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Shareholder Wealth (shareholder + wealth)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

Corporate Sell-offs in the UK: Use of Proceeds, Financial Distress and Long-run Impact on Shareholder Wealth

EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2008
Edward Lee
G34 Abstract This study examines the long-run return performance following UK corporate sell-off announcements. We observe significant negative abnormal returns up to five years subsequent to sell-off announcements. Our finding is robust to various specifications, irrespective of the intended use of proceeds. We also find a significantly positive association between long-run abnormal returns and the magnitude of cash proceeds for sellers reducing corporate debt as well as for sellers with deeper financial distress or higher growth prospects. Overall, we find that UK corporate sell-offs are associated with declines in subsequent shareholder wealth. [source]

The Effect of Board Independence on Target Shareholder Wealth

AUSTRALIAN ACCOUNTING REVIEW, Issue 2 2008
Peter M. Clarkson
We seek insights into whether, and if so how, an independent board enhances the bid premiums offered to target firm shareholders during a takeover. The results indicate that the presence of an independent board enhances the initial bid premium by, on average, 21.1%. However, the results of more refined analysis suggest that the enhanced bid premium is in fact driven by independent boards comprising non-executive directors who have reputation capital at stake. We also find that independent boards that resist takeovers or include voluntary independent expert reports in target statements, increase the bid premium revision by, on average, 15.6% and 16.2%, respectively. [source]

Corporate Sell-offs in the UK: Use of Proceeds, Financial Distress and Long-run Impact on Shareholder Wealth

EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2008
Edward Lee
G34 Abstract This study examines the long-run return performance following UK corporate sell-off announcements. We observe significant negative abnormal returns up to five years subsequent to sell-off announcements. Our finding is robust to various specifications, irrespective of the intended use of proceeds. We also find a significantly positive association between long-run abnormal returns and the magnitude of cash proceeds for sellers reducing corporate debt as well as for sellers with deeper financial distress or higher growth prospects. Overall, we find that UK corporate sell-offs are associated with declines in subsequent shareholder wealth. [source]

Capital gains taxation and shareholder wealth in takeovers

ACCOUNTING & FINANCE, Issue 2 2010
Martin Bugeja
H24; G32; G34 Abstract Before December 1999, the capital gains of shareholders who sold their shares into Australian takeovers have been taxable irrespective of payment method. Subsequently, shareholders can elect to rollover capital gains in equity takeovers. We examine the effect of this change on the association between target shareholder capital gains and bidder and target firm shareholder wealth. The results indicate that prior to the regulatory change, cash consideration results in higher target shareholder returns for non-taxation reasons. After the introduction of capital gains tax rollover relief, we find that target and acquiring firm shareholders earn lower returns when cash consideration is offered to shareholders with greater capital gains. [source]

California's Health Insurance Act of 2003: View of the Market

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, Issue 2 2008
STEVEN E. ABRAHAM
This "play or pay" mandate would have required California employers to either provide medical insurance for their employees or pay into a state insurance fund. Although the law ultimately did not go into effect, movements in shareholder wealth provide evidence about the differential effects of such health-care mandates on various types of employers. Large or unionized firms had no negative effects; expected profits declined most for firms with 50,199 employees. [source]

Wealth Effects of International Investments and Agency Problems for Korean Multinational Firms

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING, Issue 3 2003
Wi Saeng Kim
This paper recognizes the recent surge in cross-border investments by MNCs from newly industrialized countries and investigates the wealth effects of FDI announcements by Korean firms, which are the leading FDI providers in Asia. The empirical results indicate that for Korean MNCs: 1) cross-border investments increase shareholder wealth; and 2) they do not obtain the firm-specific technological advantages over international competitors. The paper also presents evidence that cross-border investments do not increase shareholder wealth for the 30 largest chaebol -affiliates, and that shareholder wealth losses are greater when corporate ownership is concentrated, as suggested by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and La Porta et al. (1998, 2000). [source]

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR COMPANY PRESIDENTS AND FIRM PERFORMANCE IN JAPAN,

THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW, Issue 4 2008
KATSUYUKI KUBO
Kaplan (1994) concludes that the relationship between top pay and stock performance in Japan is similar to that in the USA. Using a new and comprehensive data set that includes presidents' stock and their stock option holdings, this study estimates the sensitivity of Japanese presidents' wealth to shareholder wealth in the period 1977,2000. Contrary to the commonly held belief that Japanese corporate governance is becoming more like that in the USA, the results show that pay,performance sensitivity actually decreased substantially after 1990. In 2000, Japanese presidents received $US22,100 when stock returns increased from ,2.1% to 14.8%. [source]