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Royalty Rate (royalty + rate)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	50%

Selected Abstracts

An analysis of UK franchise contracting 1989,1999

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2003
Jonathan S. Seaton
This paper examines UK franchise contracts over the period 1989,1999. Franchising is modelled as comprising three main variables, contract length, royalty rate and initial franchise fee. Up to now most authors have concentrated on the latter two variables, but with the data in this paper it is possible to assess the characteristics that impact on all three. Further, our analysis looks at what affects the probability of contract change. We take account of the limited dependent variable nature of the data and exploit sectoral heterogeneity. Our main findings are that the focus of attention on ,aggregate' variables is inappropriate and that contract length appears to be an important aspect of the franchise contract which is theoretically obvious, but until now has not been empirically tested. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

LICENSING CONTRACT IN A STACKELBERG MODEL,

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 5 2005
LUIGI FILIPPINI
We study optimal linear licensing and its social welfare implications when the innovator (patentee) is an insider that can make capacity/output commitment so as to act as a Stackelberg leader in the output market. We show that (i) the patentee's profit-maximizing licensing contract is a royalty; (ii) the optimal royalty rate is greater than the cost reduction attained by the licensed technology and is increasing in the number of competitors; (iii) optimal licensing maximizes the likelihood of technology transfer, may reduce social welfare and always makes consumers worse off; and (iv) the innovator benefits from capacity commitment, and the more competitive the output market, the greater the gains it makes by licensing. The opposite holds for consumers. [source]

ROYALTY INCENTIVES AND GULF OF MEXICO OIL PRODUCTION

NATURAL RESOURCE MODELING, Issue 3 2007
MITCH KUNCE
ABSTRACT. This paper employs field-specific estimates of Pindyck's (1978) widely cited model of natural resource supply to simulate effects of changes in federal royalty rates on the timing of exploration and output by firms in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico oil industry. Results suggest that deepwater Gulf oil production is highly inelastic with respect to changes in royalty rates. Royalty rate decreases are shown to increase early period exploration effort, result in little change in reserve additions and future production. Policy implications of this study suggest that public officials should be wary of arguments that large increases in deepwater Gulf oil field activity can be obtained from reductions in federal royalty rates-particularly reductions in the early years of oil field development. [source]