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Subsidy System (subsidy + system)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	75%

Selected Abstracts

Examining the use of subsidies for the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions through experimental simulations

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND GOVERNANCE, Issue 4 2006
Lars E. Olsson
Abstract A market experiment was designed to empirically investigate the potential effectiveness of a governmental subsidy system to reduce sales and therefore production of environmentally harmful products. The important issue of whether the subsidy system preserves competitiveness was also examined. In the experiment two levels of a subsidy for unsold units were compared with no subsidy. To simulate the way in which subsidy levels may vary across time in real markets, the effects of high and low uncertainty regarding the subsidy level were also investigated. The results showed that subsidies, whether known and fixed or uncertain and varying, did not erode competition but nevertheless led to higher prices, which resulted in fewer sales. In the control condition a price war resulting in decreasing prices and increasing sales were observed. Several ways in which the proposed subsidy system may be implemented in the transport sector and other sectors are discussed. It is suggested that subsidies may make the adjustment process toward sustainable production less costly for the regulated parties. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. [source]

From Successful Family Planning to the Lowest of Low Fertility Levels: Taiwan's Dilemma

ASIAN SOCIAL WORK AND POLICY REVIEW, Issue 2 2009
Wan-I Lin
Since the implementation of family planning in the 1960s, Taiwan's fertility rate has rapidly decreased. This was praised as a family planning achievement. However, in the 21st century Taiwan has become one of the lowest of low fertility countries like European countries [Kohler, H. P., Billari, F. C., & Ortega, J. A. (2002). Population and Development Review, 28(4), 641,80]. The government has begun to worry that these extremely low birthrates will result in rapid population aging and bring about other negative socio-economic effects. Thus, in its Mega Warmth Social Welfare Program (MWSWP) of 2006, the Taiwanese government targeted the issue of low birthrates. Based on secondary data analysis, we found that the reasons for rapid decrease in Taiwanese birthrates are: (i) a declining marriage rate; (ii) later marriage; (iii) changing attitudes towards child bearing; (iv) the burdens of child care; and (v) an increase in female labour participation rates. The MWSWP includes maternity leave benefits, parental leave benefits, a childcare subsidy system and early children education and care (ECEC). First, this article presents a chronological understanding of the demography in Taiwan. Second, we attempt to evaluate the reasons contributing to the low birthrates. The policy response to this is discussed next. Finally, the article provides a careful conclusion: that the extent to which these policies can significantly stop the population from declining requires further observation. [source]

RANDOM PENALTIES AND RENEWABLE RESOURCES: A MECHANISM TO REACH OPTIMAL LANDINGS IN FISHERIES

NATURAL RESOURCE MODELING, Issue 3 2009
FRANK JENSEN
Abstract Recent literature considers illegal landings a moral hazard problem that arises because individual landings are unobservable. The literature proposes incentive schemes to solve the information problem. However, most of the proposed schemes raise huge information requirements and social budget balance is not secured. In this paper, we suggest a random penalty mechanism that reduces the information requirements and secures budget balance in the case of a given number of licensed vessels. In the random penalty mechanism, aggregate landings are measured through stock sizes and the natural growth function. If aggregate landings are below optimal landings, each fisherman receives a subsidy. If aggregate catches are above optimal landings, the mechanism works such that either the fisherman is randomly selected and pays a fine or the fisherman is not selected and receives a subsidy. The fine and subsidy can be designed such that budget balance is secured. Provided risk aversion is sufficiently large and the fine is high enough, the random penalty mechanism will generate optimal individual landings. The budget balance combined with risk aversion drives the result for this advanced tax/subsidy system that does not exhaust the resource rents. The budget balance creates interdependence between fishermen that secure optimality. [source]