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Stock Price Decline (stock + price_decline)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	100%

Selected Abstracts

Underwriting and Calls of Convertible Bonds,

DECISION SCIENCES, Issue 1 2000
Arnold R. Cowan
We model convertible bond calls under asymmetric information where, unlike Harris and Raviv (1985), we consider a nonzero call price and a call notice period. In the model, the use of underwriters conveys negative information. Consequently, the stock price decline is greater for underwritten calls than for nonunderwritten calls. Furthermore, underwritten calls are made earlier and when the conversion option is less deep in the money. Underwriting commissions and the stock price decline associated with a call are negatively related to the extent that the conversion option is in the money before the call. Empirical evidence in this paper and Singh, Cowan, and Nayar (1991) are consistent with the model's predictions. [source]

Intraday Behavior of Stock Prices and Trades around Insider Trading

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 1 2010
A. Can Inci
Our evidence indicates that insiders' trades provide significant new information to market participants and they are incorporated more fully in stock prices as compared to noninsiders' trades. We find that market professionals do not front-run insiders' trades. Both insiders' purchases and sales result in significant contemporaneous and subsequent price impact, while sales by large shareholders result in a contemporaneous stock price decline that is subsequently reversed. The arrival of insider purchases reverse the prevailing negative order imbalances from third party trades and lead to piggy-backing by market professionals resulting in subsequent market purchase orders as well as stock price increases. [source]

SIX CHALLENGES IN DESIGNING EQUITY-BASED PAY

JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2003
Brian J. Hall
The past two decades have seen a dramatic increase in the equitybased pay of U.S. corporate executives, an increase that has been driven almost entirely by the explosion of stock option grants. When properly designed, equity-based pay can raise corporate productivity and shareholder value by helping companies attract, motivate, and retain talented managers. But there are good reasons to question whether the current forms of U.S. equity pay are optimal. In many cases, substantial stock and option payoffs to top executives,particularly those who cashed out much of their holdings near the top of the market,appear to have come at the expense of their shareholders, generating considerable skepticism about not just executive pay practices, but the overall quality of U.S. corporate governance. At the same time, many companies that have experienced sharp stock price declines are now struggling with the problem of retaining employees holding lots of deep-underwater options. This article discusses the design of equity-based pay plans that aim to motivate sustainable, or long-run, value creation. As a first step, the author recommends the use of longer vesting periods and other requirements on executive stock and option holdings, both to limit managers' ability to "time" the market and to reduce their incentives to take shortsighted actions that increase near-term earnings at the expense of longer-term cash flow. Besides requiring "more permanent" holdings, the author also proposes a change in how stock options are issued. In place of popular "fixed value" plans that adjust the number of options awarded each year to reflect changes in the share price (and that effectively reward management for poor performance by granting more options when the price falls, and fewer when it rises), the author recommends the use of "fixed number" plans that avoid this unintended distortion of incentives. As the author also notes, there is considerable confusion about the real economic cost of options relative to stock. Part of the confusion stems, of course, from current GAAP accounting, which allows companies to report the issuance of at-the-money options as costless and so creates a bias against stock and other forms of compensation. But, coming on top of the "opportunity cost" of executive stock options to the company's shareholders, there is another, potentially significant cost of options (and, to a lesser extent, stock) that arises from the propensity of executives and employees to place a lower value on company stock and options than well-diversified outside investors. The author's conclusion is that grants of (slow-vesting) stock are likely to have at least three significant advantages over employee stock options: ,they are more highly valued by executives and employees (per dollar of cost to shareholders); ,they continue to provide reasonably strong ownership incentives and retention power, regardless of whether the stock price rises or falls, because they don't go underwater; and ,the value of such grants is much more transparent to stockholders, employees, and the press. [source]

Is reversal of large stock-price declines caused by overreaction or information asymmetry: Evidence from stock and option markets

THE JOURNAL OF FUTURES MARKETS, Issue 4 2009
Hyung-Suk Choi
The role of option markets is reexamined in the reversal process of stock prices following stock price declines of 10% or more. A matched pair of optionable and nonoptionable firms is randomly selected when their price declines by 10% or more on the same date. The authors examine the 1,443 and 1,018 matched pairs of New York Stock Exchange/American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations firms over the period from 1996 to 2004. It was found that the positive rebounds for nonoptionable firms are caused by an abnormal increase in bid,ask spread on and before the large price decline date. On the other hand, the bid,ask spreads for optionable firms decrease on and before the large price decline date. An abnormal increase in the open interest and volume in the option market on and before the large price decline date was also found. Overall, the results suggest that the stock-price reversal neither is a result of overreaction nor can it be simply explained by the bid,ask bounce. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 29:348,376, 2009 [source]