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Secured Creditors (secured + creditor)

Distribution by Scientific Domains
Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting100%

Selected Abstracts

A case of constitutional apples and oranges: a functional comparison of pension priority and benefit guarantees in U.S., U.K. and Canadian insolvency and pension law regimes

INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY REVIEW, Issue 2 2009
Ronald B. Davis
Canada's insolvency law reform increased the priority granted to employer-sponsored pension claims. The article compares the treatment of such claims in the U.S., the U.K. and Canada. A comparison of the legislative provisions concerning pension funding shortfalls from contribution arrears or economic underperformance in relation to the assumptions used for investment income or liability valuations finds that insolvency law has been used to address contribution arrears, but risks from economic underperformance have been addressed by pension benefit insurance. Post-insolvency priority for contribution arrears provides appropriate incentives to discourage pre-insolvency preferences for payments to other creditors, while shortfalls from economic underperformance do not involve issues of preference between creditors. The absence of any insolvency rationale for changing priority for shortfalls from economic underperformance and the likely disparity between the assets available to satisfy clams and the much larger amounts of such shortfalls makes the use of insolvency law to address this risk much less effective than insurance. Canada, however, has not adopted the insurance policy instrument used in the U.S. and U.K. to mitigate the impact of pension funding shortfalls. The constitutional inability of Canada to legislate in respect of matters of pension regulation that would allow it to control the well-known insurance problems of moral hazard and adverse selection may explain why it has only chosen to adopt an insolvency policy instrument. However, a change in priorities in insolvency may generate incentives for secured creditors that either undermine or reinforce this policy choice. Secured creditors could attempt to circumvent the new priority scheme through private arrangements with the debtor or to increase their monitoring activities to ensure the debtor is current in its pension contributions. Secured creditors choices will be influenced by the bankruptcy courts' interpretation of the preference provisions in the insolvency legislation. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Secured Creditor Recovery Rates from Management Buy-outs in Distress

EUROPEAN FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Issue 2 2003
David Citron
G33; G32 Buy-out literature suggests that secured creditors will recoup substantial proportions of the funds they extend to finance the initial buy-out. This paper uses a unique dataset of 42 failed MBOs to examine the extent of credit recovery by secured lenders under UK insolvency procedures and the factors that influence the extent of this recovery. On average, secured creditors recover 62 per cent of the amount owed. The percentage of secured credit recovered is increased where the distressed buy-out is sold as a going concern and where the principal reason for failure concerns managerial factors. The presence of a going concern qualification in the audit report and the size of the buy-out reduce the recovery rate by secured creditors. [source]

A case of constitutional apples and oranges: a functional comparison of pension priority and benefit guarantees in U.S., U.K. and Canadian insolvency and pension law regimes

INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY REVIEW, Issue 2 2009
Ronald B. Davis
Canada's insolvency law reform increased the priority granted to employer-sponsored pension claims. The article compares the treatment of such claims in the U.S., the U.K. and Canada. A comparison of the legislative provisions concerning pension funding shortfalls from contribution arrears or economic underperformance in relation to the assumptions used for investment income or liability valuations finds that insolvency law has been used to address contribution arrears, but risks from economic underperformance have been addressed by pension benefit insurance. Post-insolvency priority for contribution arrears provides appropriate incentives to discourage pre-insolvency preferences for payments to other creditors, while shortfalls from economic underperformance do not involve issues of preference between creditors. The absence of any insolvency rationale for changing priority for shortfalls from economic underperformance and the likely disparity between the assets available to satisfy clams and the much larger amounts of such shortfalls makes the use of insolvency law to address this risk much less effective than insurance. Canada, however, has not adopted the insurance policy instrument used in the U.S. and U.K. to mitigate the impact of pension funding shortfalls. The constitutional inability of Canada to legislate in respect of matters of pension regulation that would allow it to control the well-known insurance problems of moral hazard and adverse selection may explain why it has only chosen to adopt an insolvency policy instrument. However, a change in priorities in insolvency may generate incentives for secured creditors that either undermine or reinforce this policy choice. Secured creditors could attempt to circumvent the new priority scheme through private arrangements with the debtor or to increase their monitoring activities to ensure the debtor is current in its pension contributions. Secured creditors choices will be influenced by the bankruptcy courts' interpretation of the preference provisions in the insolvency legislation. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

Treatment of secured creditors of an insolvent estate: changing perspectives in South African Law

INTERNATIONAL INSOLVENCY REVIEW, Issue 1 2002
Lee Steyn
First page of article [source]