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Revenue Performance (revenue + performance)

Distribution by Scientific Domains

Business, Economics, Finance and Accounting	50%

Selected Abstracts

A Framework for Estimating Benefits of Using Auctions in Revenue Management,

DECISION SCIENCES, Issue 3 2002
Tim Baker
ABSTRACT We develop a stochastic model to explore the benefits of incorporating auctions in revenue management. To the best of our knowledge the extant literature on modeling in revenue management has not considered auctions. We consider three models, namely, a traditional fixed price (non-auction) model, a pure auction model, and a hybrid auction model and evaluate their revenue performance under a variety of conditions. The hybrid approach outperforms the other two in all 24 scenarios and yields an average revenue increase of 16.1% over the next best. A surprise finding is that there is no significant difference between the performance of the fixed price and pure auction approaches. A sensitivity analysis reveals that the relative superiority of the hybrid revenue management strategy is reasonably robust. [source]

Risk management for targeting customs controls in developing countries: a risky venture for revenue performance?

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION & DEVELOPMENT, Issue 2 2005
Anne-Marie Geourjon
Abstract Customs authorities in developing countries are often reluctant to forget systematic inspections for fear of risking revenue loss. Such physical inspections however, impede rather than facilitate trade. Control selectivity is therefore a key issue in customs administration reform. This paper shows how a sophisticated risk management method can facilitate trade by automatically and rationally selecting transactions, with the end result of actually enhancing revenue performance. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]

The Limits of Discipline: Ownership and Hard Budget Constraints in the Transition Economies

THE ECONOMICS OF TRANSITION, Issue 3 2000
Roman Frydman
The existing literature on soft budget constraints suggests that firms may be subsidized for political reasons or because of the creditors' desire to recover a part of the sunk cost invested in an earlier period. In all these models hard budget constraints are viewed as being, in principle, capable of inducing the necessary restructuring behaviour on the level of the firm. This paper argues that the imposition of financial discipline is not sufficient to remedy ownership and governance-related deficiencies of corporate performance. Using evidence from the post-communist transition economies, the paper shows that a policy of hard budget constraints cannot induce successful revenue restructuring, which requires entrepreneurial incentives inherent in certain ownership types (most notably, outside investors). The paper also shows that the policy of hard budget constraints falters when state firms, because of inferior revenue performance and less willingness to meet payment obligations, continue to pose a higher credit risk than privatized firms. The brunt of state firms' lower creditworthiness falls on state creditors. But the ,softness' of these creditors, while harmful in many ways, is not necessarily irrational, if it prevents the demise of firms that are in principle capable of successful restructuring through ownership changes. [source]