Ballot Box (ballot + box)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


CITIZEN EMPOWERMENT: BY BALLOT BOX OR MARKET?

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 4 2004
John Meadowcroft
No abstract is available for this article. [source]


LOCAL GROWTH CONTROL AT THE BALLOT BOX: REAL EFFECTS OR SYMBOLIC POLITICS?

JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Issue 2 2007
MAI THI NGUYEN
ABSTRACT:,Growth control regulations are pervasive in local jurisdictions throughout the United States; yet there is still much uncertainty about their effectiveness in slowing down or halting growth. Moreover, there is considerable debate over whether there are unintended (or sometimes intended) exclusionary consequences that disproportionately affect minority and low-income populations. Employing multiple regression analyses, this study examines the effects of growth control ballot measures, adopted by voters, on housing growth and sociodemographic change in local jurisdictions. The findings from the multiple regression analyses reveal that cities in which growth controls were adopted at the ballot box do have slower rates of housing growth. There is also evidence that ballot box growth controls reduce growth in Hispanic and lower-income populations. Overall, the results from this study suggest that the adoption of ballot box growth controls is not merely "symbolic politics," but has real measurable consequences on housing growth. Unfortunately, growth controls adopted by the ballot box may also contribute to the sociospatial segregation of cities by race/ethnicity and income. [source]


Too much of a good thing: the ,problem' of political communications in a mass media democracy

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, Issue 3 2007
Ivor Gaber
Francis Fukuyama asks: ,,,is liberal democracy prey to serious internal contradictions, contradictions so serious that they will eventually undermine it as a political system?' This paper argues that one of these ,internal contradictions' is the political communications process and it can be sufficiently serious to undermine the democratic system,but such an undermining is not inevitable. The problem can be described as follows: Democratic systems require that citizens are kept fully informed by governments (and others) in the interests of transparency and ultimately accountability. Hence, all political communications have, as their final objective, the accountability of politicians at the ballot box. Thus all political communications have what can be described as ,above' and ,below' the line content. The above-the-line is the actual content of the message, the below-the-line is the implicit one of ,think better of me and my colleagues think worse of my opponents'. Consequently, no matter how personally honest and open an individual politician might be, the democratic system requires her or him to be always thinking about securing a successful result at the ballot box. Thus we have the ,political communications paradox'. Voters want politicians to be honest and accountable but this very demand means that politicians, implicitly, always have to have another agenda in operation when they are communicating with the public, i.e. securing their approval and then their support. As a result the trust which is a fundamental to the workings of a democratic system is constantly being undermined. This has two effects. First, that governments are obliged to make communications, rather than delivery, their real priority and second trust, not just in politicians but in the political system as a whole, tends to wane over time, which in turn endangers the very system it was designed to underpin. But this decline is not inevitable because the system has some in-built self-correcting mechanisms These include: the rise of new parties and/or leaders who portray themselves as ,new' and ,untainted',New Labour, New Conservatives, etc., an almost regular ,re-balancing' of the power relationship that exists between politicians and the civil service, particularly in the communications field, the rise of new forms of communication that seek to by-pass the institutional roadblocks that are perceived as being the cause of the problems and finally increased attention by journalists and academics to the process of political communications makes it more difficult for politicians to continue with ,business as usual' as far as their communication activities are concerned. Copyright 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]


WHY DO COMMUNITIES MOBILIZE AGAINST GROWTH: GROWTH PRESSURES, COMMUNITY STATUS, METROPOLITAN HIERARCHY, OR STRATEGIC INTERACTION?

JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Issue 1 2009
MAI THI NGUYEN
ABSTRACT:,Findings from this study challenge the conventional wisdom about the motivations for local growth control. Using data of California ballot box growth controls merged with city level demographic and housing data from the U.S. Census Bureau, logit models are estimated to test four hypotheses for why communities mobilize against growth. Of the four hypotheses, growth pressures, community status, metropolitan hierarchy, and strategic interaction, the only hypothesis that was strongly supported by the logistic regression analyses was strategic interaction. Support for the strategic interaction hypothesis reveals that jurisdictions located in regions where growth control policies are more abundant have a higher probability of mobilizing against growth. In other words, jurisdictions' growth control policies influence the growth decisions made by neighboring jurisdictions within the same region. One of the most surprising findings in the logistic regression analyses is that low-income suburbs are significantly more likely to mobilize against growth than high-income suburbs. These results refute the commonly held belief that growth control is strictly a concern of elite communities and suggest that residents of low-income suburbs may be turning to the ballot box to control growth because their communities are the locations of choice for noxious land uses. [source]


LOCAL GROWTH CONTROL AT THE BALLOT BOX: REAL EFFECTS OR SYMBOLIC POLITICS?

JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Issue 2 2007
MAI THI NGUYEN
ABSTRACT:,Growth control regulations are pervasive in local jurisdictions throughout the United States; yet there is still much uncertainty about their effectiveness in slowing down or halting growth. Moreover, there is considerable debate over whether there are unintended (or sometimes intended) exclusionary consequences that disproportionately affect minority and low-income populations. Employing multiple regression analyses, this study examines the effects of growth control ballot measures, adopted by voters, on housing growth and sociodemographic change in local jurisdictions. The findings from the multiple regression analyses reveal that cities in which growth controls were adopted at the ballot box do have slower rates of housing growth. There is also evidence that ballot box growth controls reduce growth in Hispanic and lower-income populations. Overall, the results from this study suggest that the adoption of ballot box growth controls is not merely "symbolic politics," but has real measurable consequences on housing growth. Unfortunately, growth controls adopted by the ballot box may also contribute to the sociospatial segregation of cities by race/ethnicity and income. [source]


A Call to Action: New Party Candidates and the 1931 General Election*

PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY, Issue 2 2008
MATTHEW WORLEY
Sir Oswald Mosley established his New Party in early 1931. It proposed to cut across the party and class divides, with the objective of providing a ,national' solution to the economic crisis of the time. According to Mosley, the ,old parties', meaning the Labour, Conservative and Liberal Parties , had revealed themselves unable to adapt to the post-war age. In their place, he argued, a modern organisation, based on youth, vitality and a scientifically reasoned economic plan, was needed to save Britain from terminal decline. Few heeded his call, and the party ultimately paved the way for the British Union of Fascists to emerge in 1932. Nevertheless, the New Party fought the general election of 1931, offering an unsuccessful but suitably intriguing challenge to the National coalition and Labour Party. This article will assess the New Party's election campaign, concentrating on those who briefly rallied to Mosley's appeal only to fall foul of the ballot box. In other words, it provides a case study of those who contributed to a dramatic electoral failure, and traces a significant stage along Mosley's journey to fascism. [source]


Better to shop than to vote?

BUSINESS ETHICS: A EUROPEAN REVIEW, Issue 3 2001
Noreena Hertz
This paper begins by reflecting on the current generalised political apathy signalled by low voter turnout and falling party membership. It would appear that people are exercising political choices not at the ballot box but by means of consumer activism. Corporations respond to consumer pressure in a way that governments do not, and are gradually assuming the role of global political actors. But this is a dangerous state of affairs for several reasons. In the first place, social welfare can never be the core activity of corporations. Corporate social motives are commercial, and there is a danger that their social policy decisions will be driven by the logic of the market place rather than social need. Recession, for instance, will curtail their social responsiveness, as will decisions to relocate. It is also the case that partnerships between governments and corporates run the risk of removing checks on the growth and abuse of corporate power. And finally, what price does society have to pay for the growth of corporate benevolence? [source]