategically default, which reinforces the downward effect on the price of credit. The results are a function of the level of information sharing and of the sensitivity of the default probability to the interest rate. [source] Bank Mergers and Small Firm Finance: Evidence from Lender LiabilityFINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, Issue 2 2008James E. McNulty As a merger approaches, the value of repeat business for the target bank can drop sharply, so loan relationships between this bank and small businesses are often disrupted. Small firms sometimes experience serious value destruction as a consequence of this sudden lack of credit. This paper shows that lender liability may result from bank mergers and bankers involved in mergers often engage in aggressive, scorched-earth defense tactics to discourage further litigation. I summarize six lender liability cases to illustrate these points. Bank mergers have been shown to reduce credit availability in a number of studies. Since small firms depend on credit for their daily existence, owners of small firms do have a reason to fear a merger of their bank with a larger institution. Analyzing merger effects with survey data of firms obtained after a bank merger, an empirical strategy used in a number of studies, raises problems since the only firms considered are the ones that survived the bank merger. Suggesting that the problem will cure itself in the long run, an argument advanced in other studies, ignores small firms' daily dependence on credit. In the long run we are all dead. Bank examiners need to evaluate an institution's litigation experience and measure a bank's organizational architecture , its ethical climate. Banks which are repeatedly involved in lender liability lawsuits should be denied future mergers until there is a change in organizational architecture. To assist in evaluating organizational architecture, banks should be required to report their litigation expense on their call reports. Furthermore, regulators should seriously consider the recent suggestion of Carow, Kane and Narayanan (2006) that they take steps to ensure that participants in bank mergers preserve target bank relationships. Otherwise negative effects on small business lending and economic growth will continue as bank consolidation proceeds. [source] The Effect of Removing Geographic Restrictions on Banking in the United States: Lessons for Europe,FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS, Issue 1 2008Randall S. Kroszner In this paper the author argues that cross-border, intra-European bank mergers are likely to generate benefits similar to those enjoyed in the United States when interstate banking restrictions were removed. These benefits include greater banking efficiency, higher economic and employment growth, more entrepreneurial activity, and reduced economic volatility. [source] Deal Size, Bid Premium, and Gains in Bank Mergers: The Impact of Managerial MotivationsFINANCIAL REVIEW, Issue 3 2007Atul Gupta G14; G21; G34 Abstract Do mergers with greater target relative to acquirer size create more value than mergers with smaller relative sized targets? Do larger bid amounts represent wealth transfers from acquirers or do they signal greater expected merger gains? We hypothesize that the relations among aggregate merger gains, relative size, and bid premiums are asymmetric across mergers made by value-enhancing versus value-reducing managers. We use a large sample of bank mergers to test these predictions and find that the value response to different explanatory variables is asymmetric. Our findings provide new insights into how the market values merger bids. [source] Bank Mergers in Europe: The Public Policy IssuesJCMS: JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, Issue 3 2000Jean Dermine A very large merger wave in the banking industry has taken place in Europe over the last 15 years. Public policy-makers need to assess how bank mergers , be they domestic intra-industry, across-industry, or cross-border , affect their mission of protecting investors and ensuring financial stability, an appropriate level of competition, and the competitiveness of national firms. Moreover, as the banking world is becoming increasingly international, there is a need to reassess the structure of bank regulation and supervision which has been assumed historically by each nation-state. [source] The Impact of Mergers and Acquisitions on the Efficiency of the US Banking Industry: Further EvidenceJOURNAL OF BUSINESS FINANCE & ACCOUNTING, Issue 1-2 2008Adel A. Al-Sharkas Abstract:, Using the Stochastic Frontier Approach (SFA), this study investigates the cost and profit efficiency effects of bank mergers on the US banking industry. We also use the non-parametric technique of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to evaluate the production structure of merged and non-merged banks. The empirical results indicate that mergers have improved the cost and profit efficiencies of banks. Further, evidence shows that merged banks have lower costs than non-merged banks because they are using the most efficient technology available (technical efficiency) as well as a cost minimizing input mix (allocative efficiency). The results suggest that there is an economic rational for future mergers in the banking industry. Finally, mergers may allow the banking industry to take advantage of the opportunities created by improved technology. [source] Cross-Border Bank M&As and Risk: Evidence from the Bond MarketJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 4 2010SUNGHO CHOI bank risk; cross-border; M&A; yield spreads The impact of cross-border bank M&As on bank risk remains an open question. Though geographically diversifying bank M&As have the potential to reduce the risk of bank insolvency, they also have the potential to increase that risk due to the increase in risk-taking incentives by bank managers and stockholders following these transactions. This paper empirically investigates whether cross-border bank M&As increase or decrease the risk of acquiring banks as captured by changes in acquirers' yield spreads. This paper also investigates how differences in the institutional environments between bidder and target countries affect changes in yield spreads following M&A announcements. The study finds that bondholders, in general, perceive cross-border bank M&As as risk-increasing activities, unlike domestic bank mergers. Specifically, on average, yield spreads increase by 4.13 basis points following the announcement of cross-border M&As. This study also finds that these yield spreads are significantly affected by the differences in investor-protection and deposit insurance environments between the transacting countries. However, the study does not find that the regulatory and supervisory environment in the home countries of the transacting parties significantly affects the changes in yield spreads. The overall evidence suggests that regulators should judge the relative environment in both the home and the host countries in evaluating the associated risks of an active multinational financial institution and in setting the sufficiency of the banks' reserve positions. [source] The Competitive Dynamics of Geographic Deregulation in Banking: Implications for Productive EfficiencyJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 5 2008DOUGLAS D. EVANOFF market entry; bank mergers; banking deregulation; cost X-efficiency Deregulation of geographic restrictions in banking over the past 20 years has intensified both potential and actual competition in the industry. The accumulating empirical evidence suggests that potential efficiency gains associated with consolidating banks are often not realized. We evaluate the impact of this increased competition on the productive efficiency of non-merging banks confronted with new entry in their local markets and find that the incumbent banks respond by improving cost efficiency. Thus, studies evaluating the impact of bank mergers on the efficiency of the combining parties alone may be overlooking the most significant welfare-enhancing aspect of merger activity. [source] Bank Mergers, Competition, and LiquidityJOURNAL OF MONEY, CREDIT AND BANKING, Issue 5 2007ELENA CARLETTI credit market competition; bank reserves; internal money market; banking system liquidity; monetary operations We model the impact of bank mergers on loan competition, reserve holdings, and aggregate liquidity. A merger changes the distribution of liquidity shocks and creates an internal money market, leading to financial cost efficiencies and more precise estimates of liquidity needs. The merged banks may increase their reserve holdings through an internalization effect or decrease them because of a diversification effect. The merger also affects loan market competition, which in turn modifies the distribution of bank sizes and aggregate liquidity needs. Mergers among large banks tend to increase aggregate liquidity needs and thus the public provision of liquidity through monetary operations of the central bank. [source] THE GLOBAL BANK MERGER WAVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIESTHE DEVELOPING ECONOMIES, Issue 4 2002GARY A. DYMSKI This paper reconsiders causes and implications of the global bank merger wave, especially for developing economies. Previous studies of the global bank mergers,that is, mergers between banks from different nations,had assumed that these combinations are efficiency-driven, and that the U.S. case defines the paradigm for all other nations' banking systems. This paper argues that the U.S. experience is unique, not paradigmatic, and that bank mergers are not efficiency-driven; instead, this merger wave has arisen because of macrostructural circumstances and because of shifts over time in banks' strategic motives. This paper argues that large, offshore banks often engage in cross-border mergers because they want to provide financial services to households and firms that have reached minimal threshold wealth levels. For developing economies, this suggests that cross-border acquisitions of local banks by offshore banks will have mixed effects; and it cannot be assumed that the net social impact is positive. [source] Bank Mergers and Crime: The Real and Social Effects of Credit Market CompetitionTHE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 2 2006MARK J. GARMAISE ABSTRACT Using a unique sample of commercial loans and mergers between large banks, we provide micro-level (within-county) evidence linking credit conditions to economic development and find a spillover effect on crime. Neighborhoods that experience more bank mergers are subject to higher interest rates, diminished local construction, lower prices, an influx of poorer households, and higher property crime in subsequent years. The elasticity of property crime with respect to merger-induced banking concentration is 0.18. We show that these results are not likely due to reverse causation, and confirm the central findings using state branching deregulation to instrument for bank competition. [source] A welfare analysis of Canadian chartered bank mergersCANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 3 2002James McIntosh An econometric model of Canada's five largest banks is estimated using time series data from 1976 to 1996. The principal findings are that chartered bank technology is characterized by increasing returns to scale. Scale efficiency is sufficiently large to offset the consequences of reduced competition that might have arisen from a merger between Bank of Montreal and Royal Bank of Canada, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce and Toronto Dominion Bank, or both. The estimated model predicts that all the mergers proposed in 1998 would have led to slightly lower prices and, consequently, to an increase in consumer welfare. Une analyse de bien,être des fusions des banques à charte canadiennes. L'auteur calibre un modèle économétrique des cinq plus grandes banques à charte au Canada à l'aide de séries chronologiques de 1976 à 1996. Les principaux résultats montrent que la technologie des banques à charte a des rendements croissants à l'échelle. Ces rendements à l'échelle sont suffisamment importants pour compenser les effets de réduction de la concurrence qui auraient pu se produire en conséquence de la fusion de la Banque de Montréal et la Banque Royale, de la Banque Impériale de Commerce et de la Banque Toronto,Dominion, ou des deux. Le modèle suggère que toutes les fusions proposées en 1998 auraient entraîné des prix légèrement plus bas, et en conséquence un accroissement dans le niveau de bien,être des consommateurs. [source] | |||||||||||||