			Home About us Contact

Authoritarian Rule (authoritarian + rule)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Humanities and Social Sciences	83%

Selected Abstracts

The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of Authoritarian Rule

AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2010
Beatriz Magaloni
How can autocrats be restrained from rigging elections when they hold a huge military advantage over their opponents? This article suggests that even when opposition parties have no military capacity to win a revolt, opposition unity and a consequent threat of massive civil disobedience can compel autocrats to hold clean elections and leave office by triggering splits within the state apparatus and the defection of the armed forces. Opposition unity can be elite-driven, when parties unite prior to elections to endorse a common presidential candidate, or voter-driven, when elites stand divided at the polls and voters spontaneously rebel against fraud. Moreover, the article identifies some conditions under which autocrats will tie their hands willingly not to commit fraud by delegating power to an independent electoral commission. The article develops these ideas through a formal game and the discussion of various case studies. [source]

Political Opposition in Civil Society: An Analysis of the Interactions of Secular and Religious Associations in Algeria and Jordan1

GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION, Issue 4 2008
Francesco Cavatorta
The lack of effective political parties is one of the dominant characteristics of modern Arab polities. The role of opposition to the authoritarian regimes is therefore left to a number of civil society organizations. This study examines the interactions among such groups in the context of the traditional transition paradigm and it analyses specifically how religious and secular organizations operate and interact. The empirical evidence shows that such groups, far from attempting any serious coalition-building to make common demands for democracy on the regime, have a competitive relationship because of their ideological differences and conflicting policy preferences. This strengthens authoritarian rule even in the absence of popular legitimacy. The article focuses its attention on Algeria and Jordan. [source]

Revisiting the welfare state system in the Republic of Korea

INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SECURITY REVIEW, Issue 2 2008
Yong Soo Park
Abstract The Republic of Korea's welfare system has undergone radical institutional expansion since the 1990s, largely as a consequence of the financial crisis of 1997. In spite of these changes, public social expenditure remains extremely low , particularly with regard to all other OECD countries , with the result that the overall social insurance system and social welfare service sector remain underdeveloped. Thus, the current welfare system can best be characterized as a residual model, in that state intervention as a provider of welfare remains highly limited and the family and the private market economy play the central roles in offering a social safety net. This situation is largely the legacy of the so-called ,growth-first' ideology, which has remained the dominant approach favoured by the majority of the country's political and economic decision-makers since the period of authoritarian rule (1961-1993). The adoption of Western European-style neo-liberal restructuring, implemented following the 1997 financial crisis, has also played a role. [source]

Horizontal Accountability in Transitional Democracies: The Human Rights Ombudsman in El Salvador and Guatemala

LATIN AMERICAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY, Issue 4 2004
Michael Dodson
ABSTRACT Postwar El Salvador and Guatemala have undertaken to reform and democratize the state and to support the rule of law. Each country entered the 1990s hobbled by a legacy of authoritarian rule, while a corrupt and politicized judiciary offered virtually no check on the abuse of power. Because the judiciary has performed poorly as an institution of horizontal accountability, this article examines the performance of a new "accountability agency," the Human Rights Ombudsman. The article discusses the context in which the office was established and developed in each country, perceptions of its performance, and political responses as the office began to perform its function of holding public officials accountable in their exercise of power. Unfortunately, this new office may fall prey to the same weaknesses that have plagued older institutions in both countries. [source]

Calling the Judiciary to Account for the Past: Transitional Justice and Judicial Accountability in Nigeria

LAW & POLICY, Issue 2 2008
HAKEEM O. YUSUF
Institutional and individual accountability is an important feature of societies in transition from conflict or authoritarian rule. The imperative of accountability has both normative and transformational underpinnings in the context of restoration of the rule of law and democracy. This article argues a case for extending the purview of truth-telling processes to the judiciary in postauthoritarian contexts. The driving force behind the inquiry is the proposition that the judiciary as the third arm of government at all times participates in governance. To contextualize the argument, I focus on judicial governance and accountability within the paradigm of Nigeria's transition to democracy after decades of authoritarian military rule. [source]

Police Reform and the Peace Process in Guatemala: the Fifth Promotion of the National Civilian Police

BULLETIN OF LATIN AMERICAN RESEARCH, Issue 4 2001
Marie-Louise Glebbeek
After 36 years of mostly authoritarian rule and often bitter civil conflict in Guatemala, the December 1996 Peace Accords prepared the ground for a new phase of reconstruction, democratisation and social and institutional reform. Prior to the Peace Accords, policing in Guatemala had been often violent, repressive and subordinated to the counterinsurgency logic of the military. Security sector reform intentions included the abolition of existing police forces and the creation of a new National Civil Police (PNC). The PNC was meant to give substance to a new way of policing in tune with the building of democratic governance and effective law enforcement. This paper examines the general background of the reforms, discusses the limitations of the results so far, and takes a particular and critical look at one of the key components of the police reform: the recruitment and training of PNC aspirants, using the case of the 1999 Fifth Promotion that entered the Academy of the PNC. [source]