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Social Planner (social + planner)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

The Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations,

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2002
Motty Perry
In a patent race, social incentives and private incentives may sometimes coincide and at other times diverge , too many researchers remain in the race. If the social planner cannot determine what stage the researchers have achieved, this informational constraint can result in a socially suboptimal outcome. We construct a mechanism in which a planner exploits the researchers' private information to determine when and to whom to allocate rights to pursue the final prize. This mechanism does not require any payments and, therefore, will not distort earlier investment incentives. It is solvable by the iterative elimination of dominated strategies. [source]

Business-to-business electronic marketplaces: Joining a public or creating a private

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF FINANCE & ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2004
Chrysovalantou Milliou
Abstract We analyse a firm's incentives to create a private B2B e-marketplace or to join a public e-marketplace. In the former the firm incurs higher set-up costs but lower quality investment costs due to closer supplier,buyer collaboration than in the public. In the latter, the firm's quality improvement may spillover to competitors. We show that a firm's incentives to create a private e-marketplace are stronger, the closer is supplier,buyer collaboration, the higher are spillovers, and the larger is the buyer's profit share within the e-marketplace. Our welfare analysis indicates that a firm's incentives do not always coincide with those of a social planner. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Doing Wonders with an Egg: Optimal Re-distribution When Households Differ in Market and Non-Market Abilities

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY, Issue 3 2003
Alessandro Balestrino
The paper studies non-linear income taxation and linear commodity taxation in a household production context with households differentiated by market and non-market ability. In such a setting, there is an efficiency motive for re-distribution which is independent from the usual equity motive, and operates also when the social planner is indifferent to utility inequality. As a consequence, some of the policy prescriptions applicable to the case in which households differ in market ability only do not hold when households differ also in non-market ability. For instance, re-distribution is not necessarily from high- to low-wage households, and it is not necessarily true that the marginal rate of income tax should be zero for high incomes and positive for low incomes. In some cases, re-distribution may accentuate rather than lessen utility inequality, and can reverse the direction of income inequality relative to the laissez-faire equilibrium. Furthermore, contrary to Atkinson-Stiglitz, it may be optimal to use indirect and direct taxation simultaneously even when the utility function is separable in commodities and labour. [source]

DURABILITY CHOICE AND THE PIRACY FOR PROFIT OF GOODS

METROECONOMICA, Issue 2 2010
Article first published online: 26 MAR 200, Gregory E. Goering
ABSTRACT We explore the impact of durable goods piracy in a simple two-period durability choice setting where an originator faces a future for-profit pirate that clones or duplicates copies of the durable good. We find that a social planner, as well as a monopoly originator, may well engage in a sort of ,reversed planned obsolescence'. In other words, they manufacture a product that is more durable than the first-best cost-minimizing level, if they cannot directly control the pirate. We show this occurs even in rental or committed sales settings, indicating Swan's market independence result does not hold here. [source]

R&D investment decision and optimal subsidy

R & D MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2001
Jyh-bang Jou
This article assumes that a firm facing technological uncertainty must decide whether to purchase R&D capital at each instant. R&D capital exhibits both irreversibility and externality through the learning-by-doing effect. The combination of irreversibility and uncertainty drives agents to be more prudent; the maxim ,better safe than sorry' applies. This maxim is more important if uncertainty is greater, technology progresses at a lower pace, the externality is stronger, or a catastrophic event is less likely to occur. A firm ignoring the externality will both invest later and disinvest earlier than a social planner who internalizes the externality. An equal rate of investment tax credits should be given to both costlessly reversible investments and irreversible ones, and the same rate of taxation should be imposed on disinvestment. [source]

National Treatment and the optimal regulation of environmental externalities

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 4 2008
Sumeet Gulati
Abstract., We analyze the role of National Treatment in the regulation of environmental product standards for an open economy. A social planner uses product standards to control emissions from the consumption of a traded good. We show that whether National Treatment of standards interferes with welfare-maximizing policy depends on the instruments available to the policy maker (consumption or emissions tax) and differences in the cost of complying with the standard. We also highlight the asymmetric incidence of the domestic and import product standard when taxes are suboptimal. This asymmetric incidence can also cause welfare-maximizing policy to violate National Treatment. On analyse le rôle du principe de traitement identique des entités domestiques ou importées dans la réglementation des normes environnementales dans une économie ouverte. Un gouvernement utilise des normes pour contrôler les émissions découlant de la consommation d'un produit transigé internationalement. On montre que le fait que le traitement identique des normes va ou non interférer avec l'objectif poursuivi qui est de maximiser le niveau de bien-être va dépendre de l'ensemble des instruments disponibles pour l'architecte des politiques (une taxe sur la consommation ou sur les émissions) et des différences dans les coûts à encourir pour se conformer aux normes. On souligne aussi l'incidence asymétrique des normes sur les produits domestiques et importés quand les taxes sont sous optimales. Cette incidence asymétrique peut faire que la politique qui vise la maximisation du bien-être soit en violation du principe de traitement identique. [source]

Mixed oligopoly and spatial agglomeration

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2003
Noriaki Matsushima
We use a circular city model with quantity-setting competition. In contrast to a pure market case discussed by Pal (1998a), spatial agglomeration of private firms always appears in equilibrium. All private firms locate at the same point, and the public firm locates at the opposite side. We also find that this equilibrium pattern of the location is second best provided that output of each private firm cannot be controlled by the social planner. JEL Classification: H42, L13 Oligopole mixte et agglomération spatiale Les auteurs examinent un marché mixte où une entreprise publique possédée par l'État et cherchant à maximiser le niveau de bien-être est en concurrence avec des entreprises privées qui cherchent à maximiser leurs profits. On utilise un modèle de cité circulaire où la concurrence se fait en choisissant la quantité produite. En contraste avec le cas du marché parfait discuté par Pal (1998a), l'agglomération spatiale des entreprises privées paraît être en équilibre. Toutes les entreprises privées se localisent au même point, et l'entreprise publique se localise du côté opposé. Il appert que ce pattern d'équilibre de localisation est un équilibre de second ordre compte tenu du fait que la production de chaque entreprise privée ne peut être contrôlée par le planificateur social. [source]