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Social Transfers (social + transfer)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	57%
Humanities and Social Sciences	42%

Selected Abstracts

Intergovernmental relations, social policy and federal transfers after Romanow

CANADIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION/ADMINISTRATION PUBLIQUE DU CANADA, Issue 1 2004
Tom McIntosh
Though the provinces have agreed to the split, the federal government undertook the allocation of the transfer to the new Canada Health Transfer and the Canada Social Transfer unilaterally. At the same time, the federal government has simultaneously been increasing its own social spending in areas of provincial jurisdiction in recent years. In response, the provinces have been taking an increasingly hard line towards Ottawa's unilateral actions, as demonstrated by the creation of the Council of the Federation and its focus on the so-called fiscal imbalance in the federation. These dynamics make the intergovernmental commitment to collaborative federalism ring somewhat hollow. The article argues that the inability of both orders of government to take collaborative federalism and policy interdependence seriously poses significant threats not only to the health of the federation but also to efforts to create healthy public policy. Sommaire: Le présent article porte sur les nouvelles et anciennes dynamiques inter-gouvemementales concernant les transferts accordés par le fédéral aux provinces pour le financement des politiques sociales et de santé, qui ont découlé du Rapport Romanow et de la décision de scinder le Transfert canadien en matiè-e de santé et de programmes sociaux (TCSPS) en deux composantes distinctes. Quoique les provinces aient accepté la scission, le gouvernement fédéral a entrepris de procéder unilatérale-ment à l'affectation des paiements aux nouveaux Transfert canadien en matière de santé et Transfert canadien en matière de programmes sociaux. Simultanément, ces dernières années, le gouvernement fédéral a accru ses propres dépenses sociales dans des domaines de juridiction provinciale. Face à cela, les provinces ont adopté une position de plus en plus intransigeante à l'egard des initiatives unilatéralcs d'Ottawa comme le démontrent la céeation du Conseil de la fédération et sa concentration sur le soi-disant déséquilibre financier au sein de la fédération. Cette dynarnique fait que l'engagement intergouvernemental envers le fédéralisme de collaboration sonne plutôt vide. L'article soutient que L'inaptitude des deux ordres de gouverncment a prendre au serieux le fédéralisme de collaboration et L'interdépendance politique représente une forte menace, non seulement pour la santé de la fédération, mais aussi pour les efforts visant à créer un politique publique saine. [source]

Retirement Incomes: Private Savings versus Social Transfers

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 5 2000
John Creedy
It has long been known, from the work of Samuelson and Aaron, that if (approximately) the sum of the population and real earnings growth rates exceeds the real interest rate, all individuals can be made better off by using a pay-as-you-go pension scheme. The basic overlapping generations model that is typically used to examine such intergenerational transfers makes no allowance for labour supply responses to taxes and transfers, and so cannot be used to examine optimal tax and pension levels. The present paper allows for labour supply effects, whereby a tax imposed to finance current pensions introduces distortions to labour supply and a reduction in the tax base. The optimal proportional tax rate, and therefore the optimal combination of private savings and social transfers, is derived in terms of the time preference rate, the taste for leisure, real interest and productivity and population growth rates. It is found that the condition under which the optimal tax is positive is the same as the Samuelson,Aaron condition. A crucial ingredient in obtaining this result is an assumption that pension levels are adjusted in line with the growth of wage rates rather than, for example, being held constant in real terms. This in turn is found to imply that earnings grow at the same rate as the wage, so long as preferences are such that leisure can be expressed as a proportion of full income. [source]

Electoral turnout and income redistribution by the state: A cross-national analysis of the developed democracies

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 2 2008
VINCENT A. MAHLER
The discussion begins with the median voter hypothesis, which predicts that the extent of state redistribution in a country will be positively related to the degree of pre-government inequality. In seeking to extend the median voter approach, the article takes into account two additional variables: the level of electoral turnout and the degree to which turnout is skewed by income. The analysis confirms that pre-government inequality is indeed positively related to state redistribution. However, the predictive power of the median voter approach is significantly improved when account is taken of the level of electoral turnout and the extent to which the turnout rate reflects an income skew , variables that are themselves related. The link between turnout and redistribution is especially strong for social transfers as opposed to taxes, and for the lower and middle, as opposed to the upper, part of the income spectrum. [source]

Rights, review, and spending: Policy outcomes with judicially enforceable rights

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL RESEARCH, Issue 1 2001
AMY K. MÄKINEN
This paper posits that countries with a constitutional right to social security that can be enforced by courts via judicial review will show patterns of spending on social security that are distinct from countries with other constitutional and judicial arrangements. Governments in countries with enforceable rights will be constrained to spend more on transfer programs to avoid censure from the courts. The hypotheses are tested using data from 22 OECD countries using time,series cross,section analysis. The results show that enforceable rights are associated with higher growth rates in social security spending and lower fluctuation in expenditures on social programs, although the amount of GDP spent on social transfers is unaffected by rights. These results are consistent with the idea that governments' spending habits are constrained by positive rights, but rebut the argument that rights lead to economic distortions. [source]

Social protection and poverty in Azerbaijan, a low-income country in transition: Implications of a household survey

INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY REVIEW, Issue 4 2007
Nazim Habibov
Using a nationally representative survey, this study examines the performance of social protection in Azerbaijan from the perspective of poverty reduction. Empirical evidence presented suggests that social protection programmes have an important impact on poverty alleviation. However, poverty is still widespread. The findings demonstrate that the current system of social protection has several important limitations. First, a significant proportion of the poor population is not covered by the social protection system. Second, the poor typically receive a smaller share of total benefits than the non-poor. Finally, most social transfers are too small to lift households out of poverty. The current system of social protection in Azerbaijan requires further strengthening. In particular, the government should develop and implement new social assistance programmes specifically directed towards poverty reduction. [source]

Die reformierte Gründungsförderung für Arbeitslose , Chancen und Risiken

PERSPEKTIVEN DER WIRTSCHAFTSPOLITIK, Issue 2 2009
Marco Caliendo
In 2003, the "start-up-subsidy" (Existenzgründungszuschuss) was added to the existing "bridging-allowance" (Überbrückungsgeld) and the two programs together led to a strong increase in the number of supported start-ups. In 2006 both instruments were merged to the "start-up allowance" (Gründungszuschuss). Since the bridging allowance has been evaluated as effective and efficient and the start-up-subsidy reached new target groups, the latest reform shows several shortcomings. First of all, an end of the start-up boom is to be expected with the newly attracted target groups not being reached anymore. Secondly, the design of the "start-up allowance" is suboptimal, where efficiency losses can be expected if participants aim at maximizing social transfers. First empirical evidence from data of 2007 supports most of these expectations. [source]