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Security Council (security + council)
Kinds of Security Council Selected AbstractsChinese Choices: A Poliheuristic Analysis of Foreign Policy Crises, 1950,1996FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS, Issue 1 2005Patrick James This paper uses the Poliheuristic Theory (PH), developed by Mintz, which incorporates both psychological and rational choice components in a synthesis of these previously isolated approaches, to explain decision making in Chinese foreign policy crises. China is an interesting initial case for this project for two reasons. One is its importance as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and rising superpower. The other is China's reputation as a nearly unique "black box",an especially challenging case,with regard to decision making in foreign policy crises. Taken from the authoritative compilation of the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Project, the nine cases (with available data) in which China is a crisis actor span the period from 1950 to 1996. A comparative analysis of Chinese decision making in times of crisis is used to test hypotheses derived from the PH. The hypotheses focus on how decisions are anticipated to occur over two stages. Principal expectations are that the non compensatory rule, which places priority on political considerations, will determine viable alternatives at the first stage, while choices more in line with expected value maximization or lexicographic ordering will characterize the second stage. [source] The Responsibility to Protect and the problem of military interventionINTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, Issue 4 2008ALEX J. BELLAMY The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has come a long way in a relatively short space of time. From inauspicious beginnings, the principle was endorsed by the General Assembly in 2005 and unanimously reaffirmed by the Security Council in 2006 (Resolution 1674). However, the principle remains hotly contested primarily because of its association with humanitarian intervention and the pervasive belief that its principal aim is to create a pathway for the legitimization of unilateral military intervention. This article sets forth the argument that a deepening consensus on R2P is dependent on its dissociation from the politics of humanitarian intervention and suggests that one way of doing this is by abandoning the search for criteria for decision-making about the use of force, one of the centre pieces of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001 report that coined the phrase R2P. Criteria were never likely to win international support, the article maintains, and were less likely to improve decision-making on how best to respond to major humanitarian crises. Nevertheless, R2P can make an important contribution to thinking about the problem of military intervention by mitigating potential ,moral hazards', overcoming the tendency of international actors to focus exclusively on military methods and giving impetus to efforts to operationalize protection in the field. [source] Erratum to: Roach, S. C. "Humanitarian Emergencies and the International Criminal Court (ICC): Toward a Cooperative Arrangement between the ICC and UN Security Council."INTERNATIONAL STUDIES PERSPECTIVES, Issue 1 2006International Studies Perspectives 6 (2005): 431-446. No abstract is available for this article. [source] Thinking Different about the UN Security CouncilINTERNATIONAL STUDIES REVIEW, Issue 4 2008John Mathiason No abstract is available for this article. [source] Critical Theory and its Practices: Habermas, Kosovo and International RelationsPOLITICS, Issue 3 2008Naomi Head Developing the ,applied turn' in critical theory and Habermasian discourse ethics, this article explores whether a communicative ethics approach enables us to examine the justifications for and legitimacy of actions taken by states during NATO's intervention in Kosovo. By focusing on the deliberations which took place in the UN Security Council over Kosovo from March 1998 to June 1999 and the negotiations at Rambouillet in 1999, it will be shown that there are patterns of exclusion, coercion and illegitimacy which not only challenge the claims to legitimacy of the intervention and of the interveners, but indicate the critical power of a communicative framework. [source] The Little State Department: McGeorge Bundy and the National Security Council Staff, 1961-65PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES QUARTERLY, Issue 4 2001ANDREW PRESTON This article examines the alteration of the role, prerogatives, and power of the special assistant to the president for national security affairs, a position more commonly known as the national security adviser. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower conceived of and shaped the National Security Council(NSC) and its staff to be administrative in their responsibilities and character. Under President Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy utterly changed this, concentrating power and decision-making authority in the hands of the special assistant and his NSC staff at the White House. From 1961, the special assistant and NSC staff ceased to be administrators and became policy formulators actively engaged in the policy-making process. This transformation occurred largely at the expense of the State Department and had profound consequences for American foreign policy, particularly toward the conflict in Vietnam. [source] "Memorandum for Mr. Bundy": Henry Kissinger as Consultant to the Kennedy National Security CouncilTHE HISTORIAN, Issue 2 2009Shannon E. Mohan First page of article [source] Security, Not Defence, Strategic, Not Habit: Restructuring the Political Arrangements for Policy Making on Britain's Role in the WorldTHE POLITICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 3 2010JOHN GEARSON The Conservative,Liberal Democrat coalition government has committed itself to a Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDR) in 2010. The government and the country face very hard choices to bring United Kingdom defence and security policy back from the brink of bankruptcy,both financial and strategic (Gow). To succeed, it must overcome the failings of the past (Chisnall, Dorman, Rees) and take a truly open and radical look at all aspects of policy and process,including the Trident independent nuclear deterrent (Allen), relations with Europe (Witney) and the importance of cyber-issues in the future security context (Fisher). It must get strategic concepts right to provide flexibility with credibility (Stone). It must deliver ,what the military wants': true strategic prioritisation, radical defence acquisition reform, and credible balancing of resources and commitments (Kiszley). The scale of the challenge facing the United Kingdom in,and beyond,the 2010 SDR is why The Political Quarterly convened a workshop early in 2010 involving MPs, practitioners, retired military personnel, journalists, commentators, business people and academics, and publishes these associated papers. Most of all, to overcome the failings of the past, there must be a radical move beyond the welcome first steps of the Cameron,Clegg government to introduce a National Security Council and a National Security Advisor, to reconfigure relationships within government, across departments and with Parliament to have a government figure of accountability and responsibility,a Secretary of State for Security Policy, primus inter pares with other Secretaries of State,to make sense of the questions needing to be asked and answered (Gearson and Gow). [source] Revisiting the ,Responsibility to Protect'THE POLITICAL QUARTERLY, Issue 1 2009MICHAEL NEWMAN The Declaration on ,the responsibility to protect' (R2P), unanimously endorsed by the Security Council in April 2006, identified both national and international responsibilities in relation to genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity. This was highly significant in appearing to accept that the prevention of mass atrocities was a legitimate international concern. Subsequently, there has been some disappointment about the limited practical impact of R2P, and also anxiety that its progress may be impeded by the fear that it is designed to legitimise military intervention. However, this article concentrates on a different concern. Arguing that an earlier version of R2P (in the International Commission on Intervention and Sovereignty of 2001) linked the issues with those of human security and development, it suggests that the contemporary focus is far narrower, undermining its critical potential with regard to the policies of the global North and reducing its appeal to developing countries. [source] The Durability of Managed Rivalry: Iran's Relations with Russia and the Saudi DimensionASIAN POLITICS AND POLICY, Issue 1 2009Mahjoob Zweiri Russia's Middle East policy faces a dilemma. On the one hand, Moscow maintains close, although frequently terse, ties with Iran, playing an important role in Iran's nuclear program and even using its position in the United Nations to shield Iran from harsh sanctions. In return, Moscow profits from the sales of arms and nuclear expertise, participates in Iran's energy sector, and may establish valuable cooperation on gas exports, both being obvious suppliers to the lucrative Western European market. On the other hand, Russia is also seeking to strengthen ties with Iran's neighbors, such as Saudi Arabia and Israel, many of whom see Tehran as the major threat to any nonproliferation regime in the region and recognize that Russian cooperation has increased the likelihood that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons. The impact on Russia's relationship with Saudi Arabia may be especially important to planners in Moscow. Saudi Arabia appears to be an increasingly willing client for Russian arms (and possibly also nuclear expertise), and Russia may value close relations with the next biggest oil exporter in the world. In the present study, we examine Russia's recent relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia and assess Russia's strategic position regarding the two countries. At the current time, Russia, as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and the primary source of technical cooperation with Tehran on the nuclear issue, is at the center of developments in the Middle East. How Moscow assesses its position in the Middle East, and whether it ultimately wishes to prioritize Riyadh or Tehran, could be central to the future stability of the region. [source] | ||||||||||||||||||||||