Sharing Agreements (sharing + agreement)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


A collaborative approach to the environmental assessment process prior to oil exploration activities offshore the Falkland Islands

AQUATIC CONSERVATION: MARINE AND FRESHWATER ECOSYSTEMS, Issue 1 2002
Liz Hopkins
Abstract 1.Operating Companies awarded acreage in the Falkland Islands First Offshore Licensing Round began exploration for oil and gas in 1996. Appropriate environmental management is an important aspect of exploration activities in any new frontier area and the Falklands Islands were no exception. Operators with drilling commitments established the Falklands Operators Sharing Agreement (FOSA), which included an Environmental Workgroup (EWG) to take responsibility for the environmental issues associated with exploration activities. 2.The EWG was established early in the exploration programme and commissioned a number of specific environmental studies relating to the offshore environment of the Islands. The data made available by this research provided a valuable input to the assessment of potential environmental impacts from the planned exploration activities. By undertaking environmental impact assessments prior to exploration activities FOSA were able to identify and adopt operational and management controls to ensure potential environmental impacts were, where possible, minimized or avoided. 3.The EWG also provided the main point of contact with the regulators on environmental matters and through the Falkland Islands Exploration & Production Environmental Forum facilitated consultation with government departments such as Fisheries, and other stakeholders such as Falklands Conservation. 4.The co-operative approach taken by the operators with regard to the environmental management of the exploration activities offshore the Falkland Islands is considered to have been very successful. The most obvious benefits were through the shared resources resulting in financial savings, however, other benefits have included, avoiding duplication of effort, the promoting of ,working togetherness' and a reduced burden on consultees. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]


Market Sharing Agreements and Collusive Networks*

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2004
Paul Belleflamme
We analyze reciprocal market sharing agreements by which firms commit not to enter each other's territory in oligopolistic markets and procurement auctions. The set of market sharing agreements defines a collusive network. We characterize stable collusive networks when firms and markets are symmetric. Stable networks are formed of complete alliances, of different sizes, larger than a minimal threshold. Typically, stable networks display fewer agreements than the optimal network for the industry and more agreements than the socially optimal network. When firms or markets are asymmetric, stable networks may involve incomplete alliances and be underconnected with respect to the social optimum. [source]


Input Suppliers, Differential Pricing, and Information Sharing Agreements

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 4 2008
Anthony Creane
It is common for firms to systematically share information with their input suppliers. Although such agreements with horizontal rivals have been analyzed, there has been little work examining vertical sharing, and that analysis has focused on suppliers that set uniform prices. However, there has been a systematic change in the US policy toward vertical relationships in the past decades: both FTC inaction and courts rulings have curtailed the effect of Robinson-Patman, a law meant to prevent differential pricing. Furthermore, it is not clear if differential pricing reflects the suppliers' or the buyers' power. The interaction of these effects is examined. [source]


Market Sharing Agreements and Collusive Networks*

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 2 2004
Paul Belleflamme
We analyze reciprocal market sharing agreements by which firms commit not to enter each other's territory in oligopolistic markets and procurement auctions. The set of market sharing agreements defines a collusive network. We characterize stable collusive networks when firms and markets are symmetric. Stable networks are formed of complete alliances, of different sizes, larger than a minimal threshold. Typically, stable networks display fewer agreements than the optimal network for the industry and more agreements than the socially optimal network. When firms or markets are asymmetric, stable networks may involve incomplete alliances and be underconnected with respect to the social optimum. [source]