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Solution Concept (solution + concept)
Selected AbstractsCompetitive flow control in general multi-node multi-link communication networksINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS, Issue 2 2008Ismet Sahin Abstract In this paper, we consider the flow control in a general multi-node multi-link communication network with competing users. Each user has a source node, a destination node, and an existing route for its data flow over any set of links in the network from its source to its destination node. The flow rate for each user is a control variable that is determined by optimizing a user-specific utility function which combines maximizing the flow rate and minimizing the network congestion for that user. A preference parameter in the utility function allows each user to adjust the trade-off between these two objectives. Since all users share the same network resources and are only interested in optimizing their own utility functions, the Nash equilibrium of game theory represents a reasonable solution concept for this multi-user general network. The existence and uniqueness of such an equilibrium is therefore very important for the network to admit an enforceable flow configuration. In this paper, we derive an expression for the Nash equilibrium and prove its uniqueness. We illustrate the results with an example and discuss some properties and observations related to the network performance when in the Nash equilibrium. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Switching contact task control in hydraulic actuators: Stability analysis and experimental evaluationINTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ROBUST AND NONLINEAR CONTROL, Issue 17 2009P. Sekhavat Abstract A switching contact task control for hydraulic actuators is proposed. The controller is built upon three individually designed control laws for three phases of motion: (1) position regulation in free space, (2) impact suppression and stable transition from free to constrained motion and (3) force regulation in sustained-contact motion. The position and force control schemes are capable of asymptotic set-point regulation in the presence of actuator friction and without the complexity of sliding mode or adaptive control techniques. The intermediate impact control scheme is included for the first time to dampen the undesirable impacts and dissipate the impact energy that could potentially drive the whole system unstable. The solution concept and the stability of the complete switching control system are analyzed rigorously using the Filippov's solution concept and the concept of Lyapunov exponents. Both computer simulations and experiments are carried out to demonstrate the efficacy of the designed switching control law. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Robustness in the Pareto-solutions for the multi-criteria minisum location problemJOURNAL OF MULTI CRITERIA DECISION ANALYSIS, Issue 4 2001F.R. Fernández Abstract In this paper, a new trend is introduced into the field of multi-criteria location problems. We combine the robustness approach using the minmax regret criterion together with Pareto-optimality. We consider the multi-criteria squared Euclidean minisum location problem which consists of simultaneously minimizing a number of weighted sum-distance functions and the set of Pareto-optimal locations as its solution concept. The Pareto-optimal solutions for the set of robust locations with respect to the original weighted sum-distance functions is completely characterized. These Pareto-optimal solutions have both the properties of stability and non-domination which are required in robust and multi-criteria programming. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] Delta and singular delta locus for one-dimensional systems of conservation lawsMATHEMATICAL METHODS IN THE APPLIED SCIENCES, Issue 8 2004Marko Nedeljkov Abstract This work gives a condition for existence of singular and delta shock wave solutions to Riemann problem for 2×2 systems of conservation laws. For a fixed left-hand side value of Riemann data, the condition obtained in the paper describes a set of possible right-hand side values. The procedure is similar to the standard one of finding the Hugoniot locus. Fluxes of the considered systems are globally Lipschitz with respect to one of the dependent variables. The association in a Colombeau-type algebra is used as a solution concept. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley &Sons, Ltd. [source] A THEORY OF MAN AS A CREATOR OF THE WORLD,THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 1 2008AKIHIKO MATSUIArticle first published online: 14 FEB 200 The present paper proposes a theory of man, wherein man constructs models of the world based on past experiences in social situations. The present theory considers experiences, or chunks of impressions, as primitives instead of an objective game, which is assumed to be given in the standard game theory. Agents construct models of the world based on direct and indirect experiences. Each model comprises a structural part and a factual part. The structural part is represented as a game, while the factual part is represented as a strategy profile of this game. In constructing a model, an agent might use certain axioms,for example coherence, according to which the model should be able to explain his or her own experiences; conformity to a solution concept; and minimality with respect to some simplicity measure. A few applications are presented to demonstrate how this theory works. [source] Comparing Sunspot Equilibrium And Lottery Equilibrium Allocations: The Finite Case*INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2004Rod Garratt Sunspot equilibrium and lottery equilibrium are two stochastic solution concepts for nonstochastic economies. We compare these concepts in a class of completely finite, (possibly) nonconvex exchange economies with perfect markets, which requires extending the lottery model to the finite case. Every equilibrium allocation of our lottery model is also a sunspot equilibrium allocation. The converse is almost always true. There are exceptions, however: For some economies, there exist sunspot equilibrium allocations with no lottery equilibrium counterpart. [source] A new rank correlation coefficient with application to the consensus ranking problemJOURNAL OF MULTI CRITERIA DECISION ANALYSIS, Issue 1 2002Edward J. Emond Abstract The consensus ranking problem has received much attention in the statistical literature. Given m rankings of n objects the objective is to determine a consensus ranking. The input rankings may contain ties, be incomplete, and may be weighted. Two solution concepts are discussed, the first maximizing the average weighted rank correlation of the solution ranking with the input rankings and the second minimizing the average weighted Kemeny,Snell distance. A new rank correlation coefficient called ,x is presented which is shown to be the unique rank correlation coefficient which is equivalent to the Kemeny-Snell distance metric. The new rank correlation coefficient is closely related to Kendall's tau but differs from it in the way ties are handled. It will be demonstrated that Kendall's ,b is flawed as a measure of agreement between weak orderings and should no longer be used as a rank correlation coefficient. The use of ,x in the consensus ranking problem provides a more mathematically tractable solution than the Kemeny,Snell distance metric because all the ranking information can be summarized in a single matrix. The methods described in this paper allow analysts to accommodate the fully general consensus ranking problem with weights, ties, and partial inputs. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source] A Tractable and Expressive Class of Marginal Contribution Nets and Its ApplicationsMLQ- MATHEMATICAL LOGIC QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2009Edith Elkind Abstract Coalitional games raise a number of important questions from the point of view of computer science, key among them being how to represent such games compactly, and how to efficiently compute solution concepts assuming such representations. Marginal contribution nets (MC-nets), introduced by Ieong and Shoham, are one of the simplest and most influential representation schemes for coalitional games. MC-nets are a rulebased formalism, in which rules take the form pattern , value, where "pattern " is a Boolean condition over agents, and "value " is a numeric value. Ieong and Shoham showed that, for a class of what we will call "basic" MC-nets, where patterns are constrained to be a conjunction of literals, marginal contribution nets permit the easy computation of solution concepts such as the Shapley value. However, there are very natural classes of coalitional games that require an exponential number of such basic MC-net rules. We present read-once MC- nets, a new class of MC-nets that is provably more compact than basic MC-nets, while retaining the attractive computational properties of basic MC-nets. We show how the techniques we develop for read-once MC-nets can be applied to other domains, in particular, computing solution concepts in network flow games on series-parallel networks (© 2009 WILEY-VCH Verlag GmbH & Co. KGaA, Weinheim) [source] | |||||||||||||