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Shareholder Interests (shareholder + interest)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting83%

Selected Abstracts

Global Markets and National Regulation: The Protection of Shareholder Interests in Germany and Italy

GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, Issue 1 2007
Dermot McCann
Global market integration is widely perceived as presenting a major challenge to the sustainability of many national economic regulatory systems. There is far less agreement, however, about precisely how these pressures feed into the politics of reform and reshape national public policy. This article will seek to cast light on this relationship by identifying four influential ,models of linkage' between global pressures and regulatory change. It will then comparatively assess their capacity to elucidate the progress of shareholder protection reform in Germany and Italy. While no single model proves fully satisfactory, it will be argued that the weaknesses of two of them can be largely overcome through a process of refinement and integration. [source]

Board Characteristics and Audit Fees,

CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTING RESEARCH, Issue 3 2002
Joseph V. Carcello
Abstract This paper examines the relations between three board characteristics (independence, diligence, and expertise) and Big 6 audit fees for Fortune 1000 companies. To protect its reputation capital, avoid legal liability, and promote shareholder interests, a more independent, diligent, and expert board may demand differentially higher audit quality (greater assurance, which requires more audit work) than the Big 6 audit firms normally provide. The audit fee increases as the auditor's additional costs are passed on to the client, such that we expect positive relations between audit fees and the board characteristics examined. We find significant positive relations between audit fees and board independence, diligence, and expertise. The results persist when similar measures of audit committee "quality" are included in the model. The results add to the growing body of literature documenting relations between corporate governance mechanisms and various facets of the financial reporting and audit processes, as well as to our understanding of the determinants of audit fees. [source]

GOLF TOURNAMENTS AND CEO PAY,UNRAVELING THE MYSTERIES OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION

JOURNAL OF APPLIED CORPORATE FINANCE, Issue 3 2001
John Martin
Leading financial economists and activist institutional investors have long argued that the proper alignment of manager and shareholder interests requires the use of performance based compensation. Partly in response to these pressures, and in combination with a change in the tax code that encourages performance-based pay, corporate boards have dramatically increased their use of stock grants and executive stock options. Combine this development with the longest bull market in U.S. financial history, and the result is unprecedented levels of CEO pay at the close of the 20th century. This review of executive compensation reveals that the economic theory of tournaments may provide a rationale for the pattern, if not the level, of executive pay. Specifically it finds that the total compensation of the five highestpaid executives in a cross-section of new and old-economy firms is very similar to the pattern of payouts to players in a golf tournament. The author also reports that recent studies show a significant increase in the pay-for-performance correlation throughout the 1990s. But whether that correlation is as high as it should be, and whether current levels of CEO pay are socially "optimal," are questions that remain unanswered. [source]

Taking (and Sharing Power): How Boards of Directors Can Bring About Greater Fairness for Dependent Stakeholders

BUSINESS AND SOCIETY REVIEW, Issue 2 2010
HARRY J. VAN BUREN III
ABSTRACT One of the ways in which scholars have sought to broaden the discussion of the social responsibilities of corporations and their managers is through the development of the stakeholder concept. The primacy of shareholder interests in corporate-governance processes and managerial action is, however, a myth that justifies all sorts of managerial self-interest seeking and exploitation of particular stakeholder groups. What makes this myth particularly problematic,from the standpoint of fairness and corporate governance,is that not all nonshareholder stakeholders are equally situated with regard to their ability to secure fair treatment. In this article, I explore the ethical dimensions of board responsibilities to dependent stakeholder groups by first describing the differences between shareholders and nonshareholder stakeholders with regard to risk, examining why dependent stakeholders (stakeholders with legitimate and urgent claims, but no power) are particularly important from the standpoint of stakeholder risk, and discussing how stakeholder consultation might provide a partial fix to such problems. I will conclude with proposals for how boards can more faithfully discharge their ethical responsibilities to dependent stakeholder groups, and in so doing facilitate stakeholder involvement in corporate governance in ways that promote fairness in organization,stakeholder relationships. [source]

Exploring the Political Side of Board Involvement in Strategy: A Study of Mixed-Ownership Institutions*

JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES, Issue 8 2006
Davide Ravasi
abstract This article reports on a comparative study of strategic decision-making and board functioning in nine firms. Findings indicate that the heterogeneity of interests represented on the board, members' possession of relevant knowledge, and the presence of ex-ante conflict resolution mechanisms combine in shaping if and how board members engage in strategy-related activities and how strategic decisions are taken. Findings extend current understandings about the strategic functions of the board (monitoring, advice, and resource-dependence), suggesting how, under certain conditions, boards may act as negotiation forums where directors search for a reconciliation between diverging shareholders' interests and views. [source]

Presidential Address: Do Financial Institutions Matter?

THE JOURNAL OF FINANCE, Issue 4 2001
Franklin Allen
In standard asset pricing theory, investors are assumed to invest directly in financial markets. The role of financial institutions is ignored. The focus in corporate finance is on agency problems. How do you ensure that managers act in shareholders' interests? There is an inconsistency in assuming that when you give your money to a financial institution there is no agency problem, but when you give it to a firm there is. It is argued that both areas need to take proper account of the role of financial institutions and markets. Appropriate concepts for analyzing particular situations should be used. [source]