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Stackelberg Leader (stackelberg + leader)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	75%

Selected Abstracts

Sourcing Through Auctions and Audits

PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2008
Ying-Ju Chen
Buyers often find that obtaining complete information about suppliers is costly. In such scenarios, there is a trade-off between the costs of obtaining information and the benefits that accrue to the owners of such information. There are also various ways in which the missing information can be obtained or inferred. In this paper, we compare the efficiency of obtaining information via the classical mechanism design approach, which relies on the information available before the contracts are designed, with that of an "audit-based" approach, which relies on the information obtained after the fact. In our model, a single buyer (the Stackelberg leader) wishes to procure a package of products or services from various competing suppliers that possess private cost information. We allow for arbitrary cost and revenue functions and can incorporate multiple cost and revenue drivers. We show how the buyer can optimize her profit and at the same time coordinate the channel by using a contract scheme involving auctions, audits, and profit sharing. We also examine the behavior of this mechanism when the supplier can exert effort to reduce cost but the cost of effort cannot be verified. We propose several mechanisms for different precontract informational scenarios and compare their performance. [source]

LICENSING CONTRACT IN A STACKELBERG MODEL,

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 5 2005
LUIGI FILIPPINI
We study optimal linear licensing and its social welfare implications when the innovator (patentee) is an insider that can make capacity/output commitment so as to act as a Stackelberg leader in the output market. We show that (i) the patentee's profit-maximizing licensing contract is a royalty; (ii) the optimal royalty rate is greater than the cost reduction attained by the licensed technology and is increasing in the number of competitors; (iii) optimal licensing maximizes the likelihood of technology transfer, may reduce social welfare and always makes consumers worse off; and (iv) the innovator benefits from capacity commitment, and the more competitive the output market, the greater the gains it makes by licensing. The opposite holds for consumers. [source]

Strategic Choice of Quantity Stickiness and Stackelberg Leadership

BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Issue 1 2001
Midori Hirokawa
This paper re-examines endogenous Stackelberg leader,follower relations by modelling an explicitly dynamic market. We analyze a twice-repeated duopoly where, in the beginning, each firm chooses either a quantity-sticky production mode or a quantity-flexible production mode. The size of the market becomes observable after the first period. In the second period, a firm can adjust its quantity if and only if it has adopted the flexible mode. Hence, if one firm chooses the sticky mode whilst the other chooses the flexible mode, then they respectively play the roles of a Stackelberg leader and a Stackelberg follower in the second marketing period. Somewhat intriguing is the finding that such a Stackelberg-like equilibrium can arise only when the relative weight of the pre-Stackelberg first marketing period is sufficiently high, with time preferences being sufficiently strong. [source]