Reservation Prices (reservation + price)

Distribution by Scientific Domains


Selected Abstracts


Price Dispersion and Consumer Reservation Prices

JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & MANAGEMENT STRATEGY, Issue 1 2005
Simon P. Anderson
We describe firm pricing when consumers follow simple reservation price rules. In stark contrast to other models in the literature, this approach yields price dispersion in pure strategies even when firms have the same marginal costs. At the equilibrium, lower price firms earn higher profits. The range of price dispersion increases with the number of firms: the highest price is the monopoly price, while the lowest price tends to marginal cost. The average transaction price remains substantially above marginal cost even with many firms. The equilibrium pricing pattern is the same when prices are chosen sequentially. [source]


Pricing Double-Trigger Reinsurance Contracts: Financial Versus Actuarial Approach

JOURNAL OF RISK AND INSURANCE, Issue 4 2002
Helmut Gründl
This article discusses various approaches to pricing double-trigger reinsurance contracts,a new type of contract that has emerged in the area of ,,alternative risk transfer.'' The potential coverage from this type of contract depends on both underwriting and financial risk. We determine the reinsurer's reservation price if it wants to retain the firm's same safety level after signing the contract, in which case the contract typically must be backed by large amounts of equity capital (if equity capital is the risk management measure to be taken). We contrast the financial insurance pricing models with an actuarial pricing model that has as its objective no lessening of the reinsurance company's expected profits and no worsening of its safety level. We show that actuarial pricing can lead the reinsurer into a trap that results in the failure to close reinsurance contracts that would have a positive net present value because typical actuarial pricing dictates the type of risk management measure that must be taken, namely, the insertion of additional capital. Additionally, this type of pricing structure forces the reinsurance buyer to provide this safety capital as a debtholder. Finally, we discuss conditions leading to a market for double-trigger reinsurance contracts. [source]


Market risk and process uncertainty in production operations

NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL, Issue 7 2006
Bardia Kamrad
Abstract By adopting a real options framework we develop a production control model that jointly incorporates process and market uncertainties. In this model, process uncertainty is defined by random fluctuations in the outputs' yield and market risk through demand uncertainty for the output. In our approach, production outputs represent commodities or items for which financial contracts do not trade. Outputs are also functionally linked to the level of input inventories. To extend the model's applicability to a wide range of production industries, inputs are modeled to reflect either renewable or partially renewable or non-renewable resources. Given this setting, techniques of stochastic control theory are employed to obtain value maximizing production policies in a constrained capacity environment. The rate of production is modeled as an adapted positive real-valued process and analogously evaluated as a sequence of complex real options. Since optimal adjustments to the rate of production also functionally depend on the outputs' yield, we optimally establish "trigger boundaries" justifying controlled variations to the rate of production over time. In this context, we provide closed form analytic results and demonstrate their robustness with respect to the stochastic (including mean reverting) processes considered. Using these results, we also demonstrate that the value (net of holding costs) accrued to the producer from having an inventory of the output is equivalent to the producer's reservation price to operationally curb its process yield. These generalizations extend the scope of model applicability and provide a basis for applying the real options methodology in the operations arena. The model is explored numerically using a stylized example that allows for both output and demand uncertainty and achieves greater realism by incorporating an element of smoothing into the sequence of production decisions. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006 [source]


HOMEOWNERSHIP IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD WITH SUBSTANTIAL TRANSACTION COSTS,

JOURNAL OF REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 5 2007
Margaret H. Smith
ABSTRACT This paper presents a dynamic model of residential real estate tenure decisions that takes into account the substantial transaction costs and the uncertain time paths of rents and prices. By temporarily postponing decisions, buyers and sellers obtain additional information and may avoid transactions that are costly to reverse. One implication is that the combination of high transaction costs and substantial uncertainty can create a large wedge between a household's reservation prices for buying and selling a home, which can explain why households do not switch back and forth between owning and renting as home prices fluctuate. [source]


Price-matching policy with imperfect information

MANAGERIAL AND DECISION ECONOMICS, Issue 6 2005
Article first published online: 25 AUG 200, Wen Mao
The model of price-matching policy emphasizes on the importance of information imperfection. The demand is derived based on the assumptions that consumers have different reservation prices and different preferences over location. When a firm undercuts its competitor's price, it changes the demand structure of the market. The result shows that price-matching policies are anticompetitive, but they do not facilitate monopoly price. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [source]


Optimal search on spatial paths with recall, Part II: Computational procedures and examples

PAPERS IN REGIONAL SCIENCE, Issue 3 2000
Mitchell Harwitz
Search; spatial search; spatial economics Abstract. This is the second part of a two-part analysis of optimal spatial search begun in Harwitz et al. (1998). In the present article, two explicit computational procedures are developed for the optimal spatial search problem studied in Part I. The first uses reservation prices with continuous known distributions of prices and is illustrated for three stores. The second does not use reservation prices but assumes known discrete distributions. It is a numerical approximation to the first and also a tool for examining examples with larger numbers of stores. [source]


Commercial Real Estate Valuation, Development and Occupancy Under Leasing Uncertainty

REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, Issue 1 2007
Richard Buttimer
A model of commercial property valuation is developed where individual property owners are price takers and tenants randomly arrive and depart. Spot lease and tenant reservation prices are stochastic and correlated and can divert from but eventually revert back to market equilibrium. Within this framework we examine built property values and vacancy rates for varying parameter sets representing differing markets and economic conditions. We also examine how potential and existing vacancies, spot lease prices and tenant reservation prices feed back into development decisions. We demonstrate how preleasing acts as a hedge to the developer against the risk of leasing uncertainty. [source]


An Experimental Analysis of the Impact of Intermediaries on the Outcome of Bargaining Games

REAL ESTATE ECONOMICS, Issue 2 2001
Abdullah Yavas
We conduct an experimental analysis of the bargaining between a buyer and a seller of the exchange of a single good by means of an intermediary or broker. We examine how an intermediary affects the price, the likelihood of a successful negotiation, and the time it takes to complete a negotiation. We first examine the impact of the intermediary as a pure middleman, and then as an information source about the distribution of seller and buyer reservation prices. The results show that an intermediary, whether or not informed, increases the sale price, reduces the likelihood of an agreement, and increases the time to reach an agreement (though the number of bargaining rounds declines). The results suggest that the benefits of brokerage may be predominantly in the matching of buyers and sellers rather than in facilitating bargaining. [source]


PROFIT MAXIMIZATION AND SOCIAL OPTIMUM WITH NETWORK EXTERNALITY,

THE MANCHESTER SCHOOL, Issue 2 2006
URIEL SPIEGEL
The paper analyzes the options open to monopoly firms that sell Internet services. We consider two groups of customers that are different in their reservation prices. The monopoly uses price discrimination between customers by producing two versions of the product at positive price for high-quality product and a free version at zero price for lower-quality product. The monopoly can sell advertising space to increase its revenue but risks losing customers who are annoyed by advertising. Network externalities increase the incentive to increase output; thus we find cases where the profit maximization is consistent with maximum social welfare. [source]