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Strategy Profile (strategy + profile)
Selected AbstractsVoluntary Contributions to Multiple Public ProjectsJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 1 2003M. Koster The problem of financing a set of discrete public goods (facilities, projects) by private contributions is studied. The corresponding cooperative game, the realization game, is shown to be convex. For the noncooperative setting we study a realization scheme that induces a strategic game. This contribution game is shown to be a generalized ordinal potential game; a best,response in the contribution game implies a best response in a coordination game in which the payoff to all players is the utilitarian collective welfare function, i.e., the sum of the utility functions of the players. Strategy profiles maximizing utilitarian welfare are strong Nash equilibria of the contribution game. Each strong Nash equilibrium corresponds in a natural way with a core element of the realization game, and vice versa. Moreover, each strong Nash equilibrium is coalitional proof. [source] A THEORY OF MAN AS A CREATOR OF THE WORLD,THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2008AKIHIKO MATSUIArticle first published online: 14 FEB 200 The present paper proposes a theory of man, wherein man constructs models of the world based on past experiences in social situations. The present theory considers experiences, or chunks of impressions, as primitives instead of an objective game, which is assumed to be given in the standard game theory. Agents construct models of the world based on direct and indirect experiences. Each model comprises a structural part and a factual part. The structural part is represented as a game, while the factual part is represented as a strategy profile of this game. In constructing a model, an agent might use certain axioms,for example coherence, according to which the model should be able to explain his or her own experiences; conformity to a solution concept; and minimality with respect to some simplicity measure. A few applications are presented to demonstrate how this theory works. [source] The Regulatory Environment and Rural Hospital Long-Term Care Strategies From 1997 to 2003THE JOURNAL OF RURAL HEALTH, Issue 1 2007Mary L. Fennell PhD ABSTRACT:,Context: Since the passage of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, rural hospitals have struggled with the need to strategically adapt to an abundance of changing reimbursement and regulatory programs, as well as to respond to the needs of an increasingly frail elder population in need of postacute and long-term care (LTC). Purpose: This article has 2 goals: (1) to provide a summary of the many legislative acts and provisions influencing rural hospital LTC strategies during the 1997-2003 period and (2) to track changes in the LTC strategies of a national sample of rural hospitals through this 7-year period. Methods: A 3-wave panel of rural hospital discharge planners in 540 nonfederal community-general hospitals were interviewed in 1997, 2000, and 2003. Questions focused on hospital structure, discharge planning process, and reports of internal and external organizational arrangements for providing LTC services to hospitalized patients, and changes in LTC strategy since the previous interview. Descriptive statistics are presented on LTC strategies in place in 1997 and dropped or added in 2000 and 2003. Findings and Conclusions: The general shape of the regulatory environment confronting rural hospitals and their LTC strategies during the recent past can be described as complicated, rapidly changing, and at times contradictory in intended effects. There has been a large volume of strategy change during this 7-year period, without the emergence of any identifiable pattern or LTC strategy profile, other than swing-bed participation combined with home health agency ownership. [source] Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete InformationECONOMETRICA, Issue 5 2002Matthew O. Jackson This paper offers a new approach to the study of economic problems usually modeled as games of incomplete information with discontinuous payoffs. Typically, the discontinuities arise from indeterminacies (ties) in the underlying problem. The point of view taken here is that the tie,breaking rules that resolve these indeterminacies should be viewed as part of the solution rather than part of the description of the model. A solution is therefore a tie,breaking rule together with strategies satisfying the usual best,response criterion. When information is incomplete, solutions need not exist; that is, there may be no tie,breaking rule that is compatible with the existence of strategy profiles satisfying the usual best,response criteria. It is shown that the introduction of incentive compatible communication (cheap talk) restores existence. [source] | ||||||||||