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Short-term Debt (short-term + debt)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	100%

Selected Abstracts

Presidential Address, Committing to Commit: Short-term Debt When Enforcement Is Costly

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 4 2004
Douglas W. Diamond
ABSTRACT In legal systems with expensive or ineffective contract enforcement, it is difficult to induce lenders to enforce debt contracts. If lenders do not enforce, borrowers will have incentives to misbehave. Lenders have incentives to enforce given bad news when debt is short-term and subject to runs caused by externalities across lenders. Lenders will not undo these externalities by negotiation. The required number of lenders increases with enforcement costs. A very high enforcement cost can exceed the ex ante incentive benefit of enforcement. Removing lenders' right to immediately enforce their debt with a "bail-in" can improve the ex ante incentives of borrowers. [source]

Long-Term Debt and Optimal Policy in the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level

ECONOMETRICA, Issue 1 2001
John H. Cochrane
The fiscal theory says that the price level is determined by the ratio of nominal debt to the present value of real primary surpluses. I analyze long-term debt and optimal policy in the fiscal theory. I find that the maturity structure of the debt matters. For example, it determines whether news of future deficits implies current inflation or future inflation. When long-term debt is present, the government can trade current inflation for future inflation by debt operations; this tradeoff is not present if the government rolls over short-term debt. The maturity structure of outstanding debt acts as a "budget constraint" determining which periods' price levels the government can affect by debt variation alone. In addition, debt policy,the expected pattern of future state-contingent debt sales, repurchases and redemptions,matters crucially for the effects of a debt operation. I solve for optimal debt policies to minimize the variance of inflation. I find cases in which long-term debt helps to stabilize inflation. I also find that the optimal policy produces time series that are similar to U.S. surplus and debt time series. To understand the data, I must assume that debt policy offsets the inflationary impact of cyclical surplus shocks, rather than causing price level disturbances by policy-induced shocks. Shifting the objective from price level variance to inflation variance, the optimal policy produces much less volatile inflation at the cost of a unit root in the price level; this is consistent with the stabilization of U.S. inflation after the gold standard was abandoned. [source]

The Impact of Managerial Entrenchment on Agency Costs: An Empirical Investigation Using UK Panel Data

EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 3 2009
Chrisostomos Florackis
G3; G32 Abstract This paper empirically investigates the relationship between managerial entrenchment and agency costs for a large sample of UK firms over the period 1999,2005. To measure managerial entrenchment, we use detailed information on ownership and board structures and managerial compensation. We develop a managerial entrenchment index, which captures the extent to which managers have the ability and incentives to expropriate wealth from shareholders. Our findings, which are based on a dynamic panel data analysis, show that there is a strong negative relationship between managerial entrenchment and our inverse proxy for agency costs, namely asset turnover ratio. There is also evidence that short-term debt and dividend payments work as effective corporate governance devices for UK firms. Finally, our findings reveal that agency costs are persistent over time. The results are robust to a number of alternative specifications, including varying measures of managerial entrenchment and agency costs. [source]

Monetary Transmission and Inventory: Evidence from Japanese Balance-Sheet Data by Firm Size

THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2002
Kazuo Ogawa
I analyse the response of inventories and short-term debts to monetary policy using disaggregated data on Japanese manufacturing firms classified by firm size. I find that monetary contraction decreases the inventories of large firms; however, inventories of small and medium firms increase considerably for the first several quarters. This implies that in a subcontracting system small and medium subcontractors serve as a buffer and alleviate the monetary shocks felt by their large parent firms. Moreover, inventory build-ups are financed by increases in accounts payable. I also find that for small firms land asset is important in easing credit conditions and increasing inventories. JEL Classification Numbers: E22, E32, E44, E51. [source]