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Strategic Communication (strategic + communication)
Selected AbstractsThe Role of Trust in Channels of Strategic Communication for Building Civil SocietyJOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION, Issue 4 2005Carl H. Botan In these turbulent times, development communication is a growing and important area of both academic research and practice. This article explores the role of strategic communication channels in the development of civil society in Bosnia. This case study reports the results of a survey that asked Bosnians about their levels of trust in government officials, alternative media, and state-controlled media outlets. The findings suggest that shortly after the war Bosnians had medium levels of trust in their communication channels, and when it comes to obtaining important information, it appears that alternative media were considered more trustworthy than either the state media or local government officials. Finally, political affiliation and ethnicity affect trust in communication channels in complex ways. [source] Delegation versus Veto in Organizational Games of Strategic CommunicationJOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 6 2007ANTHONY M. MARINO In organizations, principals use decision rules to govern a more informed agent's behavior. We compare two such rules: delegation and veto. Recent work suggests that delegation dominates veto unless the divergence in preferences between the principal and the agent is so large that informative communication cannot take place. We show that this result does not hold in a reasonable model of veto versus delegation. In this model, veto dominates delegation for any feasible divergence in preferences, if it induces the agent to shut down low quality proposals that he would otherwise implement and if such projects have sufficient likelihood. [source] Systematic objective setting for effective issue managementJOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Issue 1 2005Tony Jaques While a great deal of academic and practitioner effort has been devoted to understanding and formalizing objective setting in corporate strategic planning and in strategic communication, far less effort has been committed to objective setting for issue management. Within this context, setting a proper objective is sometimes swept aside in the ,rush for results' and, as a consequence, issue management efforts can be misdirected, misapplied and poorly evaluated. Objective setting for issue management has unique requirements which distinguish it from broader corporate planning processes, and this paper develops a rationale and proposes specific guidelines to help to establish strategic objectives for effective issue management. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Persuasion in International Politics: A Rationalist AccountPOLITICS & POLICY, Issue 4 2005James I. Walsh Governments offer us the promise of rewards or the threats of punishment to secure favorable international bargains, but they also draw on reasoned arguments to convince their bargaining partners to accept mutually beneficial agreements. Works that have studied such attempts at persuasion hold that it is most likely to succeed when the states involved share important normative values or are uncertain about what is the "right" action to take. Drawing on rational choice theory of strategic communication, this study seeks to expand understanding the conditions under which attempts at persuasion in international politics succeed or fail. Persuasion can occur for reasons other than shared values; under some conditions, one state can persuade another by altering the latter's beliefs about the rewards associated with available foreign policy options. [source] | |||||||||||||