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Sovereign Debt Crises (sovereign + debt_crisis)
Selected AbstractsCOALITION GOVERNMENTS AND SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISESECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2009SEBASTIAN M. SAIEGH This article examines the domestic politics of sovereign debt crises. I focus on two alternative mechanisms that aggregate the preferences of domestic actors over debt repayment: single-party versus multiparty coalition governments. I uncover a very strong empirical regularity using cross-national data from 48 developing countries between 1971 and 1997. Countries that are governed by a coalition of parties are less likely to reschedule their debts than those under single-party governments. The effect of multiparty coalitions on sovereign defaults is quantitatively large and roughly of the same order of magnitude as liquidity factors such as debt burden and debt service. These results are robust to numerous specifications and samples. [source] CHALLENGES FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY POLICY,ECONOMIC AFFAIRS, Issue 4 2004Alastair Clark Financial stability issues have attracted increasing attention as the global financial system has become more complex and more integrated. This article discusses some challenges posed by this environment for financial stability policy-makers. The challenges identified are: how to assess the relative merits of different policy measures and calibrate their effects; how to design regulatory capital requirements that are not too prescriptive or detailed; how incentive structures for individuals within firms can be better aligned with a firm's objectives for both return and risk; how,the authorities' should relate to large, complex financial institutions; and how to improve the handling of sovereign debt crises. The article gives a flavour of the official debate in each of these areas. [source] COALITION GOVERNMENTS AND SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISESECONOMICS & POLITICS, Issue 2 2009SEBASTIAN M. SAIEGH This article examines the domestic politics of sovereign debt crises. I focus on two alternative mechanisms that aggregate the preferences of domestic actors over debt repayment: single-party versus multiparty coalition governments. I uncover a very strong empirical regularity using cross-national data from 48 developing countries between 1971 and 1997. Countries that are governed by a coalition of parties are less likely to reschedule their debts than those under single-party governments. The effect of multiparty coalitions on sovereign defaults is quantitatively large and roughly of the same order of magnitude as liquidity factors such as debt burden and debt service. These results are robust to numerous specifications and samples. [source] Co-ordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures*THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, Issue 487 2003Sayantan Ghosal We study a model of sovereign debt crisis that combines problems of creditor co-ordination and debtor moral hazard. In the face of sovereign default, the need to give appropriate incentives to the debtor leads to excessive ,rollover failure' by creditors. We discuss how the incidence of crises might be reduced by international sovereign bankruptcy procedures , involving increased ,contractibility' of sovereign debtor's payoffs, suspension of convertibility in a ,discovery' phase and penalties in case of malfeasance. In relation to the current debate, this is more akin to the IMF's Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism than the Collective Action Clauses promoted by others. [source] | ||||||||||